Jewellery store robbery: a victim risk and intervention perspective by Zannoni, Elio
 i
 
JEWELLERY STORE ROBBERY: A VICTIM RISK AND INTERVENTION 
PERSPECTIVE  
 
 
 
By 
 
 
 
ELIO ZANNONI 
 
 
 
submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for  
the degree of  
 
 
 
MASTER OF ARTS 
 
 
 
in the subject  
 
 
 
CRIMINOLOGY 
 
 
 
at the  
 
 
 
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH AFRICA 
 
 
 
SUPERVISOR: PROF. S. JOUBERT 
 
 
 
APRIL 2008 
 
 
 
 
 ii
 
Student number:  479-545-8 
 
 
I declare that 
 
JEWELLERY STORE ROBBERY: A VICTIM RISK AND INTERVENTION 
PERSPECTIVE 
 
is my own work and that all the sources that I have used or quoted have been 
indicated and acknowledged by means of complete references. 
 
 
 
……………………………     ………………. 
SIGNATURE       DATE 
(MR. E ZANNONI) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 iii
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In memory of: 
 
* my father, Claudio Zannoni 
 
 
In appreciation of: 
 
* my loving mother, Bruna Gaio Zannoni 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 iv
 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
 
 
 
 
I would like to express my sincere appreciation for the highly competent assistance, 
constant support and encouragement, throughout the study, of my supervisor, Prof. S. 
Joubert.  
 
The guidance received from Mr. N. Hall (Department of Computer Services) and 
Prof. F.E. Steffens (Department of Statistics) with regard to the development of the 
questionnaire, as well as Mr. H. J. Gerber’s help with the statistical testing and advice 
on the line of interpretation must also be acknowledged. 
 
A special word of thanks is due to the Jewellery Council of South Africa for 
endorsing the study and to Gem & Jewel Acceptances for sponsoring the printing and 
distribution of the questionnaire. My appreciation goes also to Kristen-Lee and Leonie 
who assisted patiently with tables and figures, and to Esmé for the assistance she 
provided during the study. Credit must also be given to SA Jewellery News, all 
jewellers and members of staff who responded to the questionnaire and interviews, 
and to the experts who have made contributions through their knowledge in the study 
subject.  
 
I would like to express my heartfelt gratitude to my mother Bruna, Trudy, Franca, 
Silvia, Luigina, Emilia and all my dearest friends who have always stood by my side 
through good and bad times. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 v
ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
The exploratory study investigated jewellery store robbery from a victim risk and 
intervention perspective.  An explanation of the phenomenon was offered based on 
the information obtained from a review of the existing literature, case studies, 
personal observations at jewellery stores, discussions with jewellers, a scientific 
questionnaire submitted to jewellers, and semi-structured and structured interviews 
conducted with a group of knowledgeable respondents and victimised jewellers 
respectively. A predominantly quantitative research method was applied. 
 
The research findings obtained during the study enabled a proposal for a jewellery 
store robbery intervention model based on the situational crime prevention 
perspective, which is inclusive of decisional, environmental, situational, procedural, 
personnel and business-oriented strategies. 
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Jeweller, jewellery store, jewellery store robbery, commercial robbery, robbery 
victimisation, victim risk, victim vulnerability, victim precipitation, victim 
facilitation, crime opportunity, situational crime prevention, robbery intervention 
model. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
OVERVIEW AND METHODOLOGICAL LAYOUT OF THE STUDY 
 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Recent incidents of armed robberies committed at jewellery stores in busy shopping 
centres highlight the fact that jewellery stores are vulnerable to this type of crime. In a 
robbery at a mall in the northern Johannesburg suburb of Fourways, a gang of up to 
12 robbers armed with automatic firearms shot their way out of a gun battle with 
police and stole in excess of R 1 million in jewellery (Swart 2007:3). In another 
robbery, jewellery worth over R 1.5 million was stolen by a gang of up to 15 men 
who conducted a simultaneous attack against two jewellery stores situated in a 
shopping centre in the eastern Johannesburg suburb of Bedfordview. According to 
research participant McKinnon (2007), during the attack, robbers did not hesitate to 
discharge their firearms in order to intimidate staff, customers and security personnel. 
A robbery was also committed at a jewellery store inside a Kempton Park shopping 
centre where, after holding security personnel hostage, the gang escaped with 
approximately R 20 million worth of jewellery (R20m robbery reported finally 
2007:3). During a robbery in the Pretoria eastern suburb of Brooklyn, a gang of up to 
six robbers wearing construction hats and mouth covers, fired shots into the windows 
and used hammers to smash open the display counters. The robbers managed to steal 
in excess of R 1 million in valuable items (Flanagan 2006:4). In some instances, 
within a short period of time, jewellery stores were subjected to repeat victimisation 
by heavily armed gangs (Thompson 2006:10). More recently, a jewellery store 
situated at a new shopping centre in Centurion was robbed by three armed men who 
shot and critically wounded a security guard before escaping with an undisclosed 
amount of cash and jewellery (Guard shot during mall robbery 2007). 
 
The focus of robbers is not always directed towards cash but also includes valuable 
assets such as jewellery.  As stated at a conference held by Effective Consumer 
Response (Kalideen 2004:2), crime in South Africa is often moving from one industry 
to another. As targets get harder, e.g. banks, criminals shift their activities to soft 
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targets where cash or valuable merchandise is easily available, particularly in the 
retail sector. Jewellery stores can be regarded as suitable targets for victimisation due 
to the presence of high value merchandise and a lack of stringent security measures. 
Jewellers and members of staff not only run the risk of being violently victimised, but 
also of sustaining significant financial damage, which may seriously compromise 
their ability to conduct business.  
 
In order to understand the crime phenomenon of armed robbery at jewellery stores, 
the researcher identified the need to conduct a scientific investigation.  In this chapter, 
an overview and methodological layout of the study will be addressed. The researcher 
will state the rationale for his initiative and explain the aim of the study, the scientific 
approach and research goal, unit of analysis, data collection, data analysis and 
interpretation. The key concepts are defined and the problems encountered during the 
study elaborated on.  The chapter will end with a layout of the study to guide readers 
through the various stages of the research process. 
 
1.2 RATIONALE FOR THE RESEARCH  
 
When stating the rationale for the study undertaken, the researcher must explain how 
an interest develops in the proposed topic and, above all, why the research is worth 
doing (Vithal & Jansen 1997:30). Criminological research into crime specifically 
committed against jewellery stores in the Republic of South Africa is lacking. The 
researcher established that neither the Jewellery Council of South Africa, of which 
jewellers can become voluntary members, nor the South African Police Service 
(SAPS) maintain a database on crime directed at jewellery stores. Thus there is a 
distinctive lack of knowledge and insight into jewellery store robbery, as well as of a 
comprehensive strategy to intervene against such crime. This situation justifies the 
adoption of an exploratory approach to the topic of research. 
 
Most jewellers can be regarded as high-profile targets for robbers. According to the 
SAPS Robbery Intelligence Desk (2002), jewellery stores were third on the list of the 
most targeted businesses after supermarkets and clothing stores. Retail jewellers, who 
encourage the public to enter their premises, are at greatest risk due to the fact that 
robbers often pose as customers. Persons at risk during a robbery attack include not 
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only jewellers and members of staff, but also clients who happen to be present at the 
time of the robbery.  
 
Following on the reasons given above, and as a result of the researcher’s professional 
involvement in a consulting capacity with companies operating in the jewellery retail 
sector, it was decided to conduct a scientific study on a specific type of crime 
affecting jewellers, i.e. jewellery store robbery. This topic was selected, amongst 
others, because of the potentially devastating effects that a robbery event may have on 
both, the jeweller him/herself as an individual, as well as his/her occupation/business. 
Furthermore, the researcher is of the opinion that, robbery being a crime of violence 
where the lives of victims may be in danger deserves attention in terms of research 
and intervention measures.  Through a scientific study of jewellery store robbery, the 
researcher intended to achieve a better understanding of this phenomenon in order to 
explore and describe its nature and dynamics, and formulate an effective intervention 
strategy.  
 
In May and June 2002 the researcher conducted general discussions with jewellery 
store owners, representatives of the Jewellery Council of South Africa, jewellery 
retail groups, insurance companies, brokers and loss adjusters specialising in the 
jewellery industry, in order to become more familiar with the topic and, at the same 
time, to establish whether robbery was regarded as a worrisome problem affecting the 
jewellery retail sector. The majority stated that armed robbery was indeed a serious 
phenomenon that needed to be thoroughly addressed in order to bring about a 
reduction of this type of crime. 
 
During the said discussions, mention was also made of the fact that the jewellery 
industry had not stood united in the fight against crime. Offenders had not been 
effectively dealt with via a common effort between all the interested parties in 
conjunction with the SAPS. On the contrary, the Banking Council of South Africa, 
which may serve as an example, had initiated a number of crime reduction projects 
and started the South African Banking Risk Information Centre (SABRIC), a centre 
aimed at an understanding of the types of crime committed against banks, with the 
intention to develop and implement effective crime intervention strategies (SABRIC 
2004).  
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1.3 AIM OF THE STUDY AND ACTUATING QUESTIONS 
 
Research cannot proceed without a clear articulation of a goal. It demands a clear and 
unambiguous statement of the goal, in other words what the research intends to 
accomplish (Leedy 2005:5). The multiplicity of this study’s aims underlines the 
complex nature of the topic under investigation. The researcher drew a distinction 
between immediate aims and an ultimate aim. 
 
The immediate aim of this study is to scientifically explore the phenomenon of 
jewellery store robbery with a view to gain new knowledge and insight. The study 
aims at achieving the following main objectives: 
 
• Determining how serious the phenomenon of robbery victimisation is among the 
study’s participants. 
• Understanding the dynamics and outcomes of the robbery event and the modus 
operandi of the robbers from the victim’s point of view. 
• Identifying areas of risk and vulnerability affecting the owner and employees of a 
jewellery store. 
• Offering a theoretical explanation based on the data obtained from the literature 
on the crime, the offender and the victim.  
• Determining the type and effectiveness of the security measures implemented by 
the jewellers for the protection of their stores against robbery. 
• Identifying possible deficiencies in the above security measures. 
• Establishing the jewellers’ procedures with regard to the security screening and 
crime prevention training of their staff.  
• Develop some understanding regarding the level of fear of robbery victimisation 
among the respondents as well as how robbery may ultimately affect their work 
motivation. 
• Verify the respondents’ attitude towards the implementation of specific crime 
intervention strategies. 
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The study’s ultimate aim is the development of an effective robbery intervention 
strategy, which should take into account not only identified security deficiencies 
(procedural, physical and technological), but also the respondents’ views on the 
subject of crime prevention. In order to reach the set aims, the researcher formulated 
actuating questions that were raised on fundamental issues concerning jewellery 
store robbery. The following questions were used as guiding points throughout the 
research: 
 
• Is armed robbery a serious phenomenon affecting jewellers?  
• Do jewellery stores experience a high level of risk of robbery because of the 
nature of their activities and the type and value of the merchandise being stored? 
• Can a theoretical explanation be offered for armed robberies at jewellery stores? 
• Do factors such as, amongst others, geographical location, presence of escape 
routes, situation of the store, store visibility, lighting conditions and number of 
staff visible on the floor, affect the likelihood that a jewellery store be robbed?  
• Can anything be done to reduce a jewellery store’s vulnerability to robbery? 
• Do jewellers and their staff perceive their work as being risky?  
• Do jewellers and their staff have the right mentality of security in order to 
counteract the threat of robbery?  
• Are jewellery stores equipped with adequate security measures to minimise the 
risk of robbery? 
• What is the jeweller’s attitude in respect of crime prevention in general and 
robbery prevention in particular?  
• Are jewellers willing to make a difference and invest in new systems and 
procedures to minimise the risk of robbery and injury to themselves, their staff 
and customers? 
 
1.4 SCIENTIFIC PROCEDURE OF THE STUDY 
 
In an effort to understand any phenomenon, researchers can follow several methods of 
inquiry. Scientific research requires a specific plan of procedure, in other words, a 
carefully thought explicitly planned and logically designed plan of action (Leedy 
2005:6). This presumes that the researcher works from a specific scientific approach, 
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adopts a specific type of study, focuses his/her attention on a specific unit of analysis 
and makes use of given scientific methods and techniques to direct the investigation. 
 
1.4.1 Scientific approach 
 
Two approaches can be identified in social science research, i.e. quantitative and 
qualitative. A quantitative approach may be described as that approach to research 
that is more formalised, controlled and defined, through which phenomena can be 
observed and measured, and causatively related and expressed in mathematical 
formulae or statistical analysis (Neuman 2000:33; Rubin & Babbie 1997:372). In 
contradistinction, a qualitative approach is not strictly formalised and its scope is 
more likely to be undefined and more narrative in nature with emphasis on 
individuals’ perceptions, attitudes, beliefs, feelings and behaviour (Davis & Klopper 
2003:72-76; Neuman 2000:33; Mouton & Marais 1996:155-156).  
 
This project undertaken by the researcher is primarily quantitative in nature in that, on 
the one side, the areas being investigated by means of a questionnaire are all defined 
and statistically measurable and, on the other, relevant issues on the phenomenon of 
jewellery store robbery are discussed in a controlled manner during semi-structured 
and structured interviews. The focus of the interviews is on a person’s specialised 
knowledge and not on their feelings, experiences and subjective views as direct role 
players, such as offenders or victims. 
 
1.4.2 Unit of analysis and sampling techniques 
 
The unit of analysis identifies the object(s) under scientific investigation. The main 
categories of units of analysis are individuals, groups, organisations and social 
artefacts (Neuman 2000:132-133). Individuals are probably the most typical object of 
research in the social sciences. Even when groups or populations are studied, it is 
customary to study individuals and then to aggregate the data collected in this manner 
for the group concerned (Mouton & Marais 1996:38). In order to avoid running the 
risk of making assertions about one unit of analysis based on the examination of 
another, it is necessary to be clear as to what the unit of analysis represents (Babbie & 
Mouton 2001:88).  
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The unit of analysis used by the researcher involved a relatively small group of 
individuals knowledgeable on the topic under investigation. The researcher applied 
non-probability sampling (without randomisation) by focusing primarily on a 
selection of suitable respondents by means of purposive sampling. This type of 
sample is based entirely on the judgement of the researcher, in that a sample is 
composed of elements that contain the most characteristics, representative or typical 
attributes of the population (Strydom & Venter 2002:206-207).  
 
The selection process involved, on the one side, convenient sampling of jewellery 
store owners and members of staff willing to respond to a mailed questionnaire and, 
on the other, of persons with known and demonstrable experience and expertise in the 
area under investigation. These persons took part in semi-structured and structured 
interviews designed to obtain further insight into jewellery store robbery.  
 
1.4.3 Research goals  
 
It is possible to distinguish between three typical studies that are most useful in 
criminological science: exploratory, descriptive and explanatory depending on 
whether their principal goal is to explore, describe or explain a certain phenomenon 
(Mouton & Marais 1996:42). The study undertaken by the researcher is exploratory 
in that the main goal is to explore a relatively unknown phenomenon, i.e. jewellery 
store robbery. 
 
The distinguishing feature of exploratory studies is that relatively little is known about 
the subject of study (Champion 2000:138). By scientifically exploring the topic of 
jewellery store robbery, it is possible for the researcher to primarily acquaint himself 
with certain characteristics of the subject under investigation. While the chief 
shortcomings of exploratory studies are that they seldom provide definitive answers to 
research questions and the direction of inquiry changes frequently, they are most 
typically done for three purposes: i) to satisfy the researcher’s curiosity and desire for 
better understanding, ii) to test the feasibility of undertaking a more extensive study, 
and iii) to develop the methods to be employed in any subsequent study (Babbie 
2001:92-93; Neuman 2000:21).  
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1.4.4 Delimitation of the study 
 
According to Leedy (2005:58), in every research endeavour the researcher should 
eliminate any possibility of misunderstandings by providing clear delimitations in 
respect of the topic being investigated, the place where the research is conducted and 
the timeframe allocated to the research. With reference to this study, the following 
delimitations are relevant: 
 
• Topic delimitation - The researcher decided to limit the investigation to the crime 
of robbery committed inside jewellery stores, from a victim’s perspective. 
• Geographic delimitation - While the questionnaire targeted jewellers who 
subscribed to the Jewellery Council’s magazine, semi-structured and structured 
interviews were conducted in Johannesburg as this location was not only 
convenient to the researcher who lives and works in the city, but also the place 
where a number of jewellery store robberies in shopping centres had occurred. 
• Time delimitation - Data collection by means of questionnaires took place over 
the time period from July to August 2002. Semi-structured interviews with 
experts were conducted between October and November 2005. Structured 
interviews with victims of jewellery store robbery took place between July and 
September 2007. Respondents were encouraged to talk about their most recent 
experience of jewellery store robbery. 
 
1.4.5 Data collection techniques 
 
Designing the research instrument(s) is an essential step in the research process in 
order to collect the data needed for the successful outcome of the project (Vithal & 
Jansen 2002:26). The researcher consulted literature on robbery, examined case 
studies and collected data by means of a three-phase approach involving the initial 
distribution of a questionnaire among members of the Jewellery Council of South 
Africa, followed by semi-structured interviews with a group of knowledgeable people 
in the jewellery industry and additional structured interviews, based on the 
questionnaire model, with a group of victimised jewellers.  
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1.4.5.1 Literature and case studies 
 
Literature and case studies are aimed at contributing towards a clearer understanding 
of the nature and meaning of the problem that has been identified (Neuman 2000:32-
33).  The selection of sources used for this study includes text books, published and 
unpublished reports, internal investigation reports as well as journals and newspapers. 
In this context, the specialised literature on jewellery retail crime obtained from 
Jewelry Security Alliance, Jewelry Vigilance Canada proved to be a valuable 
instrument to gain some knowledge on jewellery store robbery, the modus operandi of 
the offenders and the applicable intervention strategies.  
 
The study benefited from this literature review as it provided the researcher with an 
understanding of the issues and debates in the area of study, current theoretical 
thinking and definitions, as well as previous studies and their results. Available 
statistics in the form of previously collected information (by the SAPS and the above-
mentioned sources) was analysed to obtain an indication of the extent of the 
phenomenon. Recent incidents of armed robbery at jewellery stores, based on 
confidential investigative reports (2005/2006), were analysed and case studies were 
compiled (see section 2.3.5).  The specialised knowledge obtained from the available 
literature was also used to compile the questionnaire and the semi-structured 
interview schedule.  
 
1.4.5.2 Questionnaire and structured interview 
 
The questionnaire was developed with due consideration to specific guidelines 
explained in the existing literature (Neuman 2000:251-255), such as careful planning, 
unmistakable clarity, relevance, objectivity, consistency, impartiality, confidentiality 
and probability of favourable reception and return. Examples of different 
questionnaires used in other criminological research projects were studied, e.g. the 
International Crime Victims Survey (Van Kesteren, Mayhew & Nieuwbeerta 
2000:152-156) and the Retail Violence Survey (2000) in the United Kingdom.  
Furthermore, to better understand the dynamics associated to jewellery stores and to 
be as accurate as possible in the formulation of the questions, the researcher, with the 
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owners’ permission, conducted physical observations of jewellery stores situated in 
shopping centres and along urban / suburban streets. Various aspects such as the 
position of the store, the store layout, number of staff present, flow of customers, 
trade activities and security measures were observed in relation to the surrounding 
environment, e.g. type of businesses in the immediate vicinity, type of roads, traffic 
conditions, parking facilities and availability of escape routes.  
 
The questionnaire contained 51 closed-ended (fixed response) questions and it was 
divided into seven sections as follows (see appendix A): 
 
- Section A - General information (on the respondent’s biographical data, position 
at work and geographical location)  
- Section B - Robbery event (covering a five year period from 1997 to 2001)  
- Section C - Location of premises 
- Section D - Mechanical, physical and electronic security measures 
- Section E - Personnel 
- Section F - Fear of crime  
- Section G - Crime prevention initiative   
 
Each of the above sections contained a number of questions relevant to the topic being 
investigated. Some questions implied that only one response category had to be 
selected, whereas others contained multiple response categories.  
 
The above instrument was also adopted for the structured interviews with victimised 
jewellers during the third and last phase of the research. Structured interviews are 
based on a strict procedure and utilise an interview schedule, which is no different 
from a questionnaire (Champion 2000:259).  
 
1.4.5.3 Semi-structured interview 
 
One of the best ways to identify one’s knowledge about a topic is to talk to informed 
people who have access to exclusive and unique information (Sarantakos 1998:255). 
By using a semi-structured interview, while focus on a specific topic is maintained, 
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interesting points can be discussed further, thus allowing the researcher to obtain 
detailed information from the respondent (Stewart & Davis 2003:51).  
 
As this study is of an exploratory nature, insiders of the jewellery retail store trade can 
provide valuable information to underline and elaborate on data collected from the 
questionnaires. Toward this end, the researcher developed a semi-structured interview 
schedule containing a set of predetermined and appropriately sequenced questions 
divided into different themes. Even though most of the questions are similar to those 
contained in the questionnaire, they are not close- ended and allow for discussion on 
the topic being investigated. 
 
The semi-structured interview schedule was divided into eight themes as follows (see 
“Appendix B”): 
 
- Theme A – Interviewee’s professional experience 
- Theme B – Perception on jewellery store robbery 
- Theme C – The jewellery store robber 
- Theme D – Particulars of jewellery store robbery 
- Theme E – The victim of jewellery store robbery 
- Theme F – The aftermath of jewellery store robbery 
- Theme G – Security risk reduction 
- Theme E – Jewellery store robbery prevention initiatives 
 
Each theme contained a number of open-ended (free response) questions, which are 
especially valuable in exploratory stages of research (Neuman 2000:261).  
 
The interview was aimed at collecting further information pertaining to this crime 
phenomenon from different sources within the jewellery retail industry, in particular 
insurance specialists, loss adjusters and police sources. Most of the questionnaire’s 
basic principles such as the need to remain neutral, unbiased, and unambiguous when 
formulating questions, also apply to the interview schedule (De Vos, Fouché & 
Venter 2002:303). 
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1.4.6 Data collection procedure and response to the questionnaire and interviews 
 
Without data, scientific reasoning and method are bound to collapse (Vithal & Jansen 
2002:26). At times, more than one research instrument is needed to collect 
information. With regard to this research, the process of data collection comprised 
three different phases as follows. 
 
1.4.6.1 Phase one – Questionnaire addressed to Jewellery Council’s members 
 
Phase one involved the distribution of the questionnaire described in section 1.4.5.2 
above as an insert in the Jewellery Council’s monthly magazine “SA Jewellery 
News”. During this phase the investigation was therefore confined to members of the 
Jewellery Council of South Africa who received the magazine. According to the 
Jewellery Council, at the time of the distribution, “SA Jewellery News” reached 
approximately 200 jewellery retail store owners / companies, bearing in mind that the 
magazine was also addressed to jewellery manufacturers and wholesalers who were 
not the target of this investigation.  
 
Therefore, the Jewellery Council’s database was regarded as the main population to 
target jewellery store owners. The criteria adopted was that, due to the method of 
distribution of the questionnaire (via SA Jewellery News) and the target of the 
research instrument (members of the Jewellery Council receiving the magazine), it 
was probable that jewellery store owners subscribing to SA Jewellery News would 
have been included. However, it is important to stress the fact that the researcher did 
not have any control as to who would receive the questionnaire. 
 
The July 2002 issue of SA Jewellery News was chosen in view of the concomitant 
Jewellex International 2002 trade show. A self-addressed and stamped envelope was 
included with the questionnaire in order to facilitate the highest possible response 
rate. Prior to the questionnaire being distributed, the researcher succeeded in 
addressing the population by means of an insertion in the above-mentioned magazine 
in which the importance of the project for the jewellery retail industry was stressed. A 
reminder was also inserted in the August 2002 issue of SA Jewellery News, with a 
view to encourage the respondents to take part in the project by returning the 
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completed questionnaire. In addition, in order to encourage their participation, 
mention was made that the results of the study would be made available in a future 
SA Jewellery News’ issue. 
 
Notwithstanding the fact that, as explained in the available literature (De Vos et al 
2002:177; Neuman 2000:270), important questionnaire-related criteria were adhered 
to, over a period of approximately two months, a total of only 45 questionnaires were 
returned to the researcher. When compared to the actual number of jewellery store 
owners / companies receiving the magazine (approximately 200 as indicated by the 
Jewellery Council), the collective response constituted approximately 22,5 percent. It 
was clear that, as findings could not be based on such a small return, additional steps 
were needed to obtain a consistent picture of the phenomenon under investigation. 
Therefore, it was decided that the exploration of jewellery store robbery should 
continue by addressing people with special knowledge and insight into this type of 
crime. 
 
1.4.6.2 Phase two – Semi-structured interviews with knowledgeable respondents 
 
The semi-structured interviews referred to in section 1.4.5.3 above were conducted 
with the following informed respondents (names of persons and businesses are 
withheld for reasons of confidentiality): 
 
• Respondent 1, jewellery store owner based in Fourways, northern Johannesburg 
suburb (twenty years in the jewellery retail sector). 
• Respondent 2, jewellery insurance company director based in Randburg, northern 
Johannesburg suburb (33 years in the insurance sector, of which six in the 
jewellery field).  
• Respondent 3, jewellery insurance brokerage director based in Sandton, northern 
Johannesburg suburb (30 years in the jewellery insurance sector). 
• Respondent 4, chartered insurance practitioner and loss adjuster based in Rivonia, 
northern Johannesburg suburb (40 years in this field).  
• Respondent 5, SAPS superintendent based at the Johannesburg central police 
station (32 years in the police service). 
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The interviews were conducted at the above respondents’ workplace inside their 
private office. The average time spent on an interview was approximately one and a 
half hours. The respondents co-operated patiently with the researcher and stated that, 
if needed, they would be available to provide additional information.  
 
1.4.6.3 Phase three – Structured interviews with victimised jewellers 
 
To further substantiate the information obtained during phase one and two, in order to 
generate the most objective and comprehensive picture of jewellery store robbery, it 
was decided to proceed to the third and final phase in the data collection process. This 
phase involved structured interviews (based on the questionnaire model) with 
victimised jewellers. A list of potential respondents was obtained from a leading 
jewellery insurance company. Respondents were contacted telephonically and asked 
whether they were willing to take part in a structured interview with the researcher. A 
small number of respondents participated as follows (names of persons and businesses 
are withheld for reasons of confidentiality). 
 
• Respondent 6, jewellery store owner operating in Bedfordview (eastern 
Johannesburg suburb) 
• Respondent 7, jewellery store owner operating in Bedfordview (eastern 
Johannesburg suburb). 
• Respondent 8, jewellery store owner operating in Fourways (northern 
Johannesburg suburb). 
• Respondent 9, jewellery store owner operating in Randburg (northern 
Johannesburg suburb). 
• Respondent 10, jewellery store owner operating in Cresta (northwestern 
Johannesburg suburb). 
 
All interviews were conducted at the respondents’ jewellery stores in private offices. 
The average time spent on an interview was approximately forty minutes. Although, it 
was not an easy task for the researcher to set-up interviews (see section 1.6.3), all of 
the above respondents were very cooperative and did not object to any of the 
questions posed during the interview. It must be noted that, as opposed to the 
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questionnaire, the interaction between the respondents and the researcher allowed for 
the recording of additional comments arising from the close-ended questions. 
 
1.4.7 Data analysis and interpretation 
 
Quantitative data analysis is used to interpret the results and obtain meaningful 
answers to research questions (De Vos et al 2002:223). With regard to this study, 
questionnaire data was analysed by means of computer programming. Interview data 
instead was analysed manually as it involved a small group of respondents. 
 
Where applicable, percentages were illustrated in the form of graphic presentations, 
i.e. bar graphs and pie charts. These are used as a descriptive statistical technique to 
summarise and display data (De Vos et al 2002:230). Cross tabulation was, at times, 
used to try and reveal a relationship between two different variables.  
 
Information obtained from the semi-structured and structured interviews was used to 
substantiate the initial interpretations stemming from the questionnaire results. It 
needs to be stressed that the study was contextual in nature and the findings cannot be 
generalised beyond the research group.  
 
1.4.8 Validity and reliability 
 
Validity and reliability imply information on the ways in which objectivity of the 
data/information, as presented in the research project, is being sought and maintained. 
Whilst validity is concerned with the effectiveness of the measuring instrument and 
seeks to establish whether the researcher is measuring what he/she in fact intended to 
measure, reliability deals with its dependability and consistency (Mouton & Marais 
1996:193-194). 
 
In order to add scientific value to the questionnaire and semi-structured interview 
schedule, a study of the existing literature and an analysis of case studies on the 
subject were conducted. Furthermore, the researcher held various discussions with 
jewellers, representatives of jewellery insurance companies, loss adjusters, security 
experts and people related to the researcher, during which the research instruments 
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were tested for clarity and relevance and for questions that could have been 
misleading to the respondents. These subjects were asked to complete the 
questionnaire and study the semi-structured interview schedule to determine whether 
the research design and methodology were relevant and effective. They all agreed that 
the questions were relevant, simple and easy to understand. With regard to the 
questionnaire, it was stated that, as the questions were all close-ended, this would 
facilitate and speed-up its completion. Furthermore, in order to scientifically test the 
measuring instrument, the researcher consulted with statisticians and academics at the 
University of South Africa. Consequently, it can be stated that the data collection 
instruments used by the researcher contributed to an accurate and true measure of the 
phenomenon under study. 
 
1.5 DEFINITION OF KEY CONCEPTS 
 
Prior to commencing the study, an explicit definition of the key (central) concepts is 
necessary in order to clarify and delimit important research issues. By giving an 
accurate definition of the most important concepts, it will be possible to avoid 
creating confusion and conflict during the research process (Mouton & Marais 
1996:161).  
 
1.5.1 Jewellery 
 
Jewellery includes all the merchandise displayed for sale in a store such as neck 
chains, arm bracelets, rings, earrings, watches, pendants, lose stones (precious and 
semi-precious) and various giftware and silverware. Gem and Jewel Acceptances’ 
policy cover (2005:2) defines stock as “jewellery, gold, diamonds, precious or semi-
precious metals or stones, watches, other merchandise or materials usual to the 
insured business”. For the purposes of this study, jewellery can also be defined as the 
main target of robbery. 
 
1.5.2 Jewellery store 
 
For the purposes of this study, a jewellery store is defined as the place, intended as a 
permanent and independent structure, wherefrom jewellers conduct their trading 
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activities. Only individual stores (private and chain) situated within building 
structures were the subject of this study. Mobile structures such as stands and counters 
mounted in specific areas, e.g. a flea market or an exhibition venue, as well as 
jewellery stands within large departmental stores, were not included.  A jewellery 
store can also be defined as the scene of the robbery event. These definitions provide 
both a spatial and crime delimitation as the study focuses on the robbery event 
committed inside a jewellery store. 
 
1.5.3 Robbery 
 
Robbery is a traditional form of interpersonal violence. The act of robbery requires 
the physical taking of property from another either by threat or by use of force. Even 
though it is done for economic motives, it is the use or threat of force that places 
robbery in the violent crime category (Hunter & Dantzker 2002:12). According to 
Criminal Law (Snyman 2002:506-510), robbery is the unlawful, intentional, violent 
removal and appropriation of a movable corporeal thing belonging to another. In 
short, the crime may also be defined as theft by means of violence. The element of 
violence needs to be further explained. It must not be intended as a physical 
aggression of the victim only, but also as intimidation and verbal violence. A threat of 
violence is indeed sufficient to constitute robbery. Both violence and threat of 
violence must be committed in the process of acquiring the thing, e.g. jewellery. If, 
for instance, violence is employed to retain a thing which has already been stolen, or 
to escape once the theft has been committed, one in this case is dealing with the 
crimes of theft and assault and not robbery. Further to this definition, it must also be 
stated that the South African Police Service distinguishes between common robbery 
(involving mainly muggings) and robbery with aggravating circumstances 
(involving the use of dangerous weapons). Armed robberies do in fact constitute an 
aggravating factor for the criminals who committed them because the victim’s life is 
put in jeopardy (Schönteich 2002:3). From a broader criminological perspective, 
robbery can be defined as a predatory crime, a typically urban phenomenon, 
committed violently or accompanied by threat of violence against persons and 
businesses. It is also a method to obtain a quick economic reward. 
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Based on the researcher’s own operational definition, jewellery store robbery is the 
unlawful and wilful use of force or the threat of force, committed inside a jewellery 
store and directed against the owner(s), members of staff and customers (when the 
latter happen to be present) in order to compel them to hand over to the robber(s) 
jewellery and other personal belongings such as cash, bags and wallets.  
 
1.5.4 Robber 
 
Robber is the person who perpetrates the material act of robbery. This person may be 
armed or unarmed. The crime is committed at the time when a threat is made or 
violence is used to obtain a specific thing belonging to another person, e.g. jewellery 
in the case of a jewellery store robber (Snyman 2002:506-510). Statistically, both 
abroad and in South Africa it is mainly men involved in the crime, particularly 
robbery (Flowers 2003:187; Masuku 2002:9) and therefore most references to the 
robber, in this study, will be male, e.g. he/his. 
 
1.5.5 Robbery victimisation    
 
Any person or business is potentially a victim of crime (Van der Hoven & Maree 
2005:55). Victimised individuals and organisations suffer injury, pain, prejudice, 
damage, loss, and inconvenience of one sort or another (Fattah 1991:4). This study is 
about robbery victimisation, which can be defined as victimisation caused by, or 
resulting from a specific criminal offence, i.e. jewellery store robbery.  
 
The process of victimisation resulting from a jewellery store robbery has both long 
and short term consequences and involves a number of direct victims, i.e. the jeweller, 
members of staff and customers (if present during the robbery) who may be 
traumatised, injured or killed; the store which may be damaged during the robbery; 
the business itself which may be compromised as a result of the loss sustained. 
 
1.5.6 Victim risk  
 
In Criminology, risk refers to the probability of harm, the role of its calculation on 
assessment in making decisions about whether to perform criminal actions, and its 
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role in criminal justice decision making (O’Malley 2001:250-251). According to Van 
der Hoven and Maree (2005:56), victim risk is the amount of exposure to the 
possibility of suffering harm or loss perceived for a given individual. In the context of 
this study, based on the researcher’s own operational definition, victim risk refers to a 
situation where a jeweller and a jewellery store, because of the presence of high value 
merchandise, are most at risk of being confronted by armed criminals. 
 
1.5.7 Victim vulnerability 
 
Victim vulnerability refers to the likelihood of a person or organisation becoming a 
crime victim, thus incurring potential physical and psychological damage or economic 
losses (Van der Hoven & Maree 2005:56). Whilst every individual, dwelling, business 
and organisation can be vulnerable to crime, some are more vulnerable than others 
because of specific characteristics such as, amongst others, age, sex, race, location, 
extended working hours, presence of cash or easily accessible high value merchandise 
(as in the case of jewellery stores). 
 
1.5.8 Victim precipitation 
 
Victim precipitation can be defined as a form of overt, aggressive and provocative 
behaviour by the victim that triggers the action of the criminal (Van der Hoven & 
Maree 2005:56). In the context of this study, victim precipitation is relevant to the 
robbery event in that, at times, the criminals’ violent reaction may be triggered not 
only by the aggressive verbal and physical behaviour of the jeweller or the employees, 
but also by their inaction as a result of shock or hysteria. To establish victim 
precipitation, then, is to demonstrate that had it not been for the precipitating action of 
the victim, the victimisation would not have occurred against that particular victim in 
that particular situation.   
 
1.5.9 Victim facilitation 
 
Facilitation can be defined as some kind of negligent or careless behaviour on the part 
of the victim, which gives rise to crime temptation and / or opportunities, thus making 
it easier for an individual to commit a criminal act (Karmen 2007:110-111). 
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Facilitation leads to the creation of risks and, unlike precipitation, it does not 
necessarily involve interaction with the criminals (Van der Hoven & Maree 2005:56). 
Jewellers and members of staff may, as a result of their negligence or careless 
behaviour, be instrumental in the facilitation of a robbery at their stores. 
 
1.5.10 Criminal opportunity 
 
Criminal opportunity can be defined as a necessary condition for a crime to occur or 
an immediate cause for the commission of criminal behaviour (Felson & Clarke 
1998:2-3; Van der Hoven & Maree 2005:57). Opportunity also represents the 
situational ability for crime to occur (Wilcox, Land & Hunt 2003:60). In the context 
of this study, opportunity is not only concerned with a jeweller’s (or members of 
staff) action or inaction which may lead a person to seize the opportunity to commit a 
robbery, but also with specific environmental and situational conditions that may be 
conducive to robbery such as, amongst others, the location of the store or a lack of 
security measures at the store, e.g. physical and electronic barriers. 
 
1.5.11 Crime prevention and intervention 
 
Crime prevention has been described by criminologists as probably the most 
overworked and least understood concept in contemporary criminology (Pelser & 
Louw 2003:1). It involves a wide range of activities directed, in the long and short 
term, towards the crime situation, the victim and the offender. All activities are aimed 
at eliminating or reducing opportunities for crime in a multiplicity of environments 
and situations, e.g. familial, social, physical and situational.  
 
The 1998 White Paper on Safety and Security defines Crime prevention as “all those 
methods and strategies which reduce, deter, or prevent the occurrence of specific 
crimes, firstly, by altering the environment in which they occur, secondly, by 
changing the conditions that are thought to cause them, and thirdly, by providing a 
strong deterrent in the form of an effective criminal justice system” (Leggett 
2004c:12). Crime prevention also entails any action designed to reduce the actual 
level of crime and/or the perceived fear of crime. These actions are not restricted to 
the efforts of the criminal justice system and include activities by individuals and 
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groups, both public and private. Crime prevention clearly denotes an attempt to 
eliminate crime either prior to the initial occurrence or before further activity (Lab 
2000:19). In practice, preventing crime involves actions taken before (prevention of 
criminal behaviour or victimisation), during (prevention of further victimisation) and 
after crime commission (preventing a repetition of a crime or recidivist behaviour).  
 
Due to the fact that the prevention of crime is, in actual fact, difficult to achieve, it is 
perhaps more appropriate to refer to intervention strategies against robbery where, 
based on the researcher’s own operational definition,  intervention may be defined as 
all those actions aimed at reducing the likelihood for this type of crime to occur. In 
the context of this study, emphasis is given to robbery intervention in a situational 
(the context in which jewellery activities take place), environmental (the place where 
the said activities are conducted, i.e. the jewellery store) and behavioural context (the 
actions or behaviour of a jeweller and his/her members of staff). It is within this 
context, i.e. the elimination of opportunities in the physical environment (also known 
as physical and environmental crime prevention), that a robbery intervention strategy 
needs to be formulated and implemented in order to manage the risk of jewellery store 
robbery successfully. Crime prevention strategies directed towards the offender as an 
individual (also known as individual-directed approaches), do not fall within the 
scope of this study.  
 
1.6 PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED 
 
Generally speaking, the project undertaken was met with positive comments and 
willingness to co-operate from most parties approached by the researcher. However, 
the study did not proceed without problems. On the contrary, various obstacles of a 
different nature were encountered along the way. 
 
1.6.1 Finding support for the study 
 
The researcher realised that, in order for the study to be successful, the support of key 
organisations in the jewellery industry was needed. In this regard, various meetings 
were held with companies and organisations involved in the jewellery industry. 
Managing members of the Jewellery Council of South Africa, a non-profit 
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organisation representing the jewellery industry, reassured the researcher that there 
was a real need for constructive initiatives against crime. They also stated that they 
were most willing to co-operate by offering their support for the initiative and by 
making relevant information and data, which were at their disposal, available to the 
researcher.  
 
1.6.2 Finding sponsorship  
 
The researcher realised that the success of the project depended not only on its 
endorsement by relevant jewellery organisations, but also on a professional 
presentation. The jewellery sector is, in fact, known to be very attentive to image and 
presentation. After several meetings with organisations involved in various fields, 
such as insurance, trade and security, sponsorship was offered by Gem & Jewel 
Acceptances (Pty) Ltd, a company specialising in jewellery insurance. This company 
acknowledged the validity of the project as a new and interesting initiative, which 
would ultimately prove beneficial to the jewellery industry as a whole. It was then 
agreed that Gem & Jewel Acceptances would sponsor the costs related to the printing 
and distribution of the questionnaire as an insert in SA Jewellery News. 
 
1.6.3 Gaining the trust of respondents 
 
The Jewellery Council, jewellers and representatives of insurance companies warned 
the researcher that the jewellery industry was highly protective of their information 
systems and wary of discussing security issues with other parties, particularly if the 
latter did not belong to the industry. In order to overcome this problem, following on 
the researcher’s request, the Department of Criminology of the University of South 
Africa issued a letter which certified the academic nature of the project and facilitated 
the task of the researcher (see “Appendix C”). The Jewellery Council also issued an 
official letter of endorsement of the project, which subsequently proved to be of 
valuable assistance to the researcher in gaining the trust of the respondents (see 
“Appendix D”).  
 
Notwithstanding the above, the researcher still found it difficult to obtain cooperation 
from jewellers particularly during the final phase of the data collection process, which 
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involved structured interviews with victims of jewellery store robbery. The majority 
of the jewellers did not wish to take part stating that they were too busy or reluctant to 
share the information. Moreover, it must be stressed that, due to the sensitive nature 
of the topic being investigated, this type of interview could not be done by simply 
walking into a jewellery store and requesting an interview with either the store owner 
or manager. Prior formal arrangements were necessary. 
 
1.6.4 Obtaining specialised literature and statistics 
 
Due to the general lack of local and international data on retail store robbery and 
specifically jewellery crime, as well as the general unwillingness on the part of the 
jewellery retail groups to disclose sensitive information, the researcher decided to 
utilise all valuable sources linked to this crime phenomenon, even though such 
sources were prior to the year 2000.  In addition, the researcher conducted an 
extensive internet search in order to identify organisations involved in the specialised 
field of jewellery crime prevention. Jewelers’ Security Alliance (JSA) emerged as the 
leader in this field. JSA is a non-profit organisation dedicated to the security needs of 
the jewellery industry in the United States of America since 1883. JSA has, over the 
years, collected an extensive database on crime committed against the North 
American jewellery industry, probably the largest and most accurate in existence 
counting 15 500 members. Jewellers’ Vigilance Canada (JVC) was also identified as 
an important organisation which was, however, much dependant on JSA’s assistance 
with regard to information and statistics. Through these organisations, the researcher 
was able to obtain specific information, statistics as well as annual reports, which 
would otherwise have been difficult to obtain locally. This information provided the 
background in formulating research questions. 
 
1.6.5 Distributing the questionnaire 
 
Various meetings with representatives of the Jewellery Council and the Editor of SA 
Jewellery News, a specialised magazine distributed to members of the Jewellery 
Council were held. It was decided, with the consent of the Jewellery Council, that the 
best way to distribute the questionnaire in order to reach as many jewellery store 
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owners as possible (in the most professional way) would be as an insert in the said 
magazine.  
 
1.6.6 Preparing the respondents 
 
The researcher offered to write an article for SA Jewellery News on a topic relevant to 
jewellery crime prevention. This would give the researcher an opportunity to 
introduce himself to the jewellery industry, prior to the actual distribution of the 
questionnaire. This initiative was welcomed by both the editor of the magazine and 
the Jewellery Council. The editor suggested that the article be published in the 
December (2001) issue and asked the researcher to focus on the topic concerning the 
forthcoming Christmas Season and the crime risk factors associated with it. The 
article was then submitted for publication with the title: “Preventing open store crime” 
(Zannoni 2001:9). A brief note about the researcher’s profile and project involving the 
distribution of a research questionnaire on jewellery store robbery was included. The 
note stressed the importance of the project and asked for the jewellers’ co-operation in 
returning the questionnaire. In spite of all the efforts to obtain a good response rate, 
only a small number of questionnaires were returned to the researcher. 
 
1.7 OUTLINE OF THE DISSERTATION 
 
The dissertation comprises seven chapters. In Chapter 1 both the objective and 
importance of this study have been discussed, the research problem has been clearly 
formulated and the key concepts have been unambiguously defined. In Chapter 2 a 
literature review and an analysis of case studies are conducted on robbery and 
robbers. Chapter 3 focuses on the victim of robbery in general and the jeweller (and 
members of staff) as victims of robbery in particular. An attempt is also made to 
describe a typology of the jeweller as a robbery victim. Chapter 4 is concerned with 
the theoretical explanation of robbery based on a literature review. Chapter 5 
summarises the research findings based on the responses to the questionnaire and to 
the semi-structured and structured interviews. Chapter 6 includes the formulation of a 
victim based robbery prevention strategy based on the research findings and a review 
of the existing literature, as well as the researcher’s professional experience in the 
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field of crime and security risk reduction. Chapter 7 concludes the study with 
important recommendations on the best way forward for jewellers to succeed in their 
efforts to reduce the risk of robbery victimisation. 
 
1.8 CONCLUSION   
 
In this chapter the need for research on jewellery store robbery as a contemporary 
crime issue has been stated.  The lack of a database on armed robberies directed at 
jewellery stores was discussed under the rationale in order to justify this investigation.  
The chapter further focused on the aim of the study, actuating research questions, unit 
of analysis, data collections by means of a literature study, questionnaire and 
interviews, data analysis, the definition of key concepts and the problems encountered 
during the study, as well as a layout of the following chapters. The next chapter 
focuses on jewellery stores as targets of armed robbery and explains the dynamics and 
characteristics associated with the jewellers’ occupation and the criminal event. Case 
studies on jewellery store robbery are also presented. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
JEWELLERY STORES AS TARGETS OF ROBBERY AND ASSOCIATED 
DYNAMICS 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter provides a basic explanation of the different types of jewellery stores, 
their products, personnel and clientele, as well as the various activities or tasks 
performed by jewellers and members of staff from opening until closing time. In 
addition, standard security measures, which currently seem to be accepted as best 
practice amongst jewellers, are identified.  
 
A good understanding of the various components and activities typical of a jewellery 
retail store helps create a security risk profile as each of them bears a direct influence 
on a specific crime situation. As an example, the concomitant presence of high value 
items and a low volume of customers entering a jewellery store may create a 
favourable condition for a robbery attack.  
 
The chapter also deals with the general characteristics of business robbery and robbers 
in order to provide an understanding of the dynamics of the criminal event. Aspects 
such as risk factors for robbery, typology of robbery and robbers and a description of 
the robbery event as it unfolds in a commercial environment are discussed. 
References to the phenomenon of jewellery store robbery both in South Africa and 
abroad, when available, are included. 
 
2.2 THE JEWELLERY STORE, ITS MAIN COMPONENTS AND        
      ACTIVITIES 
 
Prior to dealing with the crime of retail store robbery as a criminal event, it is 
necessary to describe both the main target of the robbers’ action (jewellery) and the 
characteristics of the environment where the crime is committed (jewellery store).  
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2.2.1 Types of jewellery stores 
 
Based on the researcher’s observations, different types of premises wherefrom 
jewellers conduct their activities can be identified: 
 
• Street front stores situated along urban or suburban streets. 
• Shopping complex stores situated inside a commercial centre as an independent 
business unit amongst other types of commercial activities. 
• Departmental counters situated within larger stores where different types of 
products are offered. 
• Flea market stores or stands operating from fixed or mobile structures situated in 
different places such as a parking lot, a shopping complex or a public square. 
 
Each type of store experiences different crime-related risks depending on factors such 
as, amongst others, location, volume of traffic and the level of security measures 
adopted. As stated in the definition of jewellery store provided in chapter one, section 
1.5.2, this study focused on shopping complex stores and included both chain and 
private stores. 
 
2.2.2 Type of merchandise 
 
The products of the mid and high-upmarket jewellery stores differ significantly from 
those of the chain stores, whose quality of stock is generally lower to cater for a larger 
section of the population. Chain stores usually keep a low volume of high value 
jewellery on site, but this is only located on request (Security Industry Best Practice 
for South Africa 2002:18). 
 
While the value of jewellery displayed may vary significantly from one item and 
jewellery store to another, the typical range of jewellery available to customers 
includes neck chains, arm bracelets, rings, earrings, watches and watch straps, 
pendants, loose stones (precious and semi-precious), various giftware and silverware 
and high quality pens. During a discussion with the researcher (2005), Mr. B. 
Friedland, a jewellery store owner, stated that the start-off capital required to open an 
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average jewellery store may exceed two million Rand including shop fittings, working 
capital and stock.  
 
2.2.3 Clientele 
 
In the past the tendency has been to associate jewellery with wealthy people. 
Nowadays, jewellery has been made more affordable to the lower income groups of 
the population, mainly due to the credit facilities available at many stores. However, 
while some jewellery stores cater for all type of clientele, others remain exclusive, 
only within the reach of the higher income groups (Friedland 2005). 
 
 In general chain stores whose products are usually more affordable than the mid or 
high-upmarket stores, have a larger number of customers. On the other hand, high-
upmarket stores in shopping complexes or street front stores in suburban areas, 
usually experience a lesser flow of customers. This situation influences the element of 
risk to which a store may be exposed. In fact, the higher the volume of customer 
traffic, the higher the risk for jewellers to experience opportunistic theft or theft by 
distraction. Robbers instead seem to prefer targets that are less busy and offer easy 
access to high-value items.  
 
2.2.4 Personnel 
 
The number of staff members employed at a jewellery store and their professional 
qualifications differ depending on the type of store. The average store employs at least 
four people in various positions, including one senior manager, two sales persons and 
one junior member of staff. The owners or directors may also be present but not at all 
stores (Friedland 2005). 
 
Private jewellers usually select experienced personnel by sourcing them from within 
the industry. Some retail chain stores instead may also select inexperienced candidates 
and train them internally. Training for members of staff involved in the jewellery 
retail sector is also available through organisations such as, amongst others, the 
Jewellery Council of South Africa and the Diamond Training School. 
 
 - 29 -
2.2.5 Jewellery store-related activities 
 
According to research participants McKinnon (2007) and Friedland (2005), various 
activities characterise the work of jewellers and members of staff from opening until 
closing time: 
 
At opening time  
 
Before opening the store to customers, the stock must be removed from the safes or 
strong rooms and placed on the display cases. The store, windows and cases are 
cleaned and repaired and ordered items of jewellery are prepared for collection by 
customers. Only when the stock is laid out and secured in the display cases, and the 
members of staff are ready to receive customers, the store is opened for business 
(usually at 9 a.m.). 
 
During business hours 
 
Besides looking after customers, typical activities conducted by staff during business 
hours include preparing and maintaining the stock, e.g. polishing and re-marking; 
changing the lay-out of the jewellery and re-positioning items in different display 
cases; entering newly purchased stock and designing new jewellery (only at those 
stores which specialise in jewellery design). It is common practice amongst jewellers 
to receive sales representatives only by appointment. 
 
At closing time  
 
At closing time (usually between 5 and 7 p.m. depending on factors such as the 
location of the store and management’s directives), after having locked the doors, 
members of staff proceed to remove items of jewellery from windows and show 
cases, pack jewellery onto trays, place trays in the safes or strong rooms, count the 
amount of money received from the daily sales, reconcile the stock list against the 
store master list, and prepare for the following day (e.g. stock to be repaired or 
collected and list of clients to be contacted). All these activities are time consuming 
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and for a zealous jeweller it may take up to two hours, after the official closing time, 
to leave the store.  
 
2.2.6 Standard security measures 
 
Due to the constant element of risk and as a result of insurance-related requirements, 
most jewellers have adopted a best practice with regard to security at their stores. A 
Jewellery Council of South Africa’s sponsored survey conducted between 2001 and 
2002 across three retail jewellery stores in Gauteng, showed how chain, mid and up-
market private stores reviewed their security arrangements (Security Industry Best 
Practice for South Africa 2002:17-18). The following were some of the most 
important findings: 
 
• Standard security measures adopted by all stores included intruder detection and 
panic systems comprising of door and window contacts, motion detectors, vault 
protection, hard wired panic buttons and wireless panic transmitters, and radio / 
telephone link up to a security control centre. Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) 
systems were utilised by chain stores and high up-market private stores but not by 
the mid up-market private stores. All stores relied heavily on their own security 
response companies. 
• The high up-market private stores, which cater for a very affluent clientele and 
have the most expensive range of products, held concern for a more organised 
heist and therefore implemented more intensive security measures. 
• None of the jewellers interviewed employed their own security personnel. 
Shopping complex stores relied on the visible security presence within the centre, 
whereas the individual jewellery stores sub-contracted a security response service. 
• In the case of the chain store, general staff were strictly pre-screened, i.e. their 
references and criminal records were checked, whereas in the case of the private 
jewellers, credibility within the industry provided suitable reference with no 
systematic pre-screening process. 
• Due to aesthetic reasons, chain stores did not implement barriers for access 
control, but this was in the process of being reviewed. In the case of private 
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jewellers, access control was strictly handled by the door buzzer system, after 
which the staff took control. 
• Only jewellers in high up-market stores made use of a private viewing area when 
showing customers goods in excess of a specified amount. Only senior managers 
attended the private room with customers, and a dedicated CCTV camera viewed 
and recorded all transactions.   
 
2.3 ARMED ROBBERY AS THE CRIMINAL EVENT  
 
While different personal, social and psychological risk factors may play a role in the 
causation of robbery, an immediate cause for an individual to commit this crime 
seems to be his desire for material gain, i.e. obtain quick and easy money (Siegel 
2005:255). This might also be the most important factor which motivates offenders to 
commit jewellery store robbery. Furthermore, the presence of specific robbery 
facilitating factors such as the presence of opportunities and the availability of 
firearms may also be easily exploited by criminally predisposed individuals. 
 
While SAPS statistics serve as a good indicator of the extent of aggravated and 
business robbery both at a national and provincial level, it is difficult, on the other 
hand, to determine the extent of jewellery store robbery as this is not recorded as a 
separate crime category. Therefore, the researcher had to rely on available literature 
and statistics. 
 
In the context of this study, a careful analysis of the robbery event has important 
theoretical and practical implications. Business robbery is usually characterised by 
various phases, i.e. planning, selecting a suitable target, casing the store, establishing 
co-presence, entering into a conflict situation, transferring of valuables, leaving the 
crime scene and disposing of stolen valuables (Maree 1999:55-58). A careful analysis 
of all these phases is essential in order to understand the different dynamics of 
jewellery store robbery. In this chapter, two phases have been given special attention: 
the selection of a suitable target and the disposal of stolen merchandise. The first 
phase is important because it helps establish which factors attract the robbers’ 
attention to a specific store and which opportunity-reduction measures need to be 
adopted by jewellers to minimise the risk of robbery. The second phase, which 
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involves an understanding of the role of the fence (receivers), is also important for, 
without the presence of the fence, robbers would find it extremely difficult to dispose 
of the stolen jewellery and obtain the much needed cash. 
 
2.3.1 Contributory factors to robbery 
 
It would be too simplistic to attribute this crime to a single factor, for it is generally 
agreed that, for this crime to be committed, there must also necessarily be an 
individual’s predisposition to carry it out. In addition, the various factors should not 
be seen in isolation but rather as an integral part of the problem. Some researchers 
seem to agree that factors such as breakdown of family processes, poor socio-
economic conditions, inequality of the poor, lack of opportunities, unemployment, 
urbanisation and modernisation and a violent culture and sub-culture within society 
may all play a role in predisposing an individual to commit crime (Leggett 2004b:19; 
Thomson 2004:13; Masuku 2003:24; Stewart & Davis 2003:50; Van Niekerk 
2003:13; Van der Hoven 2001:84). However, due to the fact that this study does not 
focus on the robber’s perspective, it would not be possible to establish which of the 
mentioned factors in particular contribute to an individual becoming a jewellery store 
robber, and therefore the researcher is unable to substantiate them. As indicated in 
section 7.3.6, this should be treated as an area for future research. Nevertheless, some 
factors appear to be the primary motive for robbery, in particular the need to obtain a 
quick reward in the form of cash and the opportunities present in a specific 
environment. 
 
2.3.1.1 Immediate cause: material gain 
 
Wright and Decker (Siegel 2004:349) found that robbery is caused primarily by the 
individual’s pressing need for material gain. Robbers typically see their decision to 
offend as emanating from a financial need that cannot easily be met through more 
conventional means. For some, it is a way to maintain a high standard of living to 
which they become accustomed. Stewart & Davis (2003:60) confirmed that the 
economic advantage that an individual can obtain from a retail robbery is the primary 
motive for this crime. Robbery of cash is a preferred method of making money 
 - 33 -
because it is quicker, safer and easier and does not generally entail having to dispose 
of “hot” merchandise as in the case of jewellery.  
 
Another factor which, according to Wright and Decker (Siegel 2004:349), plays a  role 
in armed robbery is that it provides a psychic thrill, or a chance to hurt or humiliate 
victims through a show of power and force. It is also a way to avenge adverse 
personal factors experienced by an individual by seizing what belongs to the better 
privileged and wealthier classes. 
 
Besides the factors explained above, there are other personal, social, environmental 
situations and circumstances which, individually or collectively, may facilitate the 
commission of a crime on the part of individuals who already have a predisposition to 
criminal behaviour.  
 
2.3.1.2 Opportunity  
 
Opportunity may be considered as one of the important facilitating factors in criminal 
activities (Felson 2002:35). In fact, it can be stated that no crime can be committed 
without the physical opportunity to carry it out. Crime opportunities present in the 
environment or created by people themselves are constantly exploited by criminals. In 
this regard, criminal behaviour may be considered as the product of the interaction 
between the individual with his / her criminal predisposition and the surrounding 
environment (setting) which offers many opportunities for crime commission (Felson 
& Clarke 1998:1-3). 
 
2.3.1.3 Mood altering substances 
 
Besides opportunities, some forms of addictions in the form of mood altering 
substances such as cocaine, amphetamines and alcohol may lead individuals into 
committing serious crimes, including robbery, as they are forced to raise considerable 
amounts of money in order to support their costly addiction. Furthermore, people who 
are actively involved in a life of crime may rely on drugs and alcohol to reduce their 
anxiety or build up their courage for crimes they plan to commit (Siegel 2004:454). 
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As reported in Conklin (2001:317), a study of robbery found that alcohol was present 
in 71 percent of the crimes committed on the spur of the moment, but in only 44 
percent of the planned crimes. The major role played by drugs and alcohol in criminal 
behaviour was confirmed by a South African study conducted by the Medical 
Research Council and the Institute for Security Studies, which found that 60 percent 
of offenders were under the influence of various mood altering substances (Philp 
2005:4). Urine samples taken (within 48 hours of the crime) from more than 3000 
arrested suspects in Cape Town, Durban and Johannesburg revealed that 42 percent of 
robbers, 46 percent of murderers, 66 percent of burglars and 50 percent of rapists 
were high on drugs at the time of their crimes. Based on these findings, it is evident 
that strong police and community action on drugs and alcohol is needed to reduce 
high crime levels. 
  
2.3.1.4 Availability of illegal firearms and crime syndicates 
 
While the availability and abundance of illegal firearms, which may become an 
essential tool during an armed robbery, is not a cause of violence per se, it is 
nevertheless a facilitating factor to be recognised. In South Africa, for instance, the 
easy availability and abundance of weapons of all kinds, is a significant factor in the 
commission of robberies with aggravating circumstances. Access to a gun can have 
extremely serious consequences. According to the SAPS (Masuku 2002:10), 80 
percent of 110590 serious robberies recorded in 2000 were committed with a firearm. 
The Crime Information Management Centre also linked the number of crime 
syndicates operating in the country to the climate of lawlessness and crime of 
violence such as retail robberies (Stewart & Davis 2003:50). 
 
According to Conklin (2001:321-322), the presence of a weapon during a criminal 
confrontation can escalate the level of violence, producing a murder when an assault 
would have occurred if no firearm had been present. Furthermore, firearms give some 
robbers a sense of power and self-confidence and their actions become more lethal. 
Assaults with firearms are more likely to produce death than are attacks with other 
weapons and so the presence of a firearm makes murder a more likely outcome of an 
altercation (Conklin 2001:329).  
 
 - 35 -
2.3.1.5 Ineffective criminal justice system 
 
An ineffective criminal justice system does not act as a deterrent against robbery; 
poor detective work, easy granting of bail and relatively mild sentences may also give 
robbers the impression that it may be worthwhile pursuing their criminal careers and 
face the risk associated to it (Govender 2007:5; Van der Hoven 2001:85). The 
financial gain associated with criminal behaviour outweighs the deterrent effect of a 
possible prison sentence. This reasoning is applicable in South Africa where the high 
level of property and violent crime appear to correlate with a faltering criminal justice 
system and an overburdened and under-resourced police service (Stewart & Davis 
2003:50).  
 
2.3.2 The extent of business robbery  
 
Jewellery store robbery is recorded by the SAPS for statistical purposes as a business 
robbery which is a sub-category of aggravated robbery. Due to the fact that no 
distinction is made between different types of businesses, it is difficult to determine 
the extent of jewellery store robbery in South Africa. Therefore, the focus of this 
section will firstly be on a statistical analysis of the phenomenon of business robbery 
and, secondly, on jewellery store robbery based on available information. 
 
2.3.2.1 General statistics on business robbery 
 
Amongst violent crimes, which make up a substantial proportion of the total crime 
experienced in South Africa, robbery has traditionally been one of the crimes with the 
highest annual increase (Schönteich 2002:1-3). Based on an analysis of the latest 
SAPS crime statistics (SAPS 2007b) for the period from 2001 to 2007 available on 
line (http://www.saps.gov.za/statistics/reports/crimestats/2007/crime_stats.htm), it is 
evident that, while serious crimes such as murder, attempted murder and assault with 
intent to do grievous bodily harm showed a downward trend, aggravated robbery 
instead showed a systematic increase from 116 736 incidents in 2001/02 to 133 658 
incidents in 2003/04, with a decrease in 2004/05 and 2005/06 (down to 119 726 
reported incidents) and again a sudden increase of 5.7 percent in 2006/07 (126 558). 
In 2006/07 the provinces with the highest ratio of aggravated robbery per 100 000 of 
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the population are Gauteng (552.1) followed by Western Cape (278.7). The least 
affected province with a ratio of 53.8 is Limpopo  
 
With regard to the extent of business robbery in South Africa, to which category 
jewellery store robbery belongs, an analysis of the above SAPS statistics for the past 
five financial years from 2002/03 to 2006/07 shows that while this type of crime 
declined from 5498 incidents (12.1 per 100 000 of the population) in 2002/03 to 3320 
incidents (7.1 per 100 000 of the population) in 2004/05, it increased significantly by 
52.5 percent in the last year and by 21.6 percent between 2002/03 and 2006/07 (see 
table 2.1). It needs to be remembered that the SAPS only started recording business 
robbery as a separate crime category in 2002/03.    
 
Table 2.1: Business robbery (South Africa) - Past five financial years (SAPS) 
CASES REPORTED 
2002/03 2003/04 2004/05 2005/06 2006/07 
5498 3677 3320 4387 6689 
RATIO PER 100 000 OF THE POPULATION 
 
12.1 7.9 7.1 9.4 14.1 
PERCENTAGE INCREASE / DECREASE 
 
2002/03  
2003/04 
2003/04  
2004/05 
2004/05  
2005/06 
2005/06  
2006/07 
2002/03 
2006/07  
 
-33.1% -9.7% 32.1% 52.5% 21.6% 
 
According to the same SAPS business robbery statistics, the three provinces with the 
highest ratio per 100 000 of the population in 2006/07 are Gauteng (46.9), followed 
by North West (15.0) and KwaZulu Natal (10.2). The provinces with the lowest ratio 
per 100 000 of the population are Northern Cape (1.4) and Limpopo (1.9), possibly 
due to conditions of lower business development (see table 2.2). The highest ratio in 
Gauteng is in all probability linked to the much higher level of commercial activities 
in the province, as compared to other parts of South Africa. Most alarming is the 
significant percentage change in the past year in Gauteng, North West and Kwa-Zulu 
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Natal. This increase may cause business owners to become more fearful and invest 
more in security measures to protect staff and property. 
 
Table 2.2: Business robbery (Provinces) - Ratio per 100 000 of the population - 
Past five financial years (SAPS) 
RATIO PER 100 000 OF THE POPULATION 
 2002/03 2003/04 2004/05 2005/06 2006/07 
EASTERN CAPE 9.3 5.4 4.6 3.3 3.4 
FREE STATE 3.4 0.5 1.5 0.8 2.1 
GAUTENG 29.0 24.5 23.4 34.0 46.9 
KWA-ZULU 
NATAL 
11.1 4.4 3.9 5.4 10.2 
MPUMALANGA 11.8 3.7 2.7 2.1 5.3 
NORTH WEST 5.8 4.0 5.2 7.2 15.0 
LIMPOPO 7.4 3.6 2.3 1.5 1.9 
NORTHERN 
CAPE 
0.5 0.5 0.3 0.9 1.4 
WESTERN CAPE 2.7 2.3 1.8 2.4 4.2 
RSA TOTAL 12.1 7.9 7.1 9.4 14.1 
 
In its annual report (SAPS 2007a), the SAPS also explain that business robbery is a 
scourge at a localised level especially in central business districts (CBD) and in the 
periphery of CBD’s. In fact, this type of crime is one of the most concentrated violent 
crimes recorded in South Africa with 40 percent of all cases occurring in only 22 of 
the 1105 police precincts (2 percent), six of these (27.3 percent) being CBD stations 
(http://www.saps.gov.za/statistics/reports/crimestats/2007/_pdf/crime_situation1.pdf.)  
 
When analysing the above statistics, it is important to remember that recorded crime 
levels undercount the real levels of crime, as unrecorded crimes are not reflected. This 
is because crime rates rely on members of the public reporting crime, and the police 
recording it. The use of recorded crime statistics in the current South African context 
is especially problematic, as research has shown that upwards of 50 percent of crime 
in many important categories goes unreported. In particular, according to national 
victims of crime surveys conducted by the Institute for Security Studies (Burton, Du 
Plessis, Leggett, Louw, Mistry & Van Vuuren 2004:133-134; Leggett 2002:8), the 
reporting rates for robbery in South Africa were down from 41 percent in 1998 to 29 
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percent in 2003. Despite these problems, South African crime figures are generally 
regarded as comprehensive and largely reliable. 
 
2.3.2.2 Specific statistics on jewellery store robbery 
 
At an international level there is a generalised lack of statistical data on the extent of 
jewellery store robbery. However, reliable statistics from the United States of 
America are published online by Jewelers’ Security Alliance 
(www.jewelerssecurity.org/statistics.html). According to their 2006 statistics in the 
category of “On-Premises Crimes” (criminal activities taking place at the victims’ 
business base of operations) robbery had the third highest incidence (18.7 percent) 
after theft (61.1 percent) and burglary (20.2 percent). However, the number of 
robberies in 2006 increased by 7.7 percent when compared to 2005. 
 
The Jewelers’ Security Alliance database is the largest and most accurate in existence, 
notwithstanding the fact that it is not always possible to obtain information on every 
jewellery industry crime as many go unreported. Their database counts approximately 
15.500 members in the United States, thereby giving a reliable picture of the 
dimension of the crime problem affecting the American industry. Statistics are based 
solely on credible and verifiable information obtained by the Jewelers’ Security 
Alliance and have purposefully been divided into two categories, on-premises and off-
premises crime.   
 
Statistical data regarding the extent of robbery against the jewellery retail sector in 
South Africa is not available. Neither the South African Police Service nor the 
Jewellery Council of South Africa maintains a database on jewellery crime. The 
SAPS does not differentiate between type of business when recording robbery 
statistics, other than distinguishing between robbery committed against businesses or 
against individuals. Some statistics on jewellery crime are available through 
companies involved in the jewellery industry such as head offices of retail stores, 
insurance companies and loss adjusters who gather information via their own client 
database. These statistics give only an indication of the crime situation against the 
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jewellery industry. However, there are obvious problems for the above companies in 
disclosing such data, which is usually kept very confidential in order to protect their 
image and clients’ business interests. Research participants Esmé McKinnon and Alan 
Brown from Gem & Jewel Acceptances (2001), Joel Bergman from A.I. Brokers 
(2001) and John Pearson from Crawford International Loss Adjusters (2001), 
expressed concern at the frequency of the robbery attacks against the South African 
jewellery retail sector. It was said that some stores had sustained repeated attacks in a 
short period of time, an indication that criminals were shifting their activities to softer 
and more manageable targets. Furthermore, as indicated in Chapter 1, section 1.2, 
data released by the SAPS Robbery Intelligence Desk (2002), confirmed that 
jewellery stores were third on the list of most targeted retail businesses. 
 
2.3.3 Typologies and characteristics of the crime and the offender 
 
Through a study of the available literature, it is possible to draw a general typology of 
robbery and robbers, with particular reference to the phenomenon being investigated, 
i.e. jewellery store robbery. 
 
2.3.3.1 Typology of robbery 
 
Robbery can be classified on the basis of the type of target or victim selected by the 
criminals.  Various patterns have been identified that can be applied to jewellery store 
robbery (Siegel 2004:347). 
 
i)  Robbery of persons who, as part of their employment, are in charge of 
 money or goods.  
 Examples are cash in transit officers or owners / managers of commercial 
 activities. Jewellery store robbery can be included in this category as 
 jewellers’ and members of staff happen to be in charge of both money (from 
 the sale of jewellery) and valuable merchandise.  
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ii) Robbery on commercial targets.  
The commercial activities more often targeted by robbers include petrol 
stations, convenience stores, supermarkets, restaurants, hotels, jewellery stores 
and general retail stores. This type of robbery involves some degree of 
planning. In the majority of cases robbers are armed with firearms and 
violence is often used, although the latter seems to be correlated to a physical 
reaction of the victims during the robbery (Engelbrecht 2005). 
 
iii) Robbery in an open area.  
Although not relevant to jewellery store robbery as such, this type of robbery 
must be mentioned in that it may affect jewellers’ or jewellery representatives 
carrying a valuable line in an open area. This robbery is committed directly 
against individuals who are seen, known or thought to carry money or 
valuables. It can happen in different places, the most common being the streets 
and parking areas and involves street attacks such as muggings and purse 
snatching during which bags, wallets and cellphones are most often targeted. It 
is the most common form of robbery in urban areas. This type of robbery is 
often characterised by episodes of violence because, on the one side, the 
item(s) which the robbers want to seize is/are on the victim or in his/her 
immediate possession and, on the other, the victim often decides to resist the 
criminal attack, causing the robbers to react. Senior citizens and women are 
the preferred victims because of what the criminal perceives to be their limited 
physical capacity to react. It must be said, however, that any person who 
appears to be weak, unaware of his/her surrounding, distracted and vulnerable 
is more at risk.  
 
iv) Robbery on private premises.  
As mentioned in point iii above, this category is also not relevant to jewellery 
store robbery as such but needs to be mentioned due to the fact that a jeweller 
may be victimised at home, taken hostage together with family members and 
forcibly accompanied back to the store (Williams 1999:2). This type of 
robbery is committed inside private dwellings, apartments or homes. Two 
different scenarios can be identified: a) robbery which follows a 
housebreaking as when the victims suddenly arrive home and meet up with the 
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criminals; b) robbery per se as when the criminals enter the dwelling with the 
intent to rob the owners / occupants, or when the robbers wait for the latter to 
arrive forcing them to hand over money or valuable items.  
 
v) Robbery after preliminary association of short duration.  
This type of offence comes in the aftermath of a chance meeting, e.g. in a bar 
or store. Jewellery store robbery can also be part of this category as in most 
cases criminals enter the store posing as customers, and after a short 
association with the jeweller, suddenly show their real intention. 
 
vi) Robbery after previous association of some duration between the victim 
 and offender.  
In this type of robbery the criminal, after having befriended the victim and 
gained knowledge of his/her possessions, seizes the opportunity to commit the 
crime. This may also apply to jewellery store robbery as when criminals 
befriend a member of staff with the intention of obtaining information on a 
jeweller’s activities in order to better plan a robbery attack. 
 
Incidents in items v) and vi) above are substantially less common than stranger-to-
stranger robberies which account for the majority of robbery events. 
 
2.3.3.2 Characteristics of robbery 
 
The following findings on business robbery and jewellery store robbery in particular, 
are relevant to the study: 
i) Hourly / Daily / Monthly distribution  
According to the SAPS Robbery Intelligence Desk (2002), there is a clear 
indication that most commercial robberies in South Africa occur between 7:00 
a.m. and 9:30 a.m. This is especially true in the case of clothing, jewellery and 
furniture stores. A possible explanation for this is that there is less human 
traffic in the store, other than the staff. Employees are also distracted as they 
are usually preparing for the day ahead. Robberies at supermarkets and other 
fast moving consumer goods outlets instead tend to happen early in the 
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morning, just before opening time, and  between 6:00 p.m. and 8:00 p.m. 
(Consumer Goods Council of South Africa: 2005; Engelbrecht 2005). A 
possible explanation for this is that there is more cash present and members of 
staff are usually tired and less on their guard. Commercial robbery in 
establishments that are not open 24 hours, e.g. jewellery stores, occurs mostly 
during working hours. Because of the restricted business hours, jewellery 
stores are held up almost exclusively during the daytime period. However, 
numerous incidents of robberies at night have also been recorded, as when a 
jeweller is kidnapped from his / her home and forced to open the store; or 
when guards are held up at a gun point and the store broken into (Jewelers’ 
Security Alliance 1999:4). 
 
According to Jewelers’ Security Alliance (2000:3), jewellery store robbery is 
most likely to occur at opening time. This has been a consistent pattern which 
finds explanation in the fact that usually there are less people (customers) 
present in the store. The second most vulnerable time period for the 
occurrence of robbery has traditionally been between 4:00 p.m. and 6:00 p.m. 
However, in 2000, the second most likely time for a robbery event was 
between 2:00 p.m. and 4:00 p.m. A possible explanation is that robbers may 
be adjusting their hours of operation to overcome more stringent security 
procedures implemented by retail jewellers at closing time. 
 
According to studies conducted by the SAPS Robbery Intelligence Desk 
(2002), most commercial robberies in South Africa occur on a Monday or over 
the week-end (Saturdays and Sundays). This finding was confirmed by the 
Consumer Goods Council of South Africa (2005). A possible explanation is 
related to the robbers’ perception of large amount of money being available 
due to restricted banking hours. This reasoning does not apply to jewellery 
retail stores where jewellery (not cash) is the primary target of robbery. Mc 
Kinnon (2001) reported that most robberies at jewellery stores seemed to 
occur during the week (between Tuesdays and Thursdays), and that December 
and February usually experienced an increase in criminal activities against 
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jewellers due to crime opportunities created by the Christmas rush and the 
restocking of jewellery after the festive season. 
 
ii) Number of robbers involved  
In the United States, jewellery store robbery is almost in the totality of cases 
carried out by two or more robbers in possession of firearms (Jewelers’ 
Security Alliance 2000:5). This seems to be the trend in South Africa where in 
the majority of cases, as explained by research participant McKinnon (2001) 
and Engelbrecht (2005), groups of criminals are usually involved. 
Furthermore, attacks by groups of heavily armed robbers carrying automatic 
weapons, holding staff and customers up and executing a robbery (or more 
than one robbery at different stores in the same complex) in just a few 
minutes, have been reported (Smillie 2007:2). 
 
iii)  Modus operandi during the execution of the robbery 
According to studies conducted by the SAPS Robbery Intelligence Desk 
(2002), during commercial robberies in South Africa, the robbers usually gain 
access to the premises posing as customers. At office complexes instead, the 
perpetrators usually hold up security guards and proceed to break into the 
building. Staff and customers (when present), are held at gunpoint and are 
usually tied up and locked inside a storeroom. A member of staff (usually 
owners, managers or key holders) is then forced to open the till(s), safes or 
vaults and hand over cash and other valuable merchandise. Often members of 
staff and customers are robbed of their personal belongings, e.g. wallets, 
cellular phones, watches and jewellery. The robbers usually touch very little 
and even make cashiers open money bags in order to avoid being linked to the 
crime scene by fingerprint identification (Engelbrecht 2005) 
 
According to research participants Pearson and Bergman (2001), most 
jewellery store robberies appear to be well planned and executed. In the 
majority of the cases, robbers seem to gain access to the stores simply posing 
as customers. Since jewellery store robberies are usually committed in a few 
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minutes and within a confined space, robbers can easily control, by means of 
threat of violence, staff and customers without any need to tie them up or lock 
them inside a store room. Often they are simply pushed to the rear of the store. 
However, in recent incidents in Gauteng robbers acted differently in that they 
approached the targeted store with automatic weapons, threatening bystanders, 
shooting rounds into the windows and causing them to shatter. Once the glass 
was broken, the robbers did not walk into the store; instead they grabbed 
valuable watches from the shattered windows and fled the scene without being 
confronted (Green 2005:2).   
 
iv) Escaping from the crime scene 
According to studies conducted by the SAPS Robbery Intelligence Desk 
(2002), in South Africa the most common ways used by commercial robbers 
in escaping from the crime scene are either on foot or hi-jacked / stolen motor 
vehicles. When working in groups, motor vehicles are usually utilised to flee 
from the robbery scene. Motor vehicles are usually fitted with false number 
plates. Maree (1999:54) found that most of the bank robbers involved in her 
study drove along the getaway route a number of times, constantly looking for 
alternative routes should that become necessary.  
 
v) Type of weapons 
As reported by the Consumer Goods Council of South Africa (2005), firearms 
are the number one weapon of choice of many offenders involved in retail 
store robberies, probably because of a perception that victims find them more 
threatening. It also appears as if firearms are better for controlling groups of 
people during a robbery. The type of firearm may vary depending on the type 
of target and include 9 mm pistols, sawn-off shotguns, revolvers and AK-47 
assault rifles (Maree 1999:56). 
 
Research conducted in the United States of America by Jewelers’ Security 
Alliance (2000:5), also found that firearms were by far the jewellery store 
robbers’ preferred weapon. Robbery committed with a gun constituted 72 
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percent of the total robbery events in 2000. The carrying and actual use of 
automatic weapons in major jewellery heists in South Africa has also been 
documented. In one instance, an entertainment venue in Johannesburg came 
under siege when more than 20 robbers armed with automatic weapons fired 
their way into the complex before making off with cash and jewellery in what 
could be considered a “military-style” heist (Gang of jewel robbers rake 
Montecasino 2001:1). In a recent jewellery store robbery in Fourways (north 
of Johannesburg), bystanders dived for cover as the gunmen carrying AK 47 
assault rifles fired several shots during the robbery (Swart 2007:3). 
 
vi) Duration of robbery 
The duration of an attack may vary depending on the type of robbery and 
commercial establishment against which it is committed. According to 
research participants Bergman and Mckinnon (2001), in South Africa 
jewellery store robberies involving large losses have been carried out in 
approximately three to five minutes. 
 
vii) Place of occurrence  
Patterns in jewellery store crime have, over years of social and political 
transformation in South Africa, also changed significantly. Jewellery stores 
located along urban roads and city centres were often in the past (before the 
decaying of the urban areas from the early 90’s) attacked by robbers. 
However, most jewellery stores have since moved to the relatively safer 
environment offered by suburban shopping malls. This move does not seem to 
discourage determined criminals from committing daring attacks against 
jewellery stores situated in shopping complexes. According to research 
participants McKinnon and Brown (2001), in South Africa jewellery store 
robbery also appears to be a typical urban / suburban phenomenon, more 
predominant in the larger metropolitan areas. It is committed indoors, i.e. 
inside a jewellery store, although it may also be initiated outdoors as when, for 
instance, a jeweller is attacked whilst walking or driving and forced back to 
the store. Stores near entry / exit points, busy roads and highway ramps are 
reported to be the most vulnerable to robbery. 
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viii) Use of disguises 
Robbers are known to use all kinds of disguises to prevent recognition. Maree 
(1999:57) found that most of the bank robbers wore balaclavas or pulled a 
stocking over the head where cameras where operative. A suit is also a popular 
outfit because this formal type of dress is associated with successful business 
people. Surgical gloves are also favoured, with translucent nail polish on the 
fingers and palms to avoid leaving identifiable fingerprints. At times, robbers 
may wait until they are ready to commit the robbery before wearing masks or 
balaclavas. 
 
However, because too much disguise such as balaclavas attracts attention, 
particularly when robbing a store in a busy shopping complex, robbers may 
prefer to use simple, yet effective means to prevent recognition both by 
witnesses and video cameras such as, for instance, caps, sunglasses, false 
beards and moustaches. This also seems to be the case in jewellery store 
robberies which are for the most part committed by robbers posing as 
customers (Four arrested after attempted jewel heist 2001:2). In a robbery at a 
jewellery store in a shopping centre in Sandton (north of Johannesburg), two 
robbers were seen wearing a religious dress much like a burqas (Ndaba 
2005:1). In a more recent armed robbery attack at a jewellery store situated in 
a shopping centre on the East of Johannesburg, the offenders had disguised 
their faces with headbands over their eyes (Green 2005:2). 
 
ix) A crime between strangers 
As opposed to other violent crimes such as murder and assault, robbery is, in 
almost all cases, an event between people, i.e. the robber and the victim, who 
are strangers to each other, strangers are less likely to be able to identify 
robbers to the police (Conklin 2001:67).   
 
In the case of jewellery store robbery, it may have happened that the criminals 
posed as potential buyers or credit applicants in order to assess the situation at 
the store. In this case, as reported by research participants McKinnon and 
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Brown (2001), robbers may not be total strangers in the eye of the jewellers 
and members of staff who may, in fact, be able to recognise them.  
 
x) Presence of witnesses / bystanders 
While Barlow (1996:159) reports that armed robberies appear to be carefully 
timed to minimise the risk of intervention from third parties, research 
participant Bergman (2001) believes that, once the target is identified, 
jewellery store robbers seem to be unperturbed by the presence of by-standers 
or customers inside or near the store. This lack of concern has been shown 
during a number of daring robberies committed inside busy shopping 
complexes. 
 
2.3.3.3 Typology of robbers 
 
There are currently no important data upon which to base the classification of 
jewellery store robbers, for instance, age, gender, racial group and level of 
professionalism. However, criminological findings on robbers have led to a specific 
typology as described below (Siegel 2004:347):  
 
i) Professional robber 
Professional robbers usually manifest a long-term commitment to crime as a 
source of livelihood, carefully study each situation and plan every detail prior 
to committing a robbery. Some professionals are exclusively robbers, while 
others may engage in other types of crimes. It can be stated that planning and 
skills are the trademarks of the professional robber. They usually operate in 
organised groups in which assigned roles are the rule, and are interested in 
stealing large amounts of cash or valuable merchandise from commercial 
establishments. In the majority of cases, they are armed with firearms.  
 
ii) Opportunist robber 
They randomly select the most vulnerable targets and commit robbery at the 
most favourable opportunity. They are not committed to robbery as a source of 
livelihood. They are also not organised and usually do not plan the robberies. 
Opportunists often operate in the context of juvenile gangs. Amongst all types, 
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they are the ones that tend to be more aggressive and ready to assault and 
harm their victims.  
 
iii) Substance addicted robber 
This category comprises both drug addicts and alcoholic robbers. They act in 
order to satisfy their urge for more drugs or alcohol and because their 
aggravated condition makes them unemployable. Some drug addicts do not 
hesitate to physically attack and harm their victims, also because they may be 
acting under the influence of certain drugs which are known to cause 
aggressive behaviour, e.g. cocaine and crack. They both have a low 
commitment to robbery because of its dangers, but a high commitment to theft 
because they can raise money to fund their addictions. When committing a 
robbery, they do not usually plan it and are satisfied with enough money to get 
their next fix.  
 
2.3.3.4 Characteristics of robbers 
 
Literature findings point to a classification of the typical jewellery store robber as a 
professional criminal. It would appear as if this crime is seldom the work of 
occasional robbers. According to industry sources in Italy (Armando 1998:104-105), 
jewellery robbers have become increasingly professional, “exclusive and 
international”, in the sense that they concentrate their unlawful activities in the 
jewellery sector only and do not associate with other categories of criminals. This 
seems to be the case also in the United States where law enforcement agencies have 
developed strong evidence supporting the existence of organised criminals identified 
as “South American Theft / Robbery Gangs”, which are actively engaged in criminal 
activities against the jewellery industry (Jewelers’ Security Alliance 1999:14).  
 
In South Africa, research participants McKinnon, Brown, Pearson and Bergman 
(2001) also indicated that jewellery store robberies are a phenomenon involving 
professional criminals. Jewellery store robbery usually involves a considerable degree 
of planning, because of the presence of security systems, which protect a jewellery 
store. Also, the stolen merchandise does not really have value unless it can be 
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immediately disposed of and transformed into cash, which is what robbers want most. 
This presumes that the robbers involved maintain a reliable network of contacts 
(fences) in the criminal underworld. Attempts to identify the criminals through the 
stolen jewellery are often thwarted by the increasing availability of recycling 
operations. Furthermore, according to industry sources (e.g. insurance companies and 
loss adjusters), police investigations into jewellery store robberies found that this 
crime is at times commissioned by crime syndicates, which make use of trained and 
professional robbers. All of these factors point to various degrees of professionalism 
among jewellery store robbers.  
 
With regard to a profile on the jewellery store robber, the researcher established that 
there is a clear lack of local and international data on the offender’s perspective. This 
study is also not focused on the jewellery store robber as the offender. Therefore it is 
recommended that this specific area be considered for future research. However, 
based on a study of the available literature, it is possible to draw a general profile on 
robbers as follows: 
 
i) Age 
According to Schönteich (2000:17), Statistics SA found that 109,3 out of 
every 100 000 males aged 18 to 20 were convicted of robbery. Less than a 
third, or 30,4 out of every 100 000 males aged over 20 were convicted of 
robbery. On average, less than one out of every 100 000 females (across all 
age groups) was convicted of robbery. Maree (1999:53) in her study of bank 
robbery in South Africa, a type of crime which, as in the case of jewellery 
store robbery, involves a more professional type of criminal, found that the 
majority of robbers taking part in the sample were in their 30’s. Based on the 
same study, the majority of the subjects had a criminal record before they 
reached the age of 21. This shows that offenders start with criminal behaviour 
at an early stage of their life and usually progress to more professional types of 
crime as they get older.  
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ii) Gender 
Criminological research confirmed that male offenders are in the vast majority 
of cases responsible for robbery (Flowers 2003:187; Siegel 2004:346), 
although females may also play a part by, for instance, providing information 
on a potential target, being on the look-out during a robbery and offering a 
hide-out place for the robbers. They can therefore be considered as 
accomplices or accessories after the fact. Often young women become 
associated with a criminal subculture and provide various levels of assistance 
to the male counterpart.  
 
Statistics SA (Schönteich 2000:17) found that, on average, in South Africa 
less than one in every 100 000 females (across all age groups) was convicted 
of robbery. However, at present there is a tendency for women to become 
more involved in violent crime, including robbery, as the role of women in 
society continues to change and they become involved in the same type of 
activities as their male counterparts.  The presence of women during armed 
robberies has been reported (Ajam, Russow & Schmidt 2005:1). 
 
iii) Racial group  
As in the case of the United States, where young black perpetrators account 
for a substantially high portion of robbery (Flowers 2003:187), in an 
heterogeneous society such as that of South Africa, a disproportionately high 
number of perpetrators of crime come from marginalised and economically 
deprived black and coloured communities (Leggett 2004a:22). The possible 
causes for the frequent involvement in crime of marginalised and 
discriminated against groups can be found in their resentment, frustration, 
despair, anger and violence, all forms of rebellion against the authorities and 
the richest sections of the population, including owners of businesses. For a 
resentful, violence-prone person, robbery may afford, besides an immediate 
financial reward, a sense of power over their victims (Siegel 2004:349). 
 
iv) Social status  
It appears as if the majority of robbers are more likely to come from the lower, 
more marginalised and undereducated groups in society.  Maree (1999:53) 
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found that the majority of the bank robbers in her research were poorly 
educated (left school after standard eight) at the time the robberies took place. 
However, while the criminals executing the robbery may fit the above profile, 
this does not seem to be the case for the fences or the leaders of the robbery 
syndicates who may well be wealthy and educated people living a good life 
out of the illicit profits. 
 
2.3.4 The unfolding of a robbery 
 
In general, business robberies committed by professional criminals tend to exhibit 
high levels of planning, organization and victim-management skills (Barlow 
1996:161). These robberies are characterised by different phases, the most important 
ones being planning, selecting a suitable target, casing the store, establishing co-
presence, entering into a conflict situation, transferring of valuables, leaving the crime 
scene and disposing of stolen valuables. Each phase is further characterised by 
specific actions which, during the course of the robbers’ career, may become so 
repetitive and distinctive as to constitute their trademark or modus operandi. 
 
2.3.4.1 Planning 
 
Planning is undertaken to minimise the risk of being caught, identified or injured (or 
having to cause injury to the victims). The time spent on the planning phase varies 
from robber to robber and is influenced by factors such as, amongst others, previous 
crime experience, personal circumstances, use of drugs and alcohol, the number of 
criminals involved in the robbery, cognitive abilities and personality characteristics 
(Maree 1999:54). During the planning stage, the offender makes the necessary 
arrangements, such as seeking the assistance of accomplices, assigning specific roles, 
finding suitable weapons and vehicles, short-listing suitable targets and devising 
feasible getaway routes (Barlow 1996:159). Jewellery store robbers are probably also 
in close contact with potential buyers (fences), who may place an order for a specific 
type of merchandise. Being considered as professional implies that, in most cases, the 
jewellery store robbers will carefully plan the event and assess all possible obstacles 
which could be found on their way. 
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2.3.4.2 Selecting a suitable target   
 
Robbers’ criteria in selecting victims and targets vary depending on the type of 
robbery they are about to commit. Based on rational choice explanations, robbers try 
to assess each situation and weigh both rewards and risks (apprehension and 
sanctions) prior to going into action (see Chapter 4, section 4.3.1.1).  
 
Important factors that professional criminals usually consider during the selection of 
the most suitable target are the individual robber’s perception of the security 
countermeasures such as barriers, systems and the presence of security / police 
personnel, the location, parking opportunities, entrances and exits, movements of 
people inside and ouside, size and design of the target (Barlow 1996:158; Maree 
1999:54).  
 
i) Profitability  
To make robbery worth the risk, robbers must have some indications that the 
victim (or target) carries (or keeps on premises) a reasonable amount of money 
(or valuable merchandise). Cash (or valuable items which can be exchanged 
for cash such as jewellery) is a primary motive and the amount or value 
available a crucial determinant of the target chosen.  
 
Commercial robbers prefer retail establishments such as supermarkets, 
restaurants and bars, the reason being they are among the kinds of businesses 
that have been least affected  by the credit revolution and the accounting 
system. Robbers can usually count on the ready availability of a reasonable 
amount of cash, something that could not be taken for granted with most street 
robberies (Stewart & Davis 2003:50).  
 
Jewellery stores may be considered suitable targets for robberies due to the 
fact that they contain valuable merchandise, which can be relatively easily 
carried away (a small bag can contain a considerable amount of stolen 
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jewellery), and transformed into cash because of the presence of available 
channels (fences). In reality, robbers only manage to obtain a fraction of the 
value of the jewellery. 
 
ii) Location 
The location of the target and its immediate environmental conditions are 
important elements influencing the offenders’ decision on whether or not to 
commit the crime. Robbers usually give priority to the following: 
 
• Familiarity with the area 
Non-professional robbers generally prefer to act in areas with which 
they feel familiar. They usually do not travel far in search of targets, as 
being mobile and venturing into new areas can be risky. Professional 
robbers, on the other hand, seem to be willing to travel considerable 
distances in order to reach lucrative targets and avoid possible 
recognition. In one instance, a group of criminals in the United States 
travelled long distances to rob jewellery stores in small towns because, 
in their eyes, small town jewellery stores were a perfect target; they 
typically contained an abundance of high value merchandise but lacked 
the sophisticated security systems associated with big city jewellers. 
The Police in small towns were also perceived as being less efficient 
than their metropolitan counterparts (Wright & Decker 1997:92-93). 
These findings are in line with those of Maree (1999:55) who indicated 
that professional robbers preferred to attack targets away from their 
residential area. 
• Presence of police and security personnel         
Robbers try to avoid confrontation with the police and security, the risk 
of being apprehended, injured or killed being the obvious reasons 
(Siegel 2004:113). When selecting a target, the robber usually assesses 
the probability of police or security intervention by considering factors 
such as the distance of the target from the nearest police station / 
security company, the estimated response time and the frequency of 
police / security patrols in the area.  
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• Availability of escape routes        
Because the finding of suitable escape routes is of the utmost 
importance, robbers usually need to be familiar with the area; this is 
referred to as their “awareness space” (Siegel 2004:113). The 
following factors are usually taken into consideration: the vicinity and 
the geographical location of the target; the traffic flow in the 
immediate area; available parking (depending on the escape mode); the 
whereabouts of the nearest police station (to estimate the reaction time) 
and the design of the target. Commercial targets situated near a 
freeway are usually preferred as this offers easy and immediate access 
to a major escape route. Busy streets also allow robbers to blend with 
the traffic, thus reducing the risk of being identified and caught (Felson 
2002:136). 
 
iii) Manageability of target 
Some targets can be more manageable than others depending on factors such 
as temporal and physical accessibility, the victim’s capability or willingness to 
resist the robbery, and the physical layout and visibility of the store. 
 
• Temporal and physical accessibility  
Certain targets are more appealing than others due to their extended 
working hours or their easy physical accessibility, e.g. cafes, 
supermarkets and restaurants. Such free access enables the robbers to 
be fast and efficient, thus minimising the risk of apprehension. 
Jewellery stores are also generally not difficult to attack because of 
their “open door approach” and lack of effective security barriers 
during business hours. As a result these businesses are soft targets for 
robberies. This is especially true for those which are unable to afford 
costly security measures (Stewart & Davis 2003:50). The presence of 
physical and electronic systems such as gates, alarms and CCTV may, 
at times, act as a deterrent. However, as reported by Bergman (2001), 
these measures do not seem to deter a determined effort by 
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professional criminals who will either neutralise the security features 
or simply choose to ignore them. 
• Victims’ capability/ willingness to resist the robbery 
Retail establishments are also often targeted because their employees 
are merely ordinary citizens who are usually not equipped to defend 
themselves against robbers (Stewart & Davis 2003:50). Robbers seem 
to be aware that employees of retail stores are usually not armed. 
Furthermore, they are not likely to resist armed criminals, not only 
because the money and merchandise are not theirs but also because 
they are thought to be insured.  
 
Robbers are unwilling to act when they perceive the chances of 
meeting strong opposition from the victim, getting caught, injured or 
killed are too high. Robbers may see the prospect of having to deal 
with large number of people, e.g. staff and customers, as a risk factor. 
In addition to such a situation being unpredictable and difficult to 
control, there is also a greater chance of being identified later. The 
logic behind this is the fact that robbers want to exercise maximum 
control over victims and events, thus avoiding the possibility of 
encountering strong resistance and being overwhelmed (Pearson 2001). 
Also, the position of the staff in the store may affect the robbers’ 
decision to attack as they may lose control when members of staff are 
positioned in different places. 
• Physical layout and visibility 
Due to the limited business hours, jewellery store criminals are usually 
forced to commit robbery during broad daylight. In this case, criminals 
seem to feel more comfortable in robbing those establishments that 
have a view to the inside obstructed by obstacles such as posters and 
furniture as this minimises their risk of being seen by security, police 
or passers-by (Felson 2002:137).   
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Stores with multiple entry and exit points present an advantage to the 
robbers who are not restricted to coming and going through a single 
opening. They also provide more than one escape route. Close 
proximity of the till / safe to the front door also allows for swift access 
to the money and reduces the risk of apprehension. As discussed, the 
position of the counters is also important as robbers do not seem to like 
having to keep control over members of staff positioned in different 
areas of the store. 
 
2.3.4.3 Casing the store 
 
Most robberies against jewellers are preceded by some form of “casing” which can be 
defined as “to inspect or study the store with the intent to rob” (Jewellers’ Vigilance 
Canada 2000:24). The criminals will want to find out as much information as possible 
about the conditions in the vicinity of the store which they intend to target, in 
particular parking opportunities, police / security patrols and general movement of 
people. Sometimes casing takes place immediately before a loss, not giving the 
jeweller time to react. However, in other situations, the process of casing is conducted 
over a period of hours, days, weeks and even longer. The robbers may pose as 
customers and spend some time looking at the merchandise in order to assess certain 
conditions inside the store such as, amongst others, the position of the CCTV 
cameras, the alarm system, the position of the till or safe, the location of the most 
expensive merchandise, the layout of the store, the number of entries / exits, the 
number of employees and the presence of store guards (Barlow 1996:159). In other 
cases, in order to obtain information on the store, some jewellery store robbers may 
pose as credit applicants, obviously providing false information on the application 
form. Research participants Bergman and Pearson (2001) reported that robbers often 
repeatedly visited the store which they intended to attack. 
 
2.3.4.4 Establishing co-presence 
 
The offenders move into striking range of the target or victim. Since they are usually 
careful not to cause unnecessary suspicion or opposition from the victim, the 
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criminals rely on the elements of speed and stealth or deceit to surprise an 
unsuspecting victim (Wright & Decker 1997:95-96). As reported by research 
participants Bergman and Pearson (2001), both deceit and speed are employed by 
jewellery store robbers who may pose as customers suddenly showing their real 
intention to unsuspecting victims, or storm into the store brandishing weapons. 
 
2.3.4.5 Entering into a conflict situation 
 
At this stage, the criminals announce their real intention which is to dominate the 
events at all costs. They assume the assigned roles to which they must adhere if the 
robbery is to be successful, e.g. watching the entrance, paying attention to time, 
keeping staff and customers at bay, seizing cash and valuables (Barlow 1996:160). 
Robbers also threaten the victim with violence should he / she fail to comply with 
their orders and demands, often through the creation of a convincing illusion of 
impending death (Wright & Decker 1997:128). After the surprise factor, fear of losing 
one’s life or being injured sets in and this usually prevents any reaction by jewellers, 
staff and customers, especially if confronted by robbers armed with firearms. The 
danger exists that a victim because of his/her shocked condition, may be unable to 
react to the commands put to him/her. Robbers who fail to secure co-operation may, 
at this stage, resort to force in order to subdue, incapacitate or further intimidate the 
victim(s). Should the victim react, the offenders usually respond with severe but non-
lethal violence in order to bring the victim(s) into line with their expectations. In 
general, robbers do not intend to kill the victim(s), but some are prepared to resort to 
deadly force if need be (SAPS Robbery Intelligence Desk 2002). Maree (1999:55) 
also found that bank robbers who acted as a group were more inclined to be violent 
but, when possible, without causing serious bodily harm to the victims.   
 
2.3.4.6 Transferring of valuables 
 
After having obtained the victim’s co-operation through threat of violence, 
intimidation or actual physical force, the robbers then proceed to seize valuables, 
unless this action is suddenly interrupted by events such as the arrival of a third party, 
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security or police, or the stubborn resistance by the victim(s). As reported by research 
participant Bergman and Pearson (2001), in a jewellery store robbery, fine jewellery 
and watches are amongst the robbers’ preferred items. However, robbers (especially if 
not immediately threatened), will seize as much jewellery as possible and may also 
turn their attention to cash (from the till) and the victims’ personal belongings, e.g. 
cash, wallets, bags, and cellular phones or firearms. While seizing jewellery, much 
damage can be done to counters and display cases, which are usually smashed by 
robbers using hammers or handheld pickaxes. 
 
2.3.4.7 Leaving the crime scene 
 
The getaway is the most important phase of any robbery for the criminals must escape 
to avoid apprehension. The robbers will usually attempt to terminate the interaction 
with the victim at a time and under conditions of their choosing. It is during this stage 
that violence is most likely to erupt, especially if the robbers are hindered at the time 
of their escape (Barlow 1996:161). This is in fact a very critical moment in the 
robbery event, which requires the victim(s) to remain calm in order to avoid the 
possibility of further victimisation, which may include shooting, stabbing or taking 
hostages (Consumers Goods Council of South Africa 2005). The criminals have to 
rely on the skills of their driver who is usually positioned nearby with the engine 
running in order to clear the scene quickly.  
 
2.3.4.8 Disposing of stolen valuables 
 
According to research participants Bergman and Pearson (2001), robbers are known 
to dispose of the stolen jewellery via a network of professional fences who maintain 
close contacts with crime syndicates. The fence can be defined as someone who 
purchases stolen goods on a regular basis for resale; he is a middleman, a layer 
between the thief and the buyer, the latter generally being a merchant, a businessman, 
a wholesaler or a criminal group (Siegel 2004:376-377). According to Snyman 
(1995:479-485), fences’ activities are clearly unlawful. In fact, they can be charged 
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with the crime of “receiving stolen property, well knowing it to have been stolen”, 
which is committed when a person intentionally and unlawfully receives possession 
of property knowing at the time of receipt that it has been stolen. 
 
Two types of fences can be identified, i.e. the occasional and professional receiver 
(Felson 2002:70). They are different in that while the occasional receivers do not 
exclusively devote themselves to fencing, the professional receivers dedicate 
themselves to fencing, regularly buying stolen property directly from criminals and 
profitably working it back into legitimate trade through a network of contacts with 
legitimate buyers. To be successful, a professional fence must meet certain conditions 
such as i) available cash to pay the criminals; ii) thorough knowledge of the trade; iii) 
connections with suppliers of stolen goods who are relatively free of police 
interference (e.g. warehouse workers); iv) continued access to buyers; v) complicity 
with law enforcers, which usually involves either bribing corrupted officials or acting 
as an informer in important cases (Siegel 2004:377).  
 
Having to rely on fences makes jewellery store robbery particularly risky in that, if 
the fence is arrested he / she may reveal the names of the robbers and vice versa. 
Furthermore, if a fence is not immediately available, this also adds to the risk. 
However, without a fence, jewellery robbers would find it extremely difficult to 
dispose of the stolen goods and, in so doing, generate the cash they need, which 
remains the main objective of their criminal action.  
 
According to police sources, a sudden increase in the robbery of jewellery stores in 
the northern suburbs of Johannesburg could be due to the known presence of fences 
operating in the area, willing to buy stolen jewellery from criminals (Jewellery theft 
on the rise 2001:2).  In some cases, in fact, robbers do not even choose their own 
targets. Instead, they rely on the services of a professional fence who tells them where 
and when to commit robberies and specifies exactly what type of jewellery is to be 
taken on the basis of current demands (Wright & Decker 1997:93). However, thieves 
and robbers also depend on members of the public which often supply the demand for 
stolen goods (Felson 2002:71). 
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Fences dealing in stolen jewellery need to have a certain level of expertise, in order to 
be able to evaluate the merchandise received from the criminals. For this reason it 
may be inferred that some of them are somehow associated with the trade. When 
selling jewellery to fences, criminals are usually paid out a fraction of the price of the 
merchandise. Professional criminals who steal high-priced items are given the highest 
amounts. Jewellery, especially when made of exclusive design or belonging to private 
individuals, could be easily identified by the legitimate owners. According to 
Bergman (2001), a common method employed by criminals in order to thwart 
identification of stolen jewellery is by removing identifiable characteristics. Gold, 
silver and other metals can be melted down and jewels (precious stones) can be 
removed from their settings. However, fences also rely on a very rapid turnover of the 
stolen goods and often prefer sending “hot” merchandise a considerable distance 
away, through buyers situated in other cities and even in foreign countries. Once 
received from the criminals and paid for, the fence will then either directly or 
indirectly resell the stolen goods. Directly, as when the jewellery is resold to 
customers in the fence’s own store (making out false or vague receipts and keeping a 
supply of purchase receipts of legitimate goods that can cover the purchase of similar 
stolen goods at a later stage, may help in legitimising the possession of particular 
items of jewellery); indirectly, as when the jewellery is channeled to business buyers 
or to other dealers who then sell the goods directly to consumers or perhaps direct 
them along other distribution channels, e.g. other dealers in stolen goods, second-hand 
stores, pawn shops, auctions, retail merchants, wholesalers, and special customers 
such as private collectors. 
 
The police use a number of methods in order to arrest offenders and bring about a 
conviction for fencing stolen property, such as frequent inspections of pawnshops and 
second hand stores, “sting operations” (posing as fences), or keeping suspects under 
surveillance by means of legal investigative techniques such as telephone tapping, 
photographic evidence, tailing and use of informers (Felson 2002:73). Whatever the 
method, it is of paramount importance for the police to arrest the fences if there is to 
be a reduction in jewellery store robbery. Proving in a court of law that the fence 
knows that the goods are stolen can be a difficult task.  This is particularly true if one 
takes into account the relative impersonality of property items and the lack of 
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adequate property identification. Furthermore, owners often fail to maintain an 
adequate record of their jewellery, with relevant photographs of each item. 
 
2.3.5 Case studies on jewellery store robbery 
 
The researcher was able to analyse different types of jewellery store robbery 
following information (in the form of confidential investigative reports) received from 
the loss control manager of a national jewellery retail company (confidentiality was 
agreed on). Three case studies were compiled as follows: 
 
• Robbery committed by a lone criminal. 
• Robbery committed by a small group of criminals. 
• Robbery committed by a large group of criminals. 
 
2.3.5.1 Case study A: armed robbery committed during business hours by an  
        offender acting alone and by surprise. 
 
i)  Type of premises 
 Jeweller retailers 
ii)  Location 
 Multi storey shopping centre in suburban area (corner store facing mall 
 walkway) 
iii)  Time, day and date of loss 
 Approximately 11:50 a.m. – Wednesday - 19 April 2006 
iv) Cause of loss 
Armed robbery by a criminal acting alone 
v) Number of staff employed 
Two permanent and one casual (two were present at the time of the robbery) 
vi) Security arrangements 
- Alarm system comprising of one panic button and one magnetic door 
  contact (no passive infrared detectors). 
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- SABS category 2 ADM safes. 
- Security guards provided by centre management. 
- CCTV system provided by centre management (no cameras installed at 
  or near the store). 
- No roller shutters on doors / windows. 
vii) Description of incident 
One member of staff was in the back office and the other busy on the phone 
when a man approached the latter and asked her: “Do you know that security 
guards are on strike”? As she did not answer him immediately, the man 
repeated the question and then told her to move away as he “wanted to work”. 
He then showed her his firearm and told her to move into the back office. 
Before she could react, the robber jumped over the counter behind her. Both 
members of staff were made to sit on the floor in the back office. The robber 
opened the safe and took one pad of rings, which he placed into a bag that he 
had brought with him. He then asked for the keys to the front display units and 
made one member of staff assist him in opening them. During this time, 
customers approached the staff member and each time the robber politely told 
them that they were busy. A customer entered the store to change the account 
details and was told by the robber to return later as they were busy with a 
survey. 
 
Every time the robber took a tray of jewellery, he went to the back office to 
put the jewellery into his bag. When the bag was full, he ordered both staff 
members to remain seated and, before walking out, took their cellular phones 
and cash from the till. During the robbery the offender constantly made 
reference to the fact that he was not alone and that his accomplices were just 
outside the store. When the staff realized the robber had left, they immediately 
raised the alarm and the centre management security responded shortly 
thereafter. 
viii) Loss 
The loss amounted to approximately R 250 000 in stock retail value (assorted 
jewellery), R 5000 in cash and R 2000 for the cellphones. 
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ix) Investigation 
The robbery was reported to the local police station and a case docket was 
opened for investigation. No arrest and / or recoveries were made. 
x) Comments 
The alarm system was substandard as it did not include passive infrared 
detectors and glass sensors (for the volumetric and perimeter protection of the 
store). A jewellery store cannot rely only on a magnetic door contact at the 
front door. Furthermore, for an emergency panic system to be effective, staff 
should not rely only on a fixed panic button installed at the main counter but 
should instead also be provided with panic buttons at strategic positions 
including the back office where they are usually confined by robbers. Portable 
panic transmitters should also be carried by each member of staff.  
 
In the above incident, the existing centre management CCTV system proved to 
be totally ineffective for the identification of the robber as no cameras had 
been installed near the store entrance. Again, this stresses the fact that 
jewellery store owners should not rely exclusively on centre management’s 
security arrangements but should instead adapt security to the unique needs of 
their stores. 
 
2.3.5.2 Case study B: armed robbery committed during business hours by a 
 small group of offenders acting by force. 
 
i)  Type of premises 
 Jeweller retailers 
ii)  Location 
 Shopping centre in the central business district of a small town 
iii)  Time, day and date of loss 
 Approximately 10:45 a.m. - Saturday - 13 August 2005 
iv) Cause of loss 
Armed robbery by four criminals 
v) Number of staff employed 
Two permanent and one casual (all were present at the time of the robbery) 
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vi) Security arrangements 
- Standard alarm system comprising of a magnetic contact at front door, 
  passive infrared detectors and glass break sensors. 
- Fixed panic button located beneath desk in the office. 
- Portable panic transmitters placed beneath a counter and at the point of 
  sale. 
- SABS category 2 ADM safe. 
- Security guards provided by centre management. 
- CCTV system provided by centre management (no cameras installed at 
  or near the store). 
- No roller shutters on doors / windows. 
vii) Description of incident 
An armed man entered the store, jumped over the counter and placed a firearm 
at one of the store employees’ side. Simultaneously two more men entered the 
store, jumped over the counter and held another staff member up at gun point, 
manhandling her in the process as they thought she intended to trigger the 
alarm. At the time of the attack, ten customers were in the store. The offenders 
forced staff to open the till and display cabinets and to remove and place 
jewellery in bags. At times, when the robbers considered the staff were not 
acting quickly enough, display cabinets were forced open. During this time, a 
fourth offender kept watch at the entrance. After threatening and warning staff 
and customers not to move, the robbers escaped on foot. The robbery lasted 
for approximately five minutes. 
viii) Loss 
The loss amounted to approximately R 500 000 in stock retail value (assorted 
jewellery and watches), R 500 in cash (stolen from the till). 
ix) Investigation 
The robbery was reported to the local police station and a case docket was 
opened for investigation. No arrest and / or recoveries were made. 
x) Comments 
The presence of thirteen people in the store did not deter a determined group 
of robbers. Staff members were unable to activate the panic system as they did 
not carry the panic transmitters on their person. Furthermore, a major 
shortcoming in the store security arrangements was that no video footage of 
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the robbery was available to assist the police with their investigation (given 
that no CCTV camera had been installed inside or near the store). 
 
Immediately after the robbery, an alerted employee locked the doors and 
requested the witnesses to remain inside the store until the police arrived. 
However, one customer who suffered from severe shock left without being 
asked for his/her name and address. In this type of situation, it is of the utmost 
importance for staff to know how to handle the crime scene as the presence of 
a large group of people in a small area may cause the destruction of valuable 
evidence (see Chapter 6, section 6.3.4.2.3). 
  
2.3.5.3 Case study C: armed robbery committed after business hours by a         
 large group of offenders evading security. 
 
i)  Type of premises 
 Jeweller retailers 
ii)  Location 
 Major shopping centre in suburban area 
iii)  Time, day and date of loss 
 Approximately 06:50 a.m. - Wednesday – 1 February 2006 
iv) Cause of loss 
Armed robbery at two jewellery stores (committed by twelve armed 
criminals). 
v) Number of staff employed 
Store A: six permanent and one casual (none present at the time of the 
robbery). Store B: seven permanent and one casual (none present at the time of 
the robbery). 
vi) Security arrangements 
- Standard alarm system comprising of a magnetic contact at front door, 
  passive infrared detectors and glass break sensors. 
- No panic buttons linked to alarm system. 
- SABS category 2 ADM safes. 
- Security guards provided by centre management (fourteen guards,  
  some of them armed, were on duty at the time of the robbery; all  
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  guards are in two way radio communication with their control centre 
  located on the top parking level of the mall). 
- CCTV system provided by centre management (164 cameras  
  strategically placed throughout the shopping centre). 
- All twelve entrances to the shopping centre are locked at about 01h00 
  a.m. (after the last movie) and reopened between 06h00 and 06h30  
  a.m. One entrance remains open to allow cleaners entry / exit (always 
  under  guard. 
- No roller shutters on doors / windows. 
vii) Description of incident 
Twelve heavily armed men entered the mall via the entrance (found open) 
closest to the targeted jewellery stores (situated in an area called “The 
Jewellery Court”). The criminals were armed with a variety of weapons 
including handguns, semi-automatic rifles, shotguns and pick axes. Most of 
them wore headgear to prevent recognition of facial features. CCTV footage 
showed some of the robbers stopping at a jewellery store and firing shots into 
the windows smashing the glass panes. The robbers then split with one group 
targeting the above store and another targeting the display windows of a store 
in the immediate vicinity. The criminals left two minutes after entering the 
shopping centre carrying the jewellery out in small bags, in their hands or in 
their pockets. 
viii) Loss 
The loss amounted to approximately R 337 000 in stock retail value (assorted 
jewellery and watches). Damage to the store amounted to approximately        
R 60 000. 
ix) Investigation 
The robbery was reported to the local police station and a case docket was 
opened for investigation. Investigating police officers confirmed that a spate 
of robberies had been committed at shopping malls following a similar modus 
operandi. 
x) Comments 
The presence of fourteen guards and 164 CCTV cameras in the mall did not 
deter a determined group of robbers who managed to gain access via an 
unattended entrance without being spotted by security. The possibility of 
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complicity on the part of some of the guards needs to be investigated, e.g. by 
means of a polygraph test. Particular attention should be paid to the actions of 
the guard who, based on CCTV footage, walked away casually from the 
entrance just a couple of minutes before the robbery. Furthermore, it appears 
as if the security service provider and shopping centre management 
concentrated most security resources on the inside of the complex, thus 
leaving the external areas without adequate security surveillance. The 
deployment of guards trained as “crime spotters” in the external areas of a 
shopping centre, particularly near entrances leading to high value stores, can 
help prevent armed robberies. These guards should be trained in surveillance 
techniques and in the identification of potential criminal behaviour. Their role 
is to act as the first line of defense against criminals planning to commit a 
robbery at a shopping centre. 
 
According to the loss adjusters who investigated the incident, other jewellery 
stores in the immediate vicinity of the robbery scene were not attacked as they 
had taken adequate precautions by not leaving high-value stock items out on 
display over night. In addition, the robbers did not manage to penetrate a third 
jewellery store as the owners had recently strengthened the display glass 
windows. Therefore, these measures proved successful in preventing after 
hour robberies. 
 
2.4 CONCLUSION 
 
In this chapter, the researcher explained how the different types of jewellery stores, 
their main components (merchandise, clientele, personnel and adopted security 
measures), and the activities performed by jewellers and members of staff (from 
opening until closing time) can influence the element of risk, in particular through 
specific situations conducive to robbery. It is evident that, while the intrinsic value of 
jewellery, which can be easily converted into cash, remains the main factor attracting 
criminals to a jewellery store, other conditions typical of a jewellery store, also play 
an important role in the unfolding of the robbery event.  
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As discussed, the lack of specific information and statistics on jewellery store robbery 
in South Africa stressed the importance of the researcher’s investigation into this 
crime phenomenon. Based on available literature and information obtained by the 
researcher via reliable sources within the jewellery industry, a picture emerged of the 
typical jewellery store robber as a professional criminal motivated by his quest for 
immediate financial rewards and experienced in the commission of robbery, which is 
generally well-planned and executed (in different phases). Jewellery store robberies 
seem to be a predominantly urban and sub-urban phenomenon of the larger 
metropolitan areas. The criminals’ modus operandi usually involves an attack by a 
group of robbers mainly at opening time, with some gaining “legitimate” access to the 
targeted store by posing as customers, and others getting involved in various 
supportive roles. In the majority of cases, victims seem to be confronted by criminals 
armed with firearms and wearing minimal or no disguises. The robbers also seem to 
be unperturbed as to the presence of bystanders and security measures (especially if a 
store has been identified as a profitable target) and, although violence is not common, 
they are usually ready to use force if provoked by the victims. Some of the robbers 
have also been recognised by jewellers and staff as having visited the store on 
previous occasions (as part of the “casing” phase). In the following chapter, emphasis 
will shift from the crime and the offender to the victim of jewellery store robbery. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
AN ANALYSIS OF VICTIMS OF JEWELLERY STORE ROBBERY 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Until von Hentig’s time (1948), the explanation of crime largely ignored the role of 
the victim in the causation of crime. The criminals with their behaviour and 
personality were the main subjects of study. With von Hentig’s work on “The 
criminal and his victim” and Mendelsohn at a later stage (1965), more attention was 
paid to the problems concerning crime victimisation, in particular to the criminal-
victim interaction and victim’s involvement in the criminal event (Garkawe 2001:92; 
Fattah 2002:32-33). 
 
Victims can play a significant role in the genesis of criminal behaviour by either 
actively or passively contributing to their victimisation (Siegel 2004:91). Everyone in 
society is a latent victim of robbery; but while the threat of robbery is always present, 
some individuals or businesses are more exposed to it due to certain factors that make 
them more attractive to criminals.  This can be said of jewellers and members of staff 
whose occupation exposes them to a high crime risk, with theft and armed robbery the 
most likely occurrences (Jewellers’ Vigilance Canada 2000:2). 
 
Due to the violent nature of the robbery event and the possible serious consequences 
on the victim, an understanding of the interaction process between the victim and the 
offender in a specific setting, in this case the jewellery store, is fundamental. The 
victim’s behaviour during the criminal attack is dependent on specific individual 
factors and ultimately determines the criminal’s reaction. In this regard, it can be 
stated that the way in which jewellers and staff react during a robbery often means the 
difference between getting injured or successfully managing the event without being 
hurt. 
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3.2 VICTIMISATION RISKS FOR JEWELLERY STORE ROBBERY 
 
Vulnerability to victimisation describes the likelihood of a person or business 
becoming a crime victim (Van der Hoven & Maree 2005:56). This is related to 
various factors such as bio-socio-demographic properties (e.g. age, gender, race and 
location), the characteristics of potential targets (e.g. attractiveness, suitability, 
vulnerability, exposure to motivated offenders and high-risk situations) and the 
behaviour or lifestyle of those targets (Walklate 2003:40). It is important to stress the 
fact that it is the combined presence of specific risk factors in time and space that 
contribute to a jeweller’s likelihood of victimisation. For instance, the presence of 
motivated offenders (e.g. robbers) in a specific area (e.g. suburban shopping centre) 
where a suitable (vulnerable) target (e.g. jewellery store) is situated may result in the 
latter being chosen by criminals and later victimised. In this regard, as explained 
below, Fattah’s integrated model of criminal victimisation can be used to show how 
various victimisation risk factors affect jewellers and their businesses (Fattah 
1991:341-346). 
 
3.2.1 Occupation as risk exposure 
 
The type of work that one does is a factor in either increasing or diminishing the level 
of fear and the actual exposure to risk. Certain occupations carry with them a higher 
than average potential for criminal victimisation and can therefore be considered as 
high-risk activities (Fattah 1991:344-345). Robbery rates vary substantially according 
to the victim’s occupation (Karmen, 2007:66). Business owners and members of staff 
working late hours and dealing with large amounts of cash, such as for instance 
convenience store and restaurant or bar owners, are subjected to high levels of fear 
and risk.  
 
In the context of this study, occupational vulnerability is very important in that it is 
the type of work that jewellers and staff do which exposes them to the risk of 
victimisation. In fact, because they are dealing with extremely valuable merchandise 
which attracts criminals, they are subjected to an above average risk of victimisation.  
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3.2.2 Level of responsibility 
 
The degree of fear and exposure to risk is affected by specific conditions such as the 
level of responsibility at work or the position and interest that one holds in a particular 
business (Fattah 1991:345). Jewellery store owners are obviously very concerned 
about all types of crime affecting their business. Incidents of theft and robbery may 
cause serious losses and even put them out of business. The store manager, because of 
his/her level of responsibility, e.g. being responsible for opening and closing or being 
in possession of the store keys, may also experience a higher level of risk.  
 
3.2.3 Location of business premises 
 
As opposed to Europe, jewellery stores in South Africa have moved out of the urban 
areas because of serious crime problems, and have concentrated in suburban areas, for 
the most part inside shopping complexes (see section 2.3.3.2 vii). However, there are 
still stores located along urban and suburban streets which, due to easier access and 
availability of escape routes, may be considered as an attractive robbery target. 
 
Whilst stores situated inside shopping complexes are usually less at risk than those 
which are street front, this is not always the case, as there have been instances of 
heavy losses suffered as a result of robberies committed during business hours and 
burglaries (after hours). Although the presence of risk reduction measures at these 
complexes such as armed guards, security patrols and response, as well as CCTV 
systems with video recording facilities are undoubtedly a deterrent for most criminals, 
they do not seem to be able to stop a determined effort by a group of professional 
jewellery criminals (research participant Pearson 2001). 
 
Victimisation shows a close relationship to specific areas (Fattah 1991:344). There are 
certain crime hot spots close to high-crime areas, in which there is a greater risk of 
victimisation than in other areas located close to low-crime areas. The rate of 
victimisation is usually higher in urban areas, particularly central city areas. A 
possible explanation is that large urban and commercial areas offer a greater degree of 
anonymity and have a higher concentration of available targets and opportunities for 
crime victimisation. In addition, they are often characterised by insufficient security 
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measures and poor environmental and architectural planning (Karmen 2007:64-65; 
Van der Hoven & Maree 2005:57-58). The proximity of a jewellery store to crime 
risk areas, entry / exit points, main roads and freeway ramps may increase the risk of 
robbery, especially if the nearest police station is situated a considerable distance 
away.  
 
3.2.4 Dangerous times and days of the week 
 
As indicated in section 2.3.3.2.i, the SAPS Robbery Intelligence Desk (2002) found 
that most commercial robberies against targets such as clothing, furniture and 
jewellery stores occured between 07:00 to 09:30, possibly because, during these 
times, there is less human traffic in the store other than the staff. Furthermore, this is 
when stores are getting ready for the day ahead. 17:00 up until closing time is also a 
critical period for robbery, with the majority of incidents occurring during the evening 
(Engelbrecht 2005). Jewellers are most often robbed while at work inside their stores, 
during business hours. Opening and closing times are particularly vulnerable. 
However, jewellers have also been attacked by robbers while on foot, driving or at 
home after business hours. According to the SAPS Robbery Intelligence Desk (2002), 
it is also clear that in South Africa most commercial robberies involving cash occur 
over weekends or on a Monday. This finding was also confirmed by a research 
conducted by the Consumer Goods Council of South Africa (2005). This is most 
probably due to perceptions among robbers that large amounts of money are available 
during this specific period because of restricted banking hours over weekends. 
 
3.2.5 Attractiveness of target 
 
An attractive target is one that the criminal perceives as being easier to attack and 
escape from and as having more rewards. But what in particular makes a jewellery 
store attractive to robbers? This is a subjective decision since, what is attractive to one 
robber, may not be necessarily so to another. Important factors, amongst others, can 
be the reward versus the risks, number of staff present at any given time, visibility 
from outside, the lack of visible security measures and the availability of easy escape 
routes (Fattah 1991:237-239). Lack of guardianship will also increase the 
attractiveness of the target for the offender. Guardianship is measured by the extent to 
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which people in the course of their daily activities do or do not protect property and 
individuals from crime. A capable guardian is a person or object that provides control 
over criminal behaviour (Van der Hoven and Maree 2005:57; Wilcox et al 2003:60). 
 
3.2.6 Crime opportunities 
 
Criminal victimisation does not happen by chance: in fact, the likelihood of 
victimisation is a function of the available opportunity to victimise. Variations in 
opportunities can thus explain, at least partially, the uneven distribution of 
victimisation and the differences in victimisation risks and rates. There are days, 
times, areas and places that provide more or better opportunities for criminal 
victimisation (Fattah 1991:341). 
 
Opportunities for criminal victimisation are closely related to the characteristics of 
potential targets (persons, households and businesses) as well as the activities and 
behaviour of those targets. The absence of capable guardians in particular is an 
important opportunity factor (Wilcox et al 2003:61-62). Therefore, providing 
criminals with opportunities for crime commission increases the possibility of 
victimisation. Through their behaviour, jewellers often create opportunities for crime 
which are then exploited by the criminal element.  
 
3.2.7 Patterns of individual behaviour 
 
Certain behavioural patterns place individuals in risky situations in that they create 
specific opportunities for crime to occur (Fattah 1991:344). The risk of being 
victimised is greater when jewellers or staff behave negligently or aggressively, e.g. 
during a robbery event. Furthermore, behaviour that tempts or attracts potential 
offenders may facilitate the commission of certain crimes such as theft and robbery. 
This reasoning implies that creating opportunities and behaving in a specific way may 
facilitate or precipitate the commission of robbery against jewellers.  
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3.2.8 Victim facilitation 
 
Negligent or careless behaviour on the part of the victim can give rise to crime 
temptation opportunities, thus making it easier for an individual to commit a criminal 
act (Karmen 2007:110-111). Imprudent, careless, reckless or negligent attitudes and 
behaviour have been empirically demonstrated to be conducive to victimisation 
(Fattah 1991:105). Robbery facilitation occurs whenever victims fail to take 
reasonable precautions to protect themselves or their property, or reasonable measures 
to prevent victimisation from taking place.  
 
Facilitating victims unwittingly assist their offenders and therefore share a minor 
amount of blame (Van der Hoven & Maree 2005:56). Practical examples related to 
this study can be the jeweller’s failure to notify police or security about the presence 
of suspicious individuals in the immediate proximity of the store; or the failure to 
adopt the security rule on “serve one customer at a time” or “show one item at a 
time”, in order to avoid falling victim to distraction theft (Jewellers Vigilance Canada 
2000:29). The jeweller’s failure to remove high value items from the windows after 
hours can also result in a burglary or smash and grab attacks. 
 
3.2.9 Victim precipitation  
 
Victim precipitation occurs when the opportunity for the commission of a crime is 
generated by some actions on the part of the victim that encourage or precipitate the 
offender’s behaviour (Van der Hoven & Maree 2005:56). According to victim 
precipitation, some people may actively or passively contribute to their own 
victimisation (Siegel 2004:91). Active precipitation occurs when victims act in a 
provocative manner, use verbal or physical threats or even attack first. Victims may 
resist in a way that turns a robbery into a murder. A practical example of this is when 
a jeweller, during a robbery, reacts by verbally or physically attacking the robber who 
then decides to use deadly force. Passive precipitation, on the other hand, may occur 
in different ways. The victim may be unaware of being targeted or may belong to a 
group being discriminated against. At times also negligent or careless behaviour can 
precipitate a crime. A practical example is when a jeweller opens the door of the store 
at closing time, to robbers posing as delivery personnel or late customers. Whether 
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active or passive, victim precipitation implies that at times the victim plays a 
significant role in causing his / her own victimisation, by giving the offender an 
opportunity to commit a crime.  
 
3.2.10 Repeat and multiple victimisation 
 
One measure of vulnerability is the frequency with which people or businesses are 
victimised repeatedly. Repeat victimisation can be described as a person, object or 
place being victimised more than once during a limited period of time (Felson 
2002:106). This implies that, in certain cases, there is a victim’s proneness because of 
specific personal characteristics, social situation, physical location, and relationship to 
offenders (Conklin 2001:310). Research has shown that repeatedly victimised people 
and places account for a significant proportion of all crime (Walklate 1989:126).  
 
The risk for a jewellery store to be attacked and robbed more than once in a short 
period of time is real. This was confirmed by research participants Mckinnon, Pearson 
and Bergman (2001) who stated that some criminals have been linked to the same 
crime scene through either circumstantial or direct evidence. According to these 
sources, some clients experienced two armed robberies within a few weeks of each 
other. It may happen that the same group of criminals commits another robbery at the 
same store once the stolen merchandise is replaced. 
 
Previous victimisation appears to be a good predictor of possible later victimisation, 
mainly for the following reasons (Conklin 2001:311):  
 
• Jewellers have risky occupations which keeps them vulnerable all the time. 
• It seems reasonable that a jewellery store which has proven to be attractive to 
burglars or robbers will remain attractive for the same and/or other burglars / 
robbers, unless the jeweller decides to increase the level of security. 
• There is a heightened risk period. After the first incident a new victimisation tends 
to follow within a short period. This will vary, however, by type of area. It would 
appear that the heightened risk period is shorter in an area with a high crime rate, 
although this will depend on the circumstances and the types of crimes.  
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According to a retail violence survey (Retail Violence Survey 2000:30-31) 
conducted in England, 34 percent of the retailers surveyed stated that they had 
been victims of a violent attack in their store between two and five times. Police 
services are becoming increasingly concerned about how often crimes are 
committed against the same places or individuals. The data in the British Retail 
Consortium (BRC) survey from single outlets shows that many shops suffer repeat 
crimes. As an example, over three-quarters of all burglaries committed against 
retailers are second, third, or even more frequent attacks against the same 
premises in the course of the year (Home Office National Board for Crime 
Prevention 2000:3). 
 
Besides the problem of repeat victimisation, jewellers also face the risk of multiple 
victimisation, that is, being a victim of more than one kind of offence (Walklate 
1989:123). As an example, a jeweller’s home can be broken into; he/she and the 
family can be held hostage; then, the jeweller can be kidnapped, assaulted, forced to 
open the store and robbed of valuable merchandise. 
 
3.3 THE VICTIMS OF JEWELLERY STORE ROBBERY 
 
The process of robbery victimisation at jewellery stores involves different types of 
victims and extends well beyond the boundaries of the store, e.g. inside the shopping 
complex or outside in the streets near the store. A jewellery store robbery, as in the 
case of many other commercial robberies, has implications for both persons and 
property. 
 
3.3.1 Property versus individuals 
 
Robbery of a business is similar to robbery of an individual: the victim must be 
present at the time of the crime and force or threat of force must be used. The robbery 
attack is carried out against the store with the intention to remove the valuable 
merchandise contained therein. During a criminal attack, the store may sustain 
considerable damage due to the robbers using force to gain access to the areas where 
the jewellery is stored; display cabinets may be forced open, glass may be shattered 
and windows damaged. At some stages during the attack, robbers may turn their 
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attention to the victims’ personal belongings, e.g. cash, watches, jewellery and 
cellular phones. Cash in the till or safe is also an attractive target. 
 
In order to get to the merchandise, the robbers must use violence or threat of violence 
against the custodians of such merchandise, i.e. the jewellers and members of staff. 
The process of victimisation may continue with the possible involvement of other 
victims, i.e. customers who happen to be present inside the store at the time of the 
robbery. Bystanders who happen to be in the robbers’ path during their escape may 
also be threatened, shot at, or taken hostage. Bystanders in many events are more than 
passive spectators; they may, by their very presence, prevent the commission of a 
robbery. What bystanders do depends on several factors such as, for instance, their 
relationship to the victim, their perception on the personal risks associated with 
intervention and the level of confidence in their ability to intervene (Sacco & 
Kennedy 2002:128). If bystanders react during a robbery event, they may cause the 
robbers to react violently and risk serious injuries and even death. Bystanders may 
also be valuable witnesses in a criminal investigation. They observe and/or hear what 
is happening at or near the crime scene, usually without taking part in the criminal act. 
However, research (cited in Sacco & Kennedy 2002:129) suggests that bystanders’ 
accounts are usually inaccurate, as they often fail to remember even key 
characteristics of the offenders. Members of a security company or police responding 
to a panic button alert or a report of a robbery in progress, may become involved in a 
shootout with the robbers and, at times, be injured or killed. During the shootout, 
general members of the public may be victimised as when, for instance, a stray bullet 
injures a passer-by near the scene of the robbery (Jewellers’ Vigilance Canada 
2000:16). Police or security involvement may happen by chance when they come 
across a robbery during their routine patrol activities. The jeweller’s family members 
may also be victimised, e.g. kidnapped or held hostage in exchange for access to the 
store or valuable merchandise (Williams 1999:2). In fact, it can be stated that 
jewellers and their families remain a tempting target for criminals 24 hours a day 
(Jewellers’ Vigilance Canada, 2000:27). 
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3.3.2 Typologies of victims  
 
Victims’ involvement in the criminal event varies according to personal, 
psychological and situational variables. Different typologies of victims can therefore 
be identified on the basis of their involvement or contribution or lack of both to the 
crime situation.  
 
3.3.2.1 General typology of victims 
 
Over the years, research into the victim’s role and position in his or her victimisation 
generated different typologies as explained below (Walklate 1989:2; Van der Hoven 
& Maree 2005:59-60). Von Hentig’s approach focused on the role of the victim in the 
perpetration of a criminal event or on how the victim could contribute to create the 
opportunities for the commission of a crime. In so doing, he identified thirteen 
different classes of victims, which referred mainly to psychological and sociological 
variables. The emphasis was on “victim proneness” or on the circumstances or 
behaviour which were more likely to cause victimisation. Mendelsohn’s typology, on 
the other hand, classified victims with respect to their culpability for a crime. His 
typology comprised six categories ranging from the completely innocent to the most 
guilty. Whilst open to severe criticism because of negative implications such as 
“victim’s blaming”, Mendelsohn’s notion of culpability turned out to be very useful 
not only in the application of the Criminal Procedure, e.g. in imposing suitable 
sentences, but also in the explanation of victim precipitated incidents of violent crime 
such as murder, assault and robbery. Mannheim (1965:672-673) suggested a general 
typology for victims of crime which is still of practical value in robbery victimisation: 
 
i) Direct victims 
This category includes all individuals or businesses that have been personally 
involved in the crime or directly affected by the actions of the criminal(s). The 
jeweller who lost valuable merchandise in a robbery event, the jewellery store 
which was badly damaged, e.g. display windows and cabinets shattered, as 
well as the customers who had their wallets and cellular phones stolen during 
the robbery, are all examples of “direct victims”. The robber himself may be 
injured or killed during the attack, thus becoming a direct victim of his crime. 
 - 79 -
 
ii) Indirect victims 
This category includes all individuals or businesses affected by the 
commission of a crime, for instance through their relationship to either the 
criminal or the victim, or simply by being members of society. The jewellery 
store robber himself becomes a victim, as he personally has to bear both the 
penal and the non-penal consequences of his unlawful actions. Also, the 
families of both the victim and the criminal may be affected by the crime. 
They may, for instance, suffer because the jeweller or robber has been killed 
or incarcerated. Furthermore, it can be stated that, since every person in 
society is directly or indirectly dependent on his fellow man for his/her orderly 
survival and security, society as a whole is ultimately victimised. 
 
iii) Latent victims  
All people or businesses are latent victims of crime because of specific 
characteristics or actions that make them a potential target of a criminal attack. 
The jeweller’s profession, for instance, constantly exposes him/her to various 
crime risk factors, and jewellery stores, because of the availability of valuable 
merchandise, are always a potential target for criminals.  
 
3.3.2.2 Specific typology of victims 
 
Based on both Mendelsohn and Mannhein’s principles as well as on studies of 
robbery victimisation such as those conducted by Fattah (1991:103-106), the 
researcher attempted to describe a specific typology applicable to jewellers as victims 
of robbery. The following types were identified: 
 
i) Attentive jeweller 
This refers to jewellers who have done everything possible to protect 
themselves, their staff, customers and stores against robbery. They have 
implemented various risk reduction strategies, but still fall victim to a robbery 
by a group of determined criminals who have identified a specific store as a 
lucrative target. 
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ii) Inattentive or distracted jeweller 
This refers to jewellers who do not pay attention to potential dangers and 
allow criminal elements to deceive or distract them during the course of their 
business activities. A practical example is when a jeweller allows some 
customers, who entered the store as a group, to distract him/her with requests 
to see different items of jewellery at the same time. In so doing, the jeweller 
provides the criminal with opportunities not only for theft but also for robbery. 
 
iii) Negligent or careless jeweller  
This refers to jewellers who through their negligent behaviour, lack of care, 
habits and lifestyle, make it easier for criminals to rob or steal from them. A 
relevant example is the jeweller who decides not to invest in adequate security 
measures both at the stores and at home. In so doing, the jeweller facilitates a 
robbery attack.  
 
iv) Over-reactive jeweller  
 This refers to jewellers who, during a robbery attack, instead of remaining 
 calm, decide to react aggressively against the robbers, thus provoking their 
 reaction and endangering in the process not only their own life but also those 
 of their staff and customers.  
 
3.4 VICTIM’S INTERACTION AND RESPONSE DURING THE ROBBERY 
 
Violent crimes such as robbery, involve an interaction between the offender and the 
victim, albeit short, within a specific setting. The victim’s response during this short 
interaction varies significantly from case to case, depending on a number of 
individual and situational variables such as, amongst others, age, sex, physical and 
mental condition, presence of bystanders, intervention by third parties, and the 
criminal’s change of heart or plans. The victim’s reaction to the robbery event will in 
turn determine the nature of the offender’s response (Fattah 1991:206). Thus, an 
understanding of offender-victim interaction dynamics in crime situations is 
fundamental to this study. Interaction research implies that, besides criminals with 
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their motivation and the opportunities for crime afforded to them, potential and actual 
victims are also important elements in the genesis of crime (Van der Hoven & Maree 
2005:61). In the context of this study, the concept of victim resistance is particularly 
significant as it involves important elements such as the ways of resistance and the 
outcome of resistance. 
 
3.4.1 Victim’s reaction 
 
In general, the decision to resist a robbery attack is related to the victim’s perception 
and assessment of the potential danger inherent in the situation. This usually depends 
on factors such as the number of robbers, the level of force actually employed or 
threatened, the presence or absence of a weapon and the type of weapon used. 
Research findings indicated that the presence of a weapon, particularly a firearm, is a 
strong intimidating factor, capable of reducing the probability of resistance and 
forcing the victim into compliance, thus enhancing the likelihood that the crime will 
be completed without the armed offender resorting to physical force (Fattah 
1991:200). 
 
Most victims resist their assailants in one way or another, the most common strategies 
being trying to escape, reasoning with or threatening the offender, shouting for help to 
scare off the attacker, and fighting back physically (Karmen 2007:83). Research 
findings also showed that victim’s resistance is a primary determinant of both the 
success or failure of the crime and the probability of death or injury to the victim 
(Fattah 1991:206-210). Resistance has both positive and negative implications in that, 
on the one side, it was found to decrease the criminal’s probability of success but, on 
the other, it significantly increased the risk of physical injuries to the victim (Conklin 
2001:67; Hansmann 2000:24-28). According to Engelbrecht (2005), commercial 
armed robbers in South Africa will not usually become physically violent unless 
confronted or met with resistance, in which case they will not hesitate to shoot. 
 
3.4.2 Outcome of resistance 
 
Evidence shows that victims who are injured during a robbery are more likely to have 
taken some self-protective measures. However, it must be stated that the conjunction 
 - 82 -
between injury and resistance also depends on a number of other factors, especially 
the presence of weapons, of other robbers, and of other victims. According to Karmen 
(2007:83), certain types of victims were more likely to be injured than other types, 
depending in part on the type of robbers they faced (armed or unarmed, alone or in 
groups). Victims were more likely to be physically harmed and need medical attention 
if they were attacked by three or more robbers and happened to be alone. 
Furthermore, the type of weapon wielded by the robber was found to be the most 
significant factor determining whether or not a victim will be wounded or killed. 
Armed robberies that began with the brandishing of a gun or knife were less likely to 
lead to injuries or death because the threat of the deadly weapon induced the victim to 
comply with the robbers’ demand without offering resistance. On the other hand, 
victims who believed they could overpower an unarmed robber were more likely to be 
injured while resisting (Conklin 2001:67). 
 
According to Jewelers’ Security Alliance (2000:4-5), in the United States there is 
evidence that jewellery store robbery is becoming more dangerous. Robbery with 
violence made up 45 percent of the total robbery events. Case analysis indicated that 
violence, i.e. physical contact or actual injuries inflicted by the robbers, almost always 
occurred as a response to some level of resistance on the part of the victim. According 
to the same source, between 1984 and 1994, 241 people were killed in crime against 
jewellers. However, murders involved with jewellery crime continued to decline 
sharply. In 2000 there were nine murders, down from fifteen in 1999 and 37 in 1991. 
Among the nine homicide victims, there were four criminals, two owners, one 
travelling sales person and two police officers. Survivors of non-fatal violent incidents 
were a total of 44 of which six were seriously assaulted, eleven pistol whipped, fifteen 
shot at but missed and twelve received non-fatal shots (Jewelers’ Security Alliance 
2000:2). In South Africa robbery at jewellery stores resulting in fatal injuries to the 
victims are not a common event but various types of injuries are often reported. 
However, the potential for a lethal outcome is always present. For example, the 
owners of a Boksburg jewellery store in Gauteng were found dead inside the store 
(Crime count & crime busters 2001:2). Recently, a policeman was killed during a 
robbery at a jewellery store in Durban (Cop caught in gunfight 2007). 
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3.5 CONSEQUENCES OF ROBBERY FOR THE VICTIMS 
 
Robbery is a sudden, unanticipated event in which the perpetrators attempt to 
establish control of the situation as rapidly as possible and by violent means. Its 
consequences for the victims are varied and far-reaching and can lead to financial and 
material loss, serious injuries or even death, as well as short or long-term 
psychological and physical effects depending on an individual personality and 
personal circumstances. Furthermore, robbery can also have a negative impact on 
someone’s family and social life.  
 
3.5.1 Financial and material losses  
 
A robbery is an event that causes an immediate financial loss. Cash, personal 
belongings or valuable items are suddenly removed from the victim’s possession. 
Very often losses are not limited to the above objects but also involve structural 
damage caused by robbers during the attack, which can lead to very expensive repairs. 
As opposed to the average commercial robbery, jewellery store robberies can be 
financially very damaging. In fact, a lifetime work can be taken away in just a few 
minutes, especially if jewellers are not adequately insured (see Chapter 6, section 
6.3.1.2). For this reason, it can be stated that if one cannot afford to have insurance, 
one cannot afford to be a jeweller (Jewellers’ Vigilance Canada 2000:6-7). Even with 
adequate insurance, there are still huge costs associated with crime, e.g. lost selling 
time, adjusting the loss, spending on crime prevention measures, low morale of 
employees and motivation at work, customers’ doubts as to their safety (Jewellers’ 
Vigilance Canada 2000:8). 
 
According to Jewelers’ Security Alliance (2000:2), in the United States robbery was 
by far the category of crime against the jewellery industry, which accounted for the 
highest Dollar losses with USD 30.8 million (up 10.4 percent from 1999), followed by 
theft (USD 21.2 million) and burglary (USD 12.8 million). The average on-premises 
robbery loss increased from USD131.423 in 1999 to USD 152.613 in 2000. Losses in 
excess of one million Rand in stolen jewellery have also been recorded in South 
Africa (Flanagan 2006:4). 
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3.5.2 Occupational impact 
 
Violent crime against jewellers may have a considerable impact on the jewellers or 
staff members’ work situation. According to a survey (Retail Violence Survey 
2000:31) conducted in England, the following results are significant to evaluate the 
economic impact of crime on retailers: 
 
• 29 percent took time off work to handle the stress. 
• 29 percent had a member of staff leaving employment as a result of retail crime. 
• 18 percent lost one or two days man-hours. 
• 18 percent lost three to seven days and twenty percent lost seven to ten days. 
• A staggering 83 percent indicated that they considered giving up independent 
retailing because of the level of retail crime. 
 
3.5.3 Physical impact 
 
Although in the majority of cases evidence suggests the contrary, robbery can at times 
involve a physical attack against one’s person which may lead to serious injuries 
(assault with grievous bodily harm) or even death (murder). In fact, due to the violent 
nature of robbery, the risk of being further victimised, i.e. seriously assaulted or 
murdered, is present. Victims can sustain both short and long-term physical injuries, 
and, at times, be physically impaired for the rest of their lives. This again bears 
serious financial implications (Siegel 2004:83). 
 
According to a survey (Retail Violence Survey 2000:30-31) conducted in England, 
the following findings related to physical trauma emerged: 
 
• 16 percent received emergency hospital treatment. 
• 11 percent required a visit to a doctor. 
• 15 percent required time off work. 
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Violent incidents against jewellers include, amongst others, serious assault, fatal 
injuries, pistol whipping, stabbing, sexual violence (Jewellers’ Vigilance Canada 
2000:16). 
 
3.5.4 Psycho-somatic impact  
 
The immediate and short-term effects of crime are usually extremely traumatic for the 
victim. Victimisation poses an enormous mental strain on victims. A common 
element is a feeling of loss after victimisation (Siegel 2004:84). However, the effect 
of a violent crime such as robbery on the victim, both in the short and the long-term, 
depends on various factors such as the victim’s personality, the nature of the crime, 
the circumstances in which it is committed, the violence to which the victim is 
exposed and the duration of the crime. 
 
A robbery event can lead to psycho-somatic reactions both on a long and short-term 
basis. Research showed that common reactions during the robbery event were 
surprise, fear of death or injury, anger and paralysis. After the robbery, fear of repeat 
victimisation, depression, distrust, aggression and desire to quit one’s profession, 
were also found to be common psychological disorders (Gabor 1987:107-119). 
 
According to a survey (Retail Violence Survey 2000:30-31) conducted in England, 
the long-term effects of violent crime on retailers are very worrying. The following 
findings related to physical trauma emerged: 
 
• 75 percent of store owners surveyed stated that they or their staff suffered stress as 
a result of retail crime. 
• 5 percent indicated that their personal stress level at the time of the survey was 
unbearable, fairly severe (28 percent) and very severe (seventeen percent). 
• 28 percent suffered stress-related illness.  
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3.5.5 Familial and social impact 
 
Some problems related to the personality of the victim may occur for extended 
periods of time. For instance a sudden and violent robbery attack may lead to fear of 
another attack and this may in turn cause victims to become socially withdrawn, to go 
out less often, and to become hyper-protective towards family members and friends 
whose safety they value (Siegel 2004:85). Also, feelings of distrust and anger can be 
very destructive in interpersonal relationships. They may find expression as racial 
hatred especially when directed against members of a racial group or minority, which 
the robber happens to belong to, and therefore racial hatred may affect one’s 
relationship with other members of the community (Gabor 1987:115-116). The social 
costs of crime are indirect and take the form of a chronic fear of crime, distrust of the 
police and authorities in general, isolation and distrust of fellow human beings. 
Furthermore it can be stated that each crime that is committed is an attack against the 
very fabric of society, and goes against its democratic values, freedom and civilised 
customs.  
 
3.5.6 Impact on criminal justice system 
 
Immediately after the commission of the robbery, victims are left traumatised and 
with a decision to be made on whom to contact for assistance and on whether to report 
the incident to the police or not. In the case of personal robberies, it is believed that 
many go unreported. On the contrary, commercial robberies are usually reported in 
view of, amongst others, insurance considerations. According to a survey (Retail 
Violence Survey 2000:30-31) conducted in England, on the issue of help following a 
violent attack, retailers stated that they would turn for assistance to family and friends 
(43 percent), police (36 percent), victim support (8 percent) and personal doctors (5 
percent). 
 
After a robbery, because of the severity of the crime and the need to report it in order 
to be paid out by their insurance, jewellers in most cases report the event to the police, 
even though they seem to have a negative attitude towards the capability of the police 
in solving the crime and recovering the merchandise. The following reasons (listed 
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according to importance) for reporting crimes to the police were offered during a 
crime victimisation survey in Southern Africa (Naudé & Prinsloo 2002:91): 
 
• The recovery of property. 
• Wanted the offender to be caught and punished. 
• Insurance purposes. 
 
According to a study conducted in South Africa (Naudé, Prinsloo & Martins 1999:18-
19), companies offered the following reasons for not reporting cases to the police:  
 
• Many companies are reluctant to report crimes because of a perception of a heavy 
police workload and police inability (and the criminal justice system in general) to 
deal with crime, previous experience, and the inconvenience and legal costs 
involved. 
• The seemingly negative attitude towards the police is supported by the fact that 
the police play a limited role in community education and, more specifically, in 
advising businesses on security matters.  
• The poor police image is primarily due to the historical dissatisfaction of 39 
percent of the research group with the way the police dealt with their previous 
reporting of crime. 
• A significant 30 percent of respondents who appear neutral and still not negatively 
predisposed towards the police indicate a latent opportunity for the police to 
regain public confidence and cooperation. 
 
The low arrest and property recovery rates following a robbery also contribute to a 
high level of dissatisfaction with the police. According to Karmen (2007:81), robbery 
victimisation studies indicated that recovery rates are usually low. Only about one 
third of the value of stolen property was ever recovered by the police, or by the 
victims themselves. 
 
3.5.7 Fear of crime versus perceived and actual risk 
 
A serious consequence of robbery can be identified in a generalised fear of this crime. 
Because of the element of violence associated to an act of robbery, people are most 
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afraid of it (together with murder and rape), even though in actual fact it occurs least 
often as compared to other categories of crime (Conklin 2001:69). According to the 
2003 National Victims of Crime Survey conducted by the Institute for Security 
Studies (Burton et al 2004:18-19), South Africans are very concerned about robbery, 
which is the second “most commonly discussed crime”, believed to be the second 
“most common crime” in respondents’ areas, and the fourth most feared crime (the 
first in Gauteng). However, according to both the survey and official crime statistics, 
the chances of any South African being robbed in any given year are about two out of 
a hundred. Fear of robbery is also linked to fear of strangers, particularly the thought 
of being attacked by strangers as in the majority of the robbery attacks.  
 
Fear of crime is a state of mind which leads people into thinking that they are more 
vulnerable to crime. It has a negative psychological impact on the individual and may 
lead to a change in personal behaviour and lifestyle, as in the case of the intense 
reaction of fear provoked by the threat of violent crime against the person (Conklin 
2001:69). Fear of crime can prevent people from living fulfilling and productive lives. 
It causes people to stay home, avoid certain neighbourhoods and move to safer 
communities. Furthermore, a person’s trust in his/her fellow human beings is 
destroyed by the fear of crime as strangers may be viewed as potential criminals. 
People who have been violently victimised may develop altruistic fear or fear for 
other, e.g. family members and close friends. Fear of crime has also an economic 
impact on individuals, families and businesses, which may lead to resorting to 
expensive measures to protect themselves against crime (Siegel 2004:85). On the 
positive side, fear of crime may help reduce the risk of victimisation by inducing 
those who are fearful to adopt specific precautions and reduce their exposure and 
vulnerability to crime. On the other hand, however, fear of crime may also contribute 
to one’s victimisation as when, for instance, a victim is chosen by robbers as a 
possible target because of his/her weak and fearful appearance (Shadel 1995:22). The 
central concept is vulnerability. When certain people believe they are vulnerable, they 
may have a high level of fear which does not necessarily correspond to the objective 
realities of threat and risk (Fattah 1991:264). In fact, many people are victimised more 
by fear of crime than by an actual crime. As an example, a victim survey (Mistry 
2004:19), highlighted the fact that, despite the decline in crime rates, South Africans 
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felt less safe in 2003 than they did in 1998. More than half of South Africans felt that 
crime had increased in the areas where they lived.  
 
Armed robbery is typically what business owners fear most. Although armed robbery 
is not the biggest threat to a business, because the media continuously portray this 
type of violence, business owners often indicate that they are afraid they will be held 
at gunpoint. Fear of crime is very common among retailers, particularly in city areas 
with higher level of crime. This emerged from a survey (Retail Violence Survey 
2000:30) conducted in England, which found that as many as 85 percent of 
respondents (retailers) felt at some risk of becoming victims of crime while at work 
(of which 28 percent feared victimisation all the time). Furthermore, 52 percent of the 
retailers also believed that their performance at work had been to a certain degree 
adversely affected. According to a 1998 national commercial crime survey (Naudé, 
Prinsloo & Martins 1999:11) conducted for the first time in South Africa, crime was 
regarded as a serious or fairly serious problem by 58,7 percent of the respondents, 
which corresponds with the general concern of all South Africans on this vital issue. 
A considerable percentage of companies (53,8) also reported an increase in crime 
problems. In a survey (Jewellers’ Vigilance Canada 2000:4) conducted among 
jewellers in Canada, it was found that, in response to the question “What are jewellers 
most concerned about?”, “making a profit” rated third below “break and enter” and 
“security”. Crime and security related issues are therefore a jeweller’s top concern in 
order to decrease feelings of fear. 
 
The fear of robbery experienced by many jewellers and members of staff is the result 
of a perceived risk of victimisation. The higher the perceived risk, the stronger the 
fear of crime will be. Perception of risk, on the other hand, does not necessarily 
correspond to the reality of the crime situation. As an example, research found that 
women were more fearful than men, despite women’s lower rates of victimisation 
(except for rape). This was attributed to the fact that fear of rape amongst women also 
had a negative effect on other types of crime. In addition, when gender is taken into 
consideration, older people were no more fearful of crime than younger ones. The 
reality is that older adults comprise the lowest category of victims of all crimes 
(Conklin 2001:394). The possible explanation for this is that they tend not to be in 
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areas that are hotspots like downtown where younger people would be going to work, 
and they tend to stay indoors, especially at night (Shadel 1995:17).  
 
3.6 CONCLUSION 
 
No crime can be analysed without a proper understanding of the victim’s role in the 
unfolding of a criminal event. The victim’s personal, psychological and situational 
involvement, as well as the criminal-victim interaction are essential elements of a 
crime. Not all individuals or businesses are vulnerable to crime to the same extent. 
Some are, in fact, more vulnerable than others because of specific factors such as 
socio-demographic properties (e.g. age, gender, race and location), specific 
characteristics (e.g. attractiveness, suitability, vulnerability, exposure to motivated 
offenders and high risk situations), behaviour and lifestyle.  
 
The same can be said of jewellers who, because of their occupation, are exposed to 
high levels of fear and victimisation risks. While for other categories of victims 
variables such as sex, age and race are relevant (particularly in the case of crimes 
against the person), jewellers are more exposed to what can be defined as 
“occupational crime risk” or the crime risks inherent in the very nature of their 
profession, the most important of which being theft, fraud and robbery. Armed 
robbery in particular, because of its violent nature and negative consequences, must 
be considered as a very serious threat to any individual or business in that it can lead 
to financial loss, serious injuries or even death, as well as short and long-term 
psychological effects. For a jewellery store owner in particular, a single robbery event 
can, apart from the possible violence associated to it, be financially very damaging to 
such an extent that he/she may be forced out of business.  In the following chapter, a 
theoretical explanation will be offered in an attempt to explain the phenomenon of 
jewellery store robbery within a specific framework. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
APPLICABLE THEORIES FOR THE EXPLANATION OF JEWELLERY 
STORE ROBBERY 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The previous two chapters contribute to a better understanding of the literature on the 
nature of jewellery store robbery offering the opportunity of a theoretical explanation. 
As it is not possible to deal with all the explanatory factors in detail, it becomes 
necessary to fix boundaries and act within a specific theoretical framework. This is 
necessary in order to focus on what is relevant in the explanation of jewellery store 
robbery. In this context, the most relevant theoretical points of departure are the 
rational choice, the victim and the integrated approaches to the explanation of crime. 
Within these approaches, various theories can then be applied in the attempt to 
explain the phenomenon of jewellery store robbery from different perspectives, i.e. 
the offender, the victim or target and the crime situation.  
 
Rational choice has dominated past criminological thinking and today is still of great 
value in explaining criminal behaviour. Modern opportunity and victimisation 
theories also play an important role not only in the explanation of robbery but also in 
the formulation of appropriate strategies for its prevention (opportunity reduction 
model). However, as it may be difficult to explain by means of a single theory why 
jewellery stores are being targeted by robbers, an integrated approach combining 
different theoretical schools of thought can possibly provide the best answers to an 
otherwise complex phenomenon. In this regard, an explanation of the criminal event 
model becomes important as it integrates various theoretical concepts into a cohesive 
unit.  
 
The focus of this chapter will firstly be on the theoretical framework for the 
explanation of crime where after a specific theoretical framework for the explanation 
of jewellery store robbery will be addressed. It is also important to stress that the 
emphasis of this study is on those theories that are mostly applicable to the victim and 
the crime situation, in this case the jewellers, members of staff and the jewellery store, 
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rather than the offender or jewellery store robber. The latter, as indicated in Chapter 7, 
section 7.3.6 should become the focus of further research activities. 
 
4.2 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
Specific criminological schools or directions can be identified which have different 
approaches or points of departure with respect to the explanation of crime. In the 
context of this study, important theoretical starting points in the explanation of 
robbery are the rational choice, the victim and the integrated approaches. Their 
relevance is due to the fact that they can be successfully applied in specific 
circumstances and environments which provide rational offenders with opportunities 
for crime commission. These approaches do not exclude the importance of other 
factors in the explanation of crime, i.e. the biophysical, the psychological and the 
sociological, which stress predisposing factors in criminal behaviour. However, 
factors focusing on the offender as an individual are considered as not being easily 
subject to treatment or change and, in actual fact, necessitate long-term and often 
complicated intervention measures. On the other hand, rational choice based 
approaches are more immediate as they focus mainly on the crime situation and 
victims’ behaviour (Felson & Clarke 1998:1-3).  
 
4.2.1 Rational choice approach 
 
The rational choice approach is derived from the classical school of criminology 
which can be traced to about 1764 to the work of Beccaria and Bentham. This is 
where the classical theory evolved. After a period of decline, during which the 
principles of the positivist approach (e.g. poverty, education, family life and 
individual’s personal traits) became the main focus, the classical approach began to 
enjoy resurging popularity in the form of rational choice (Brown, Esbensen & Geis 
2001:219). According to the rational choice perspective, offending is purposive 
behaviour in that the criminal takes into account the benefits and the costs of 
committing the offence. This decision is reached after due consideration to personal 
rewards, e.g. obtaining cash from the sale of the stolen jewellery, as opposed to the 
difficulties in the execution of the crime, e.g. the degree of protection of the target, 
and the actual risk of being caught and dealt with by the criminal justice system. 
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Therefore, the decision to commit a specific type of crime is a matter of personal 
choice based on weighing up of risks and available opportunities in a specific 
environment (Lab 2000:79; Siegel 2004:109).  
 
According to Walklate (2003:38-39), the value of this perspective has been argued 
within the context of its crime prevention potential, usually referred to as situational 
crime prevention. The harder the target of criminal behaviour, the more likely the 
offender will choose another target. Hence, the actual protection of the environment 
and the victim’s behaviour play a major role in minimising crime opportunities (see 
Chapter 6, section 6.2).  
 
4.2.2 Victim approach 
 
With the victim approach, which was generated by the thinking of von Hentig (1948) 
and Mendelsohn at a later stage (1965), more attention was paid to the problems 
concerning crime victimisation, in particular to the criminal-victim interaction and 
victim’s involvement in the criminal event. This entailed a change of focus from the 
criminal to the victim’s perspective (Garkawe 2001:92-93). This approach stressed 
the individual’s (the victim) behaviour, lifestyle and activities in the genesis of 
opportunities for criminal behaviour, the main underlying assumption being that 
specific characteristics or behavioural patterns of the victim may generate crime 
(Walklate 2003:39). For instance, careless behaviour on the part of victims not only 
creates an opportunity for crime commission, but is also considered as an important 
factor in crime causation.  
 
4.2.3 Integrated approach 
 
The integrated approach moves away from the static theoretical models used to 
explain criminal behaviour and considers all the different dynamics of the criminal-
victim interaction within a specific setting, including the physical and social 
environment, the victim, the criminal, the bystander and the criminal justice process 
(Van der Hoven 2001:82). This approach emphasises the study of crime as an event 
(process) with its preceding factors (precursors), the event itself and the aftermath of 
the event (Sacco & Kennedy 2002:137).  
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4.3 EXPLANATORY THEORIES 
 
Based on the literature study (Chapters 2 and 3), the opportunities generated by both 
the physical environment (the jewellery store and its immediate surroundings) as well 
as individual behaviour and activities (the jewellers and members of staff), are 
fundamental in the explanation of the robbery event. The robber, after having assessed 
the opportunities, risks and benefits involved (rational choice), will decide on the 
feasibility of the execution of the robbery against the selected target.  Following on 
the approaches discussed above, modern theories which can be considered as most 
relevant to this study are the opportunity theory (rational choice and crime patterns), 
the victimisation theory (routine activities and lifestyle) and the integrated theory (the 
criminal event). 
 
4.3.1 Opportunity theory 
 
The value of opportunities in the explanation of criminal behaviour has in the past 
been neglected, since most criminological thinking focused only on individual, 
psychological and social factors, all concepts which are often difficult to explain in 
the immediacy of a crime situation. On the contrary, opportunities, along with 
personal and social factors, make the case for being considered as a principal element 
in the explanation of crime (Felson & Clarke 1998:III). According to the opportunity 
theory, criminal behaviour is seen as the result of an interaction between the person 
(criminal) with his/her predispositions, and the setting (environment) with its 
precipitating conditions (crime opportunities). The simultaneous existence of the 
criminal’s desire to commit a crime and the belief that an opportunity exists to 
commit it, is fundamental for the actual execution of the offence. Opportunity theory 
is concentrated on the environment, and not on the individual bio-psycho-social 
make-up. It is the opinion of the researcher that opportunity is undoubtedly a very 
important concept in the explanation of crime in that no crime can occur without the 
physical opportunities to carry it out. Furthermore, even if one has a predisposition to 
commit a crime, one cannot do so unless specific opportunities are available.  
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With the opportunity theory emphasis is on the opportunities that criminals have to 
commit jewellery store robbery. The crime opportunities present in a specific physical 
environment (setting), in this case the jewellery store, as well as the opportunities 
generated by the action or inaction of the jewellers and their staff, are seen as an 
important factor in the commission of robbery. In this context, opportunities are given 
by factors such as the following (Felson 2002:21-22): 
 
• the presence of motivated offenders (jewellery store robbers);  
• the availability of suitable targets (there is an abundance of jewellery stores in 
every city, suburb and shopping complex);  
• the availability of highly expensive merchandise (jewellery, watches, precious 
stones, amongst others);  
• the absence of capable guardians (such as the presence of only one member of 
staff); 
• the weakness of the security measures protecting the store;  
• suitable environmental conditions (e.g. the position of the store near the exit and 
easy escape routes leading to a freeway or major thoroughfare).  
 
After assessing the above factors, criminals will decide whether robbing a jewellery 
store is worth the risk or not.  
 
Opportunity theories such as routine activity, rational choice and crime pattern should 
not be seen in isolation but rather as overlapping. They have in fact many of the same 
principles, the core ones being as explained below (Felson & Clarke 1998:V-VI): 
 
• Opportunities play a role in causing all crime; they are not restricted to 
property offences only, but involve all classes of crime, including violent crimes 
such as robbery. 
• Crime opportunities are highly specific; they differ considerably depending on 
the type of criminal and crime involved. Robbery of banks, post offices and 
jewellery stores are all different in terms of crime opportunity. It follows logically 
that crime opportunity reduction is also highly specific. 
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• Crime opportunities are concentrated in time and space. Crime shifts 
significantly from area to area, even within the same geographical area. The 
opportunities to carry it out also fluctuate with hours of day and days of week. 
• Crime opportunities depend on people’s daily activities. Offenders and their 
targets / victims shift according to the trips to work, school and leisure settings. As 
an example, jewellery store burglars move to commercial districts when these are 
closed for business. 
• One crime produces opportunities for another. During the commission of one 
crime, offenders can unwittingly be drawn into others. For example during the 
robbery of a jewellery store, the jeweller’s physical reaction may in turn provoke 
an even more violent reaction from the robbers, causing serious injuries or death. 
This is an example of how a robbery can turn into an assault or a murder. The 
stolen jewellery also generates opportunities for other type of crimes, e.g. selling 
and receiving stolen goods. 
• Some items offer more tempting crime opportunities. Obviously cash is what 
robbers target most. Jewellery is also high on the list of the most targeted items in 
that it complies in particular with the concepts of value and inertia (jewellery 
items are high in value and easy to carry away from the scene of the crime). 
• Social and technological changes produce (or reduce) new crime 
opportunities. An example of this has been the advent of cellular technology 
which brought along not only thefts and robberies targeting this specific item, but 
also facilitated the commission of many crimes, including jewellery store robbery. 
• Crime can be prevented by reducing opportunities, a fundamental concept of 
this study. This important crime prevention strategy is thoroughly discussed in 
conjunction with other concepts relevant to situational crime prevention, i.e. crime 
displacement and diffusion of benefits. 
 
4.3.1.1 Rational choice 
 
Expanding on the principles of the classical approach, rational choice focuses on the 
offenders and their decision-making, driven by a particular motive within a specific 
setting (environment or social structure) which offers opportunities for criminal 
behaviour. In this sense, crime is seen as a subjective choice within a given objective 
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situation. The choice to commit an offence is taken after due consideration of the 
expected rewards, costs and risks of alternative actions. After this initial assessment, 
criminals will then select the action which will best serve their purposes (Felson & 
Clarke 1998:7-8). Therefore, according to rational choice, most offenders do not 
select their victims or targets arbitrarily. On the contrary, in the case of property 
offences or other profit-oriented offences such as robbery, criminals usually select 
their targets carefully and cautiously.  
 
Rational choice views crime as both offence and offender specific. This implies that 
both crimes and criminals are different from one another, have different purposes, 
needs and fears and require different skills. The decision to become a criminal rather 
than a law abiding citizen, or withdrawing from a criminal career, is influenced by 
different factors such as personality, age, status, risk and opportunity. Furthermore, 
evidence of rational choice may be found in the way criminals structure their crimes 
with regard to choosing the type of crime, the time and place, the target and the 
technique to commit the offence, as explained below (Siegel 2004:109-113): 
 
• Choosing the type of crime 
Some offenders are generalist who can commit different types of crime depending 
on what their immediate needs are. Others are specialists such as professional 
robbers who focus on attacking lucrative targets. 
• Choosing the time and place of crime 
As emerged from a study of the literature (Chapter 2, section 2.3.4.2, I-II-III-X), 
commercial robbers tend to pick the time and day of crimes carefully, and to 
commit crime at the edges, away from their own neighbourhood. Robbers are also 
willing to travel considerable distances to rob a lucrative target. 
• Choosing the target 
The level of risk is a significant factor in the rational criminals’ decision to 
commit a robbery. In fact, risk is an important criterion for target selection (Fattah 
1991:342). Because robbery involves a direct confrontation with the victim, it is 
accompanied by far greater risk for the offender than offences in which there is no 
confrontation, e.g. fraud or burglary. Rational offenders usually plan their crime 
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and select their targets paying special attention to the likelihood of success or 
failure and risks or dangers of the crime situation.    
• Learning criminal techniques 
Through their association with the crime underworld and the experience acquired 
in the field, criminals learn techniques which help them avoid detection, a sure 
sign of rational thinking and planning. Eventually over a period of time, the 
criminal’s technique may develop into a set pattern of behaviour which becomes 
his trademark or modus operandi. Ultimately, this set pattern of behaviour may 
cause the criminal’s downfall, leading to his identification and apprehension. 
 
Based on the study of the existing literature as shown in Chapter 2, the average 
jewellery store robber can therefore be described as a rational choice offender. The 
jewellery store robber carefully selects his target prior to the execution of the robbery, 
taking into consideration the rewards, i.e. the cash obtained through the sale of the 
stolen jewellery, and the risks associated with his action, e.g. the possibility of 
encountering resistance, being seen by by-standers, security or police and being 
arrested or injured / killed in the process. 
 
4.3.1.2 Crime patterns 
 
Local areas play an important role in generating opportunities for crime commission. 
Crime patterns theory, a central component of environmental criminology, considers 
how criminals, potential victims and actual victims move about in space and time. 
Based on the rational choice perspective, crime patterns seek an explanation as to the 
reasons why criminals choose to concentrate their actions at specific locations and 
times. Crime patterns theory is based on three main concepts: nodes, paths and edges, 
which can be explained as follows (Felson & Clarke 1998:6-7): 
 
• Nodes refer to the way people travel to and from a specific area. Each offender 
searches for crime targets around personal activity nodes and the paths around 
them. 
• Paths are specific routes followed by people when they go about their daily 
activities. They are closely related to where they fall victim to crime. As an 
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example, a jeweller may follow a specific route on his/her way to work which 
exposes him/her to the risk of victimisation. 
• Edges refer to the boundaries of areas where people live, work, shop or seek 
entertainment. They are important because it is where people who do not know 
each other come into contact. Some crimes such as shoplifting and robbery are 
committed mostly at the edges. 
 
Specific geographical areas may act as crime generators, crime attractors (or both), or 
crime detractors (Felson & Clarke 1998:15): 
  
• Crime generators refer to a specific area where there is a concentration of 
opportunities for crime, giving rise to a phenomenon called “hot spots”, namely 
specific geographical locations which draw many more calls for police service 
than others. A hot spot can be also defined as a specific geographical area where 
crime or certain types of crime repeatedly occur. People living or working and 
businesses operating in a crime hot spot elevate their chance of victimisation 
(Siegel 2004:93). With regard to hot-spots in South Africa, Gauteng is considered 
the hot spot province for violent crimes such as armed robbery, and Johannesburg 
has been identified as the city with the highest number of violent and property 
crime followed by Pretoria and Cape Town (Van der Hoven & Maree 2005:66). 
• Crime attractors involve an area which, for some reason, acts as a magnet for 
offenders coming from other areas.  
• Crime detractors instead refer to a location where crime is discouraged from 
happening  as in the case of an area where a large presence of security and police 
acts as a deterrent against would be criminals.  
 
Crime opportunities are not equally distributed; on the contrary, they are highly 
uneven for many reasons, e.g. lack of suitable targets and victims; lack of motivated 
offenders and capable guardians; unsuitable locations for crime commission. As an 
example, robbers wanting to attack a jewellery store can do so only at particular times 
and places. Because of the concentration of up-market jewellery stores in suburban 
areas and inside shopping centres, these are usually the most likely places for a 
robbery to occur. Whilst jewellery burglars strike after hours when stores are closed, 
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robbers usually strike during business hours, although there have been recorded 
instances of after-hours robberies (Jewelers’ Security Alliance 2000:3). Following on 
this explanation, it can be stated that crime patterns theory is important because it 
helps, on the one side, to understand crime patterns (geographic profiling) and, on the 
other, to focus crime prevention efforts where needed most. 
 
4.3.2 Victimisation theory 
 
Very often individuals play a significant role in generating conditions for criminal 
behaviour. Individuals’ lifestyle, social and occupational activities, for instance, can 
actively contribute to their victimisation. Some individuals are exposed to the risk of 
criminal victimisation simply because of the dangerous nature of the work they 
perform. Lifestyle and routine activities theory are suitable to explain this type of 
exposure. In other instances instead, it is the victims’ behaviour that may expose them 
to victimisation. For instance, specific individual actions (or inactions) may generate 
opportunities for the perpetration of a crime (Siegel 2004:91-92). In fact, according to 
opportunity theory, criminals take advantage of situational opportunities, many of 
which are created by victims’ negligent, careless, or facilitating behaviour. Besides 
the crime risk inherent in their work activities, jewellers’ attitude and behaviour 
towards security, and the precautions or protective measures they take (or do not take) 
can increase or diminish the risk of victimisation. Furthermore, if victimisation does 
occur, the manner in which they react can either reduce or increase the risk of further 
victimisation, which could lead to serious injuries and even death.  
 
According to victimisation and interaction theory, more than motivation and 
opportunity are needed to understand why and how crime occurs. The victim should 
not be considered as merely a passive target in crime but rather as someone who, in 
one way or the other, contributes to his / her own victimisation. Victims often provoke 
or encourage, through specific actions or inactions (negligence), the criminal attack 
and therefore it can be said that, at times, they share a degree of responsibility in the 
genesis of crime. In fact, they are considered as key participants whose actions (or 
inactions) prior to and during a criminal event can have a dramatic impact on the 
outcome of the crime (Sacco & Kennedy 2002:107). 
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Violent crimes such as robbery involve an interaction between the offender and the 
victim, albeit short, within a specific setting. The victim’s response during this short 
interaction varies significantly from case to case, depending on a number of 
individual and situational variables such as, among others, age, sex, physical and 
mental condition, presence of bystanders, intervention by third parties, criminals’ 
change of heart or plans. The victim’s reaction to the robbery event will in turn 
determine the nature of the offender’s response (Fattah 1991:206). Routine activities 
and lifestyle exposure are the victimisation theories which are most relevant and 
applicable to this study. 
 
4.3.2.1 Routine activities 
 
Routine activities, which was developed by Cohen and Felson (1979), maintains that 
crime occurs when there is a convergence in time and space of three minimal 
elements: a motivated offender, a suitable target and the absence of a capable 
guardian (Brown et al 2001:220). Routine activities can be defined as any recurrent 
and prevalent activities that are part of people’s everyday social interaction, e.g. 
recreation and formal occupation (Davis 2005:40). According to routine activities, for 
a crime to occur, a motivated offender must find a suitable target in the absence of a 
capable guardian. It is when these three factors coincide that a crime occurs (Siegel 
2004:92). 
 
• Motivated offenders: their presence is taken as a given fact in that, in any 
society, there will always be someone criminally predisposed and willing to seize 
opportunities to commit crime.  
• Guardians can be anybody whose presence or proximity to the target would 
discourage a crime from happening. The mere presence or proximity of a 
person(s), e.g. a co-worker, public, police or security, can be a powerful deterrent 
in crime. Guardianship can also involve physical and electronic security measures, 
which can deter crime and limit access to targets. When these guardians are 
absent, a target or victim is at risk of criminal attack 
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• Suitable target means that criminal choice is influenced by the perception of 
target vulnerability. The more suitable and accessible the target, the more likely 
crime will occur. 
 
According to Felson and Clarke (1998:4-6), four main elements influence a target risk 
for criminal attack: 
 
• Value, meaning that the target or victim’s possession must be financially 
rewarding. 
• Inertia, meaning that the items, which are the target of the criminal attack, must 
be easy to carry away. 
• Visibility, which refers to the exposure of targets to offenders. 
• Access involves all those environmental and situational features which make it 
easier for offenders to get to the target. 
 
The above principles can all be seen in the following practical example applicable to 
this study. A robber (motivated offender) is assessing the possibility of committing a 
robbery against a jewellery store situated on a street, close to a highway ramp 
(suitable target). He is attracted by the following factors: a) very valuable items of 
jewellery and watches are displayed near the exit (suitable target); b) there is only one 
member of staff inside the store; no customers and security are present (absence of 
capable guardians). The robber then proceeds to rob the store and easily succeeds in 
doing so. During his assessment of the situation, as well as of the risks and benefits, 
the robber paid special attention to the following: 
 
• The targeted items were identified as being high value items, wanted by buyers 
(value). 
• The targeted items were all very easy to carry and hide away (inertia). 
• The targeted items were very visible from outside the store (visibility). 
• The targeted items were all displayed near the entry/exit and therefore easily 
reachable (access). 
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The routine activity, which is of particular interest to this study, is the type of work or 
occupation that jewellers and members of staff conduct on a daily basis. This activity 
exposes them to an above average risk of criminal victimisation and makes them 
vulnerable to specific predatory crimes such as theft and robbery. 
 
4.3.2.2 Lifestyle exposure 
 
Routine activities are closely linked to lifestyle exposure theory of criminal 
victimisation, as developed by Hindelang, Gottfredson and Garofalo (1978). The basis 
of this theory is that crime is not a random occurrence but rather a function of the 
victim’s lifestyle, which refers to routine daily activities or patterned ways, both of a 
recreational and occupational nature (Siegel 2004:92). As in the case of routine 
activities, lifestyle theory stresses the fact that certain everyday activities increase the 
risk of criminal victimisation, which is influenced by variations in lifestyle and key 
demographic variables such as age, race, income, marital status, education and 
occupation (Davis 2005:36). Lifestyle differences also reflect the social roles one is 
required to play and the various types of social restraints to which one is subject. In 
this sense, it can be stated that lifestyle structures victimisation opportunities (Sacco 
& Kennedy 2002:96-97). 
 
With regard to this study, the relevance of lifestyle exposure is that, as in the case of 
routine activities, it shares basic concepts such as proximity to criminals, time of 
exposure to criminals, target attractiveness and guardianships. The occupational 
nature of a jeweller’s daily routine activities exposes him / her to a significant risk of 
victimisation, particularly theft and robbery. However, lifestyle theory appears to be 
better suited to explain predatory crimes such as street robberies and muggings rather 
than more rational type of crimes such as jewellery store robberies. 
 
4.3.3 An integrated model: the criminal event 
  
The theories discussed above are all relevant to explain the phenomenon of jewellery 
store robbery. However, their relevance carries less weight if they are considered in 
isolation. On the contrary, a model which integrates various elements of the theories 
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into a unit, is ideal in the explanation of crime as it can be applied in a practical way 
(Van der Hoven 2001:86).  
 
Based on the different phases of robbery (Chapter 2, section 2.3.4), the criminal event 
model, which was introduced by Sacco and Kennedy (2002:137), is a new way of 
explaining and integrating the various dynamics or components present in a crime 
situation. They argued that, in studying the criminal event, explanations should move 
beyond the motivation of offenders or the responses of the victims. A more 
comprehensive view must consider firstly, the precursors of the event (including the 
locational and situational factors that bring people together in time and space); 
secondly, the criminal event (how the interactions among participants define the 
outcome of their actions); thirdly, the aftermath of the event (including the reporting 
to the police or security, their response, the harm done, the redress required, and the 
long term consequences of the event in terms of public reactions and changing of 
laws).  
 
4.3.3.1 Precursors to the robbery event 
 
In order to understand the precursors of a jewellery store robbery event, attention 
must be given to different factors such as (Van der Hoven 2001:84-85):  
 
• The jewellery store robbers’ motivation and criteria in target selection. 
• The physical context or environment. 
• The victims or targets (jewellery stores, jewellers, members of staff and 
customers) and their vulnerability to crime. 
• The role played by the victims, i.e. jewellers and members of staff, in creating the 
opportunities for a robbery. 
 
Motivation is an important element in the precipitation of a criminal event. It refers to 
an inner condition (in this case the robbers’) that stems from a need or desire. It 
directs the behaviour towards a particular goal, namely the fulfillment of the aroused 
need (Van der Hoven 2001:84). Jewellery store robbers, as in the case of the majority 
of robbers, appear to be motivated by a desire to obtain an immediate financial reward 
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(through the sale of the stolen jewellery). However, their motivation may also be the 
result of the need to maintain a high standard of living. 
 
The physical context refers to the presence of certain factors in the physical 
environment which may be conducive to crime such as, amongst others, poor 
visibility, lighting conditions, absence of security and availability of easy escape 
routes. These factors may create an attractive target for robbers. The physical context 
also creates the opportunity to commit a particular crime, e.g. the location of a 
jewellery store near a major road and freeway ramp is ideal for a robbery attack. The 
workplace (jewellery store) becomes the setting where the criminal event (robbery) 
takes place. The various activities being performed inside the jewellery store 
influence not only the type of criminal event that may occur but also the different 
reaction to such event.  
 
4.3.3.2 The robbery event 
 
The criminal event is regarded as having a dynamic nature. Important elements to be 
considered as part of the criminal event are (Van der Hoven 2001:86-87):  
 
• The interaction between the offender and the victim. 
• The type and seriousness of the crime.  
• The modus operandi of the offender.  
 
The way victims react during a robbery attack is an important element of the criminal 
event in that it may lead to extremely serious consequences. The way the crime is 
executed may show similarities with other incidents, place the same criminals at 
different crime scenes, reveal the offender’s intent as well as specific characteristics 
such as cruelty and capacity to act violently and unscrupulously. The use of 
intimidation and violence, the display of firearms to exercise total control over the 
victims, the seizing of valuable merchandise and personal belongings, the methods of 
attack and escape are, amongst others, important elements of the jewellery store 
robbery event.  
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4.3.3.3 The aftermath of the robbery event 
 
An understanding of the aftermath of a crime is essential as every crime provokes 
specific reactions and has consequences of a human and material nature (Van der 
Hoven 2001:87). In the case of a jewellery store robbery, important elements 
characterising the aftermath of the event are:  
 
• The reaction of the security or police and the victims’ level of satisfaction with 
their work. 
• The consequences of robbery on the victims (e.g. jewellers, members of staff and 
bystanders). 
 
The victims of jewellery store robbery require the assistance of the police to 
investigate the crime with a view to apprehend the suspect and attempt to recover the 
stolen merchandise. Victims may be seriously injured or killed, not to mention the 
material loss they may sustain during the robbery attack. Psychologically, the victims 
may also be seriously affected in the short or long-term. The degree of harm suffered 
by the victim and the resources required to help the victim recover are also important 
components of the integrated model.  
 
The robbery event must also be understood from the criminals’ perspective. For 
instance, the offenders’ behaviour during and after the commission of a crime has a 
bearing on their degree of guilt. It must be stressed that criminals are ultimately also 
victims of their own actions in that, if apprehended, they (and their families too) have 
to endure the criminal justice process, which may result in stiff punishment.   
 
The final phase in the analysis of the criminal event is the influence that the crime 
may have on the community. Factors to be taken into account should include the 
offender’s degree of danger to the community, the possibility of recidivism as well as 
the community’s sentiment with regard to the crime committed.   
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4.4 CRITICAL EVALUATION OF THE APPLICABLE THEORIES  
 
4.4.1 Robbers, opportunity and rationality 
 
Accepting that opportunity is the primary cause of crime, equal in importance to 
personal and social factors, results in a criminological approach that is not only more 
complete in its theorizing but also more practical and effective in the short-term 
(Felson & Clarke 1998:33). Positive considerations involving opportunity-based 
theories are as follows (Newman 1997:2-4): 
 
• They are effective and practical and pave the way for immediate actions against a 
potential or actual criminal threat as soon as specific opportunity factors are 
identified. 
• Distant bio-psycho-social conditions are much harder to alter than proximal ones 
(opportunities) and provide solutions in the short (or even immediate) term, as 
opposed to distant causes of crime, such as personal and social factors, which 
require long-term involvement. 
• Opportunities are at least as important as individual and social factors and are in 
fact far more tangible and relevant to an impending crime problem or situation. 
• Accepting opportunity as a principal cause of crime also opens up a new vista of 
crime prevention strategies focused on opportunity reduction. 
 
However, situational or opportunity theory has also received much criticism, mainly 
in relation to the following factors (Newman 1997:4; Felson & Clarke, 1998:25-28): 
 
• It does not address the root causes of crime and relegates personal and social 
factors to the background.  
• A major limitation is that it pays little attention to the nature of the offender 
motivation or to the relationship (interaction) between the offender and the victim. 
• More research is still needed to strengthen the theoretical status. 
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The fact remains that opportunity theory plays a significant role not only in the 
explanation of crime but also in the formulation of “opportunity reduction” strategies 
which may be applied as a short-term solution to specific crime problems.  
 
The applicability of the rational choice perspective is that, on the one side, it makes it 
possible to better understand the decision-making process of offenders and, on the 
other, it offers a framework within which criminological and victimological theories 
may be integrated. However, can it be safely assumed that potential offenders are 
always rational in their decision to commit robbery? Often, criminals do not make 
decisions that would appear to be in their own best interest, for a variety of reasons 
such as, amongst others (Brown et al. 2001:223): 
 
• They do not always have all the information they need to make informed 
decisions. 
• Even if information is available, they may not have the capacity to optimally 
process the information. 
• Choices may differ from individual to individual depending on one’s cognitive 
abilities / deficiencies and learning experiences. 
 
It can be stated that many crimes including crimes of violence are often committed on 
the spur of the moment, based more on an individual’s instincts than rationality. 
Certain offences such as vandalism can, in many instances, be classified as irrational. 
In the case of robberies instead, the presence of elements linked to rational choice 
such as, for instance, careful selection of the target, evaluation of the scene (prior to 
the actual robbery), escape routes and time of attack, are evident (Siegel 2004:113).  
 
4.4.2 Victims, behaviour and lifestyle 
 
With regard to victimisation theories, it cannot be denied that some individual action 
or inaction can either facilitate or precipitate the commission of a robbery. By acting 
in a certain manner or failing to act when necessary, individuals create opportunities 
for criminal behaviour. Important considerations on victim theories are as follows 
(Sacco & Kennedy 2002:104-105): 
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• Victimisation theory shifted from the traditional criminological theory which 
focused only on the action of the criminal offender whilst ignoring the role of the 
victim.  
• Victimisation theory becomes essential in providing an understanding of the 
different criminal-victim interaction dynamics, which can lead to the precipitation 
or facilitation of a robbery event in a situational context.  
 
However, much criticism has also been leveled at victimisation theory, the main 
points being the following (Fattah 1991:293-294; Sacco & Kennedy 2002:104-105): 
 
• As in the case of opportunity, victimisation theory is for the most part applicable 
in the immediate environment, thus neglecting other root causes of crime within 
an individual bio-psycho-social make-up. 
• Radical criminologists argued that the concept of victim precipitation led to 
“victim blaming” and also diverted attention from the structural causes of crime. 
This viewpoint has both ideological and gender biases and fails to see the real 
value of victimisation theory, i.e. the explanation of the dynamics of victim-
offender interaction. Victimisation theory does not seek to explain why some 
people become criminals, but rather why some individuals or targets become 
victims and this cannot be done without a thorough understanding of the 
characteristics, behaviour and lifestyle of the victims.  
• To be successful, some victimisation models imply a collective participation in the 
prevention of victimisation. However, not all individuals will co-operate 
collectively on all levels of deterrence. This factor may lead to instances where 
certain individuals are actually isolated by the majority of the group, thus 
becoming more crime vulnerable. 
• Furthermore, there is a need to move beyond the interaction between victims and 
offenders and include other participants in the crime situation, e.g. bystanders, 
security and police. 
• Research on victim response to face-to-face victimisation has yet to solve a 
number of conceptual and methodological problems. It needs, among others, to 
develop a typology of responses and adequate measures of the resistance level. 
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The effectiveness of the victim response needs to be measured on important 
aspects such as completion or non-completion of the criminal attack, avoidance or 
sustainment of injuries, duration of the attack and psychological impact (Fattah 
1991:215). 
 
Notwithstanding the above limitations, the fact remains that the role of the victim and 
his/her interaction with the criminal is fundamental, not only in the explanation of 
robbery, but also in the formulation of robbery prevention strategies, especially those 
relevant to the behaviour of individuals (before, during and after the commission of 
the crime). 
 
With reference to the routine activity of victims various aspects can be addressed in 
the evaluation (Davis 2005:41). Critics of routine activity point out that empirical 
tests of this theory are often based on false and ambiguous assumptions. For example, 
according to routine activity, the affluent should have a lower victimisation risk than 
the poor because they have better access to security. Yet affluence allows people to 
increase activities outside the home and their wealth makes them tempting targets. 
Furthermore, it has been suggested that routine activity, by placing too much 
emphasis on the victim, neglects to account for the individual (the criminal) factors 
that shape criminal choice. While the scrutiny of victims’ lifestyles is a practical way 
of assessing the risks of victimisation and possible preventative strategies, it may also 
be considered as an intrusion in an individual’s lifestyle or an instrument judgmental 
of the victim’s behaviour (Brown et al. 2001:221). Despite such criticism, routine 
activity continues to offer an important explanation of the phenomenon of 
victimisation, in particular that resulting from predatory crimes. 
 
4.4.3 Robbery as a criminal event 
 
The criminal event can be successfully applied in the explanation of jewellery store 
robbery as it helps to integrate the various dynamics or components present in a crime 
situation, i.e. the precursors, the event and the aftermath. However, the criminal event 
cannot be separated from the physical and social settings in which it occurs. It is also 
intricately linked to the routine activities in which both victims and offenders engage 
(Van der Hoven 2001:83). The criminal event also has shortcomings, especially in 
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view of the fact that the information provided by the various parties taking part in a 
specific crime, e.g. criminals, victims and bystanders, is often inaccurate and 
unreliable. 
 
4.5 CONCLUSION 
 
From the literature study on the nature of robbery at jewellery stores three 
components, namely the crime, the criminal and the victim are prominent. Therefore, 
the limitation of this study within a specific theoretical framework is essential for the 
positive outcome of the study itself. Without a solid theoretical foundation, the study 
would lose purpose and direction. In the context of this research endeavour, the 
applicable theoretical framework included opportunity-based approaches and theories 
focusing on the victim and the crime situation. 
 
The principles of opportunity theories as applicable to a specific setting, i.e. the 
jewellery store, are relevant throughout the study, where it is in fact argued that 
opportunity should be considered as one of the primary factors in the explanation of 
robbery. Furthermore, the role played by potential or actual victims, i.e. jewellers and 
members of staff, in causing the facilitation or precipitation of a robbery event, in 
other words, in generating opportunities for its commission, is also important for the 
understanding of its different dynamics and outcomes.  
 
Separate theories should not be treated as isolated sections; on the contrary, as shown 
in the criminal event analysis, various theoretical elements can be incorporated into a 
cohesive unit and applied in a practical way. Likewise, the explanation of an event 
such as jewellery store robbery cannot be considered in a fragmented way. In fact, 
various elements play an important role in creating the opportunity for this crime to 
occur, be it the robber(s), the victim(s) or environmental situations. In the following 
chapter, an analysis and interpretation of the research findings will be conducted with 
a view to continue with the exploration of the crime phenomenon under investigation. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION OF THE EMPIRICAL RESEARCH 
FINDINGS 
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter includes a presentation of the research findings as emerged from the data 
collected from the respondents’ questionnaires, structured and semi-structured 
interviews. The findings will be addressed following the headings reflected in the 
questionnaire (see “Appendix A”) and in the interview schedule’s themes (see 
“Appendix B”). Some of the findings will be presented by means of pie charts and bar 
graphs, which are effective and easy to interpret illustrations, often used instead of 
tables for frequency distributions (De Vos et al 2002:230). In the discussion, because 
the total number of questionnaire respondents was small (45), the percentage (%) and 
directly after the total number (N) will be stated for better understanding, for example 
(15.38 percent / 2). 
 
5.2 FINDINGS BASED ON THE QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
Statistical computer processing of the information collected from the respondents’ 
questionnaires was based on the FREQ procedure, which showed frequency, 
percentage, cumulative frequency and cumulative percentage.  
 
5.2.1 Respondents’ biographical and geographical information  
 
The information provided in this section deals with the respondents’ gender, age and 
position at work as well as the jewellery stores’ geographical location. The purpose of 
this section is to obtain an accurate profile of the respondents taking part in the study. 
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5.2.1.1 Gender 
 
More male (57.78 percent / 26) than female (42.22 percent / 19) respondents returned 
the questionnaire.  This is probably due to the fact that, following on the general work 
trend, males seem to be prevalent in the jewellery industry.  
 
5.2.1.2 Age 
 
Most respondents (28.89 percent / 13) belonged to the age group 40-49, followed 
closely by the age groups 30-39 (24.44 percent / 11) and 50-59 (22.22 percent / 10). 
Since most respondents were jewellery store owners or managers (as indicated in 
section 5.2.1.3 below) it is usually senior people with regard to age who hold these 
positions.  
 
5.2.1.3 Position at work 
 
Most respondents were store owners (64.45 percent / 29), followed by managers 
(31.11 percent / 14). Only 4.44 percent of respondents (2) were sales personnel who 
took the initiative to complete and return the questionnaire. Due to the sensitive nature 
of the project, it follows that owners in most instances had to be directly involved in 
answering security-related questions. 
 
5.2.1.4 Area location 
 
Most responses came from jewellers in Gauteng (53.33 percent / 24), this being the 
province with the highest number of subscribers to SA Jewellery News, through 
which magazine the questionnaire was distributed. Gauteng was followed by Western 
Cape (20.00 percent / 9), KwaZulu Natal (13.33 percent / 6), Mpumalanga and 
Northern Province (4.44 percent / 2 each), and Free State and Northern Cape (2.22 
percent / 1 each). Respondents were evenly distributed among urban (48.89 percent / 
22) and suburban (51.11 percent / 23) areas.   
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5.2.2 The robbery event 
 
The findings related to the robbery event deal with particulars such as the frequency 
of the robbery event, period of occurrence, criminals’ modus operandi, victim’s 
resistance and criminal violence. The purpose of this section is to obtain a better 
understanding of the nature and extent of robbery at jewellery stores as a criminal 
event. 
 
5.2.2.1 Incidence and place of occurrence 
 
Robbery can indeed be considered as a very serious problem affecting jewellers. 
64.44 percent of respondents (29) experienced a robbery attack during a five-year 
period. It was also found that more urban (68.97 percent / 20) than suburban (31.03 
percent / 9) stores were robbed. This is in line with other findings which indicate that 
this type of robbery is typically an urban and suburban (in metropolitan areas) 
phenomenon (Jewellers’ Vigilance Canada 2000:5).  
 
5.2.2.2 Frequency of robbery 
 
Figure 5.1 shows that jewellery store robbery is a phenomenon involving repeat 
victimisation. In fact, in as much as 48.27 percent of the cases (14), jewellery stores 
experienced two or more robberies over a five year period.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE  5.1: FREQUENCY OF ROBBERY
FOUR TIMES AND MORE
10.34%
THREE TIMES
10.34%
TWICE
27.59%
ONCE
51.73%
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These findings are similar to those of the British Retail Consortium (BRC), which 
stressed the reality of repeat criminal victimisation among retailers (Home Office 
National Board for Crime Prevention 2000:3). A possible explanation for repeat 
attacks may be that, once a jewellery store has been identified as a relatively easy 
target, robbers may be encouraged to return to the scene of the crime or may pass 
information on the same target to other criminals who then decide to rob the store. 
 
5.2.2.3 Monthly distribution 
 
According to Figure 5.2, the month of June experienced the highest percentage of 
robbery (18.53 percent / 5), followed by February, March, July and December (all at 
14.81 percent / 4).  The months with the lowest robbery activity were April, May, 
August and October (all at 3.70 percent / 1). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
It is unclear as to why June in particular experienced the highest percentage of 
jewellery store robberies. The months of December and February, which also figured 
prominently, usually experience higher levels of crime. A possible explanation is that 
numerous opportunities are offered to criminals during the Christmas Season and the 
purchasing of new stock, immediately after. 
 
 
 
FIGURE 5.2: MONTH DURING WHICH THE LAST ROBBERY 
OCCURRED 
FEBRUARY
14.81 %
MARCH 
14.81%
 
APRIL
3.70 %
MAY
3.70 %
JUNE
18.53 %
JULY
14.81%
AUGUST
3.70 % 
 
 SEPTEMBER 
7.43 % 
 
OCTOBER
3.70 %
DECEMBER
14.81 %
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5.2.2.4 Weekly distribution 
 
According to Figure 5.3, the days which experienced the highest percentage of 
robbery included Tuesday and Thursday (both at 22.22 percent / 6), followed by 
Wednesday and Friday (both at 14.81 percent / 4).  Sunday instead had the lowest 
percentage (3.70 percent / 1), possibly due to the limited number of stores opened for 
business. These findings are similar to those of Jewelers’ Security Alliance (2000:3) 
which showed that in 2000, in the United States, most robberies against jewellery 
stores were committed on Wednesday (23 percent), Thursday (20 percent) and 
Tuesday (18 percent). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5.2.2.5 Time of the day 
 
Figure 5.4 shows that robbery was committed mostly during early morning (46.43 
percent / 13) followed by opening time (25.00 percent / 7). This is in line with the 
findings of the SAPS Robbery Intelligence Desk (2002), which found that most 
commercial robbery in South Africa occurred between 07:00 a.m. and 09:30 a.m. A 
possible explanation for these findings is that in the early hours of the day there is 
usually less human traffic in a store other than the staff. During early hours, members 
of staff also tend to be more distracted as they are usually preparing for the day ahead. 
Furthermore, robbers may decide that it is better to act at a time when some members 
of staff are out on lunch (see Chapter 2, section 2.3.3.2, i). 
FIGURE 5.3: DAY OF THE WEEK
MONDAY
11.12%
TUESDAY
      22.22%
WEDNESDAY
14.81%
THURSDAY
22.22%
FRIDAY 
14.81%
SATURDAY
11.12%
SUNDAY
3.70%
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As opposed to findings by the Jewelers’ Security Alliance (2000:3) which showed 
that, in the United States, late afternoon closing time had traditionally been the second 
most vulnerable time, closing time did not appear to be a critical period for the 
respondents. In fact, only 7.14 percent of robberies (2) were committed during this 
period. Lunch and afternoon were instead the second most vulnerable time (equally at 
10.71 percent / 3). A possible explanation is that robbers are adjusting their hours of 
operation to overcome more stringent security measures implemented by jewellers at 
closing time.  
 
5.2.2.6 Offenders involved in the robbery 
 
The serious nature of jewellery store robbery is evident in the finding that in 53.85 
percent of cases (14), five or more criminals were involved as reflected in Figure 5.5.  
The involvement of a number of criminals serves to corroborate the fact that robberies 
at jewellery stores are for the most part an organised event and not the work of 
occasional robbers.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                     FIGURE 5.4: TIME OF OCCURRENCE
OPENING
25.00%
MORNING
46.44%
LUNCH 
10.71%
AFTERNOON
10.71%
CLOSING
7.14%
 - 118 -
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
These findings are in line with those of the SAPS Robbery Intelligence Desk (2002), 
according to which up to eight criminals are involved in commercial robberies.  
 
5.2.2.7 Offenders seen at the store before the robbery 
 
In 55.00 percent of cases (11) criminals were seen at the store (posing as customers) 
prior to the commission of the robbery (Figure 5.6).  Therefore, it can be stated that, 
as opposed to other findings (Conklin 2001:7) which indicated that in almost the 
totality of cases robbers are unknown to the victims, not all robbers were total 
strangers to jewellers and staff. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 5.6: CRIMINALS SEEN AT THE STORE PRIOR TO THE 
ROBBERY ATTACK 
YES
55% 
NO
45% 
FIGURE 5.5:  CRIMINALS INVOLVED IN THE ROBBERY
TWO
3.85%
THREE
26.92%
FOUR
15.38%
FIVE OR MORE
53.85% 
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The finding is in line with that of Maree (1999:54), which showed that bank robbers 
visited the chosen target a number of times prior to committing the robbery. Again, 
the fact that criminals carefully assessed the target points to jewellery store robbery as 
an organised (not casual) event. 
 
5.2.2.8 Methods of execution of the robbery 
 
As indicated in Figure 5.7, in the majority of cases (55.17 percent / 16), robbers 
managed to gain access to the store simply by posing as customers.  This was 
followed closely by the method involving immediate threat of violence i.e. 
brandishing a weapon (51.72 percent / 15).  The least used method involved forcing a 
person who is the key holder back to the store (6.80 percent / 2).   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As opposed to findings by Jewellers’ Vigilance Canada (2000:19), which indicated 
that robbers often gained “legitimate” access by posing as delivery personnel, no such 
instance was reported by the respondents. It must also be noted that only in 10.34 
percent of cases (3), robbers wore masks during the execution of the robbery. This is 
in line with Maree’s findings (1999:57) which showed that, in general, robbers 
preferred to use simple, yet effective, means to prevent recognition such as caps, 
sunglasses, false beard and moustaches. 
 
 
FIGURE 5.7: METHOD OF EXECUTION OF THE ROBBERY ATTACK
51.72%
10.34%
17.24%
55.17%
6.89%
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
BRANDISHING WEAPONS 
WEARING MASKS 
FORCING ENTRY 
POSING AS CUSTOMERS 
FORCING KEY HOLDER BACK TO STORE 
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5.2.2.9 Weapons used 
 
According to Figure 5.8, in the majority of cases (79.31 percent / 23) robbers made 
use of firearms followed a great distance away by knives and hammers / iron bars / 
pickaxes (each at 3.44 percent / 1).  The presence of clubs and batons was not 
reported.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In as much as 21 percent of cases, respondents did not know what type of weapons 
were carried by robbers, possibly an indication that, in certain instances, the panic 
caused by the criminal attack had the effect of temporarily blinding the victim(s). The 
findings are similar to those of the Jewelers’ Security Alliance (2000:5), which 
showed that firearms were by far the preferred weapons in robberies against jewellery 
stores (used in 72 percent of the total robbery events in 2000).  
 
Firearms give robbers a sense of power and dominance over their victims. In fact, the 
researcher found that in 89.65 percent of cases (26), after having gained access to the 
store, robbers displayed their weapons to force owners, members of staff and 
customers (if present) into submission. Therefore, it can be stated that the availability 
and abundance of illegal firearms play a significant role in jewellery store robbery, 
which is another indication that professional criminals are usually involved. 
 
 
FIGURE 5.8: TYPES OF WEAPON(S) CARRIED BY ROBBERS 
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5.2.2.10 Violence and injuries inflicted during the robberies 
 
As shown in Figure 5.9, be it physical in the form of actual violence inflicted on the 
victim (19.23 percent / 5) or psychological as when a threat of violence is made 
(80.77 percent / 21), the element of violence is always present during a robbery 
attack. In the majority of cases threat of violence proved to be sufficient to force the 
victim(s) into submission. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Findings by the Jewelers’ Security Alliance (2000:5) showed that the element of 
physical violence appeared in more cases in the United States, where robbery with 
violence in 2000 made up for 45 percent of the total robbery events.  
 
Notwithstanding the element of violence, as shown in Figure 5.10, in the majority of 
cases (68.96 percent / 20), robbery attacks against jewellers did not lead to injuries.  A 
possible explanation is that the robbers immediately threatened them with their life 
and forced them into submission. However, even though no fatal injuries were 
reported, 13.79 percent of cases (4) involved light injuries and 6.89 percent (2) serious 
injuries.  Therefore in 20.68 percent of cases (6), respondents were involved in violent 
physical victimisation. 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 5.9: TYPES OF VIOLENCE INFLICTED BY ROBBERS
PHYSICAL ASSAULT, 19.23%
THREAT OF VIOLENCE, 
80.77% 
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However, notwithstanding the above findings, it should be remembered that, even 
though no fatalities were reported by the respondents, incidents of violent robberies at 
jewellery stores in South Africa (causing the death of the victim), have been recorded 
(Crime count 2001:2). 
 
With regard to the element of victim resistance during the robberies, Figure 5.11 
indicates that, in the majority of cases (92.00 percent / 23), victims did not offer any 
resistance during the robbery attack. Only 8.00 percent of victims (2), on the other 
hand, reacted either verbally or physically. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 5.10: CONSEQUENCES OF VIOLENCE INFLICTED DURING THE ROBBERY ATTACK 
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FIGURE 5.11: RESISTANCE BY VICTIMS DURING THE ROBBERY ATTACK 
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 - 123 -
Research on victim’s resistance (Hansmann 2000:24-28), clearly showed that physical 
or verbal resistance to a robbery substantially increased the risk of injury to the 
victim.  
 
Findings as a result of cross tabulation indicated that among the victims who resisted, 
50 percent (1) were subjected to physical assault. On the other hand, in those 
instances where the victims had not reacted, 17.39 percent (4) were physically 
assaulted and 82.61 (19) were not. The threat of immediate danger to the victims’ life 
for the most part appears to discourage them from reacting and, in most cases where 
the victim does not react, there appears to be no physical assault.  
 
5.2.2.11 Duration of the robbery 
 
As shown in Figure 5.12, 44.44 percent of robberies (12) were executed in a time 
frame of between one and five minutes (see Chapter 2, section 2.3.3.2, vi). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The fact that a large percentage of robberies are committed in less than five minutes 
serves as another example of the robbers’ organisation and efficiency. In 55.56 
percent of cases (15), instead, robbers took longer than five minutes. A possible 
explanation is that the duration of a robbery attack is dependant on factors such as, 
amongst others, victims’ reaction, sudden response by police or security, presence of 
bystanders, degree of visibility from outside the store, and the robbers’ degree of 
professionalism. In cases where the criminals took longer than five minutes to execute 
FIGURE 5.12: DURATION OF THE ROBBERY ATTACK (IN MINUTES) 
1 TO 3
11.11%
3 TO 5
33.33%
OVER 5
55.56%
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the crime, it does not necessarily mean that they lacked professionalism. The reason 
might be that, because they were not disturbed during the robbery, they spent more 
time at the store in order to increase their “reward”. 
 
5.2.2.12 Type of merchandise stolen, value and insurance coverage 
 
Figure 5.13 indicates that jewellery was the most targeted merchandise (86.2 percent / 
25), followed by watches (48.22 percent / 14), personal belongings, e.g. wallets and 
cellphones (44.82 percent / 13) and cash from the till (37.93 percent / 11). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Therefore, as emerged from the above findings, it happens often that, in the time-
frame of just a few minutes, jewellery store robbers also turn their attention to the 
persons present in the store, may it be employees or clients, and proceed to seize their 
personal belongings. 
 
With regard to the value of the stolen merchandise, Figure 5.14 shows that in 69.23 
percent of cases (18), the total amount (cost price) was between R 50 000 and            
R 250 000.  In 15.38 percent of cases (4) the stolen merchandise exceeded                  
R 500 000, a massive loss which, if not adequately insured, could end a jeweller’s 
career. 
 
 
FIGURE 5.13: TYPE OF MERCHANDISE / ITEMS SEIZED BY ROBBERS
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It can be stated that, as opposed to other types of commercial robberies where the 
average amount stolen is generally much lower, jewellery store robberies instead 
involve a considerable financial loss. This finding was confirmed by Jewelers’ 
Security Alliance (2000:5), which found that, in the United States, jewellery store 
robberies accounted for the highest dollar losses. 
 
When considering the findings on the value lost by jewellers in a single robbery 
attack, it is obvious that their survival in business depends on adequate insurance 
cover. In this regard, findings in Figure 5.15 indicate that in 50.00 percent of cases 
(14), respondents were fully insured in respect of the loss sustained.  However, in 
17.86 percent of cases (5) jewellers were under-insured and, in as much as 32.14 
percent of cases (9), they did not have any insurance coverage. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 5.14: TOTAL AMOUNT (COST PRICE) OF STOLEN MERCHANDISE
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FIGURE 5.15: INSURANCE COVERAGE IN RESPECT OF STOLEN MERCHANDISE 
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Due to the potential for serious losses as indicated in Figure 5.14 above, the fact that 
many jewellers did not have insurance cover or were inadequately insured constituted 
a serious risk factor. 
 
5.2.2.13 The role of the police in jewellery store robberies 
 
As shown in Figure 5.16, 92.86 percent of respondents (26) indicated that they had 
reported the robbery to the police. This is a high reporting rate compared to the 
findings of Naudé and Prinsloo (2002:90) on the lower reporting rate for robberies in 
most Southern African countries. Swaziland reported a 50.4 percent; South Africa a 
38.5 percent and other countries about 26 percent.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The high reporting rate of jewellery store robbery among the respondents is possibly 
due to factors such as the fact that reporting is required by the insurance companies 
and in the hope that the stolen jewellery may be recovered by the police.  This 
explanation confirms the reasons offered by Naudé’ and Prinsloo (2002:91) as to why 
cases are reported to the police by victims in Southern African countries. 
 
The unreported cases of robbery (7.14 percent / 2) may instead be related to factors 
such as lack of insurance, distrust in the criminal justice system, particularly in the 
ability of the police to solve the robbery and recover the stolen merchandise, and a 
jeweller’s possible involvement in unlawful activities (receiving stolen property).  
 
FIGURE 5.16: ROBBERY REPORTED TO POLICE
YES
92.86%
NO
7.14%
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The high reporting rate by the victims does not result in a high number of arrestees. 
Figure 5.17 shows that in a large percentage of cases (67.86 percent / 19), robbers 
were not apprehended by the police.  Only in 25 percent of cases (7) arrests were 
carried out. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As an aggravating factor, Figure 5.18 indicates that, in the majority of cases (81.48 
percent / 22), the stolen merchandise was never recovered by the police. This finding 
again stresses the importance for jewellers to be adequately covered by insurance. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 5.17: ROBBERS APPREHENDED BY POLICE
YES
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FIGURE 5.18: MERCHANDISE RECOVERED BY POLICE
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Satisfaction with police work is closely linked to the success of the police 
investigation into the robbery event and the recovery of stolen merchandise.  Given 
the negative results in these areas, as shown in Figure 5.19, it follows that in the 
majority of cases (60.72 percent / 17) jewellers were dissatisfied with the way the 
police managed the robbery investigation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Further results based on cross tabulations showed that when arrests were carried out, 
71.43 percent of respondents (5) were satisfied with police work, as opposed to 28.57 
percent (2) who were not. On the other hand, when no arrests were carried out, 78.95 
of respondents (15) were dissatisfied with police work. Likewise, when police did not 
manage to recover the stolen jewellery, 72.73 percent of respondents (16) showed 
their dissatisfaction with police work  
 
5.2.3 The jewellery stores and surrounding environment 
 
The findings on the location of the jewellery stores provide a clear picture of the 
stores (victims) in relation to the immediate environment. The results help identify 
possible risk factors conducive to robbery (the crime). 
 
5.2.3.1 Location of the jewellery stores 
 
As shown in Figure 5.20, in the majority of cases (55.56 percent / 25) jewellery stores 
were situated inside shopping complexes as opposed to 31.11 percent (14) which were 
FIGURE 5.19: SATISFACTION WITH POLICE WORK
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trading along urban or suburban streets.  A small percentage at 11.11 (5) instead were 
located in other areas such as private premises. Only 2.22 percent of respondents (1) 
were conducting business from a hotel. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The findings are consistent with the past ten years’ trend, which saw jewellery stores 
being relocated from the dangerous streets (especially in urban areas) to the “safety” 
of shopping complexes. Further results by cross tabulation showed that among 
shopping complex stores, 56.00 percent (14) were robbed and 44.00 percent (11) were 
not victimised. Instead, among street front stores, 78.57 percent (11) were robbed and 
21.43 percent (3) were not victimised. It would appear as if street front stores were 
more frequently victimised.  
 
5.2.3.2 Description of the surrounding environment 
 
Most jewellery stores in shopping complexes were situated near entry / exit points (52 
percent / 13), followed by centre of complex (36.00 percent / 9) and stairs / lifts 
(32.00 percent / 8). Among these stores, 28.00 percent (7) of those near entry / exit 
points experienced robbery attacks, followed by 20.00 percent (5) of those near the 
centre of complex and sixteen percent (4) of those near stairs / lifts. This may be 
attributed to the fact that jewellery stores near entry / exit points offer robbers a better 
chance of a quick getaway. 
 
FIGURE 5.20: LOCATION OF STORES
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Further results indicated that most jewellery stores were situated in the proximity of 
general small businesses (77.77 percent / 35), followed by restaurant / coffee bars 
(40.00 percent / 18) and departmental stores / supermarkets (35.55 percent / 16).  
Certain environments provide criminals with an opportunity to observe a target 
without being noticed or becoming suspicious.  For example, coffee bars or 
restaurants situated in the immediate vicinity of a jewellery store may be an ideal 
place for potential robbers to closely observe routine activities and plan the most 
suitable method and time of attack. In this regard, findings indicated that 79.31 
percent (23) of jewellery stores targeted by robbers were situated near general small 
business, followed by 44.82 percent (13) near restaurants and coffee bars and 31.03 
percent (9) near departmental stores and supermarkets. 
 
With regard to main transport routes that are used by motorists to reach and leave the 
stores, findings showed that 64.44 percent (9) of jewellery stores were situated along 
main roads and within a five kilometre radius from a freeway ramp (51.11 percent / 
23). This, as found in other studies (Maree 1999:55), constitutes a risk factor as 
robbers usually prefer to target stores that are ideally placed to provide a quick 
getaway. In this regard, findings indicated that 65.52 percent (19) of stores situated 
along main roads had experienced a robbery, followed by 51.72 percent (15) of those 
within a five kilometre radius from the freeway, 34.48 percent (10) of those near 
secondary roads and 3.4 percent (1) within five to ten kilometres from the freeway. 
 
Most respondents (77.27 percent / 34) stated that their stores were situated at a 
distance of between one and 50 metres from the nearest parking, 15.91 percent (7) 
from 50 to 100 metres and 6.82 percent (3) over 100 metres. The distance from the 
jewellery store to the nearest parking lot is also an important risk factor. The shorter 
the distance from the store to the robbers’ getaway vehicles, the better is their chance 
of a successful escape. In this regard, findings by cross tabulation indicated that 
among the stores situated between one and 50 metres from the nearest parking, 55.88 
percent (19) experienced a robbery attack and 44.12 percent (15) were not victimised. 
All seven stores situated between 50 and 100 metres from the nearest parking 
experienced robberies. Only three stores were located at a distance of over 100 metres 
of which two were robbed.  
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The nearest parking facilities were found to be street parking (35.56 percent / 16), 
followed by external parking with the presence of security, e.g. guards (33.33 percent 
/ 15), internal parking with the presence of security (22.22 percent / 10) and external 
parking without security (8.89 percent / 4). Robbers generally prefer targets which 
allow for easy parking a short distance away from the scene of the crime (SAPS 
Robbery Intelligence Desk 2002). In this regard, findings by cross tabulation 
indicated that, among the stores situated close to internal parking with security, 30.00 
percent (3) were victimised by robbers and 70.00 percent (7) were not. On the other 
hand, among fifteen stores situated close to external parking with security, 73.33 
percent (11) experienced robbery victimisation and 26.67 percent (4) did not. 
Important is the finding that all four stores close to external parking (without security) 
were robbed, a possible indication that robbers preferred those stores that were out of 
security view. In addition, among the stores situated close to street parking, 68.75 
percent (11) were attacked by robbers and 31.25 percent (five) were not. Based on 
these findings, it would appear as if the stores in the proximity of external and street 
parking were more exposed to robbery victimisation.  
 
5.2.4 Mechanical, physical, electronic and other security measures. 
 
Findings on mechanical, physical and electronic security measures show the preferred 
security systems adopted by jewellery store owners. Visibility and lighting, which are 
usually considered as important factors in robbery deterrence, are also considered. 
 
5.2.4.1 Available security measures 
 
According to Figure 5.21, the security measures mostly implemented by the 
respondents, ranked from the highest to the lowest, include the following: 
 
• Intruder detection and panic system (86.66 percent / 39) 
• Safes (80 percent / 36) 
• Insurance cover (64.44 percent / 28) 
• Alarm monitoring / armed reaction and reinforced glass (each at 55.55 percent / 
24) 
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• Security gate with strike lock (31.11 percent / 15) 
• Electronic security doors (20 percent / 9) 
• Vaults and fixed grilles / shutters (each at 17.77 percent / 8) 
• CCTV system with video recording (15.55 percent / 7) 
• Store guard (13.33 percent / 6) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A possible explanation for the least implemented measure, i.e. store guard, is that it 
has high and on-going cost implications for jewellers. CCTV systems with video 
recording facilities were also not commonly considered by jewellers, possibly due to 
high cost implications for the installation of such systems. Of particular interest is the 
finding that not all jewellers who had intruder detection and panic systems installed 
were in fact linked to a dedicated control room monitoring and crime reaction service.  
It appeared as if some jewellers trading from shopping complexes relied on the 
response of the security guards who would be alerted by the sound of the siren.  
However, it must be said that this situation poses a serious risk due to the possibility 
of shopping centre guards being taken hostage by a group of robbers. For an alarm 
system to be effective, it must always be linked to a professional security company 
with a visible presence in the area and capable of offering dedicated alarm monitoring 
and response services. 
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After a robbery, it might happen that additional security measures are implemented at 
the affected stores. In this regard, 58.62 percent (17) replied that, after an incident of 
robbery, they had not implemented any additional security measures as opposed to 
41.38 percent (12) who decided that it was in their interest to do so. Even though 
jewellers often suffer repeat victimisation, only just over half reviewed and upgraded 
their security.  Preferred security measures implemented after a robbery attack 
included the following (listed from highest to lowest): 
 
• Security gate with strike lock (17.24 percent / 5) 
• CCTV system, guards and reinforced glass (each at 10.34 percent / 3) 
• Electronic security doors and alarm monitoring with security response (each at 
6.89 percent / 2). 
• Intruder detection / panic systems and insurance cover (each at 3.44 percent / 1). 
 
Findings indicated that among twelve stores which implemented additional security 
measures after a robbery, 91.67 percent (11) had not experienced another robbery 
attack. The implementation of additional security measures may have played a role in 
deterring further attacks. 
 
5.2.4.2 Visibility of the jewellery store 
 
A total of 65.91 percent of respondents (29) indicated that the inside of their store was 
“clearly visible” from the outside both during day and night, with the remaining 34.09 
percent (15) stating that it was not “clearly visible”. Good store visibility is 
considered as an important element in a jewellery store robbery reduction strategy 
(Jewellers’ Vigilance Canada 2000:7). Findings by cross tabulation indicated that 75 
percent of the stores (21) that enjoyed good visibility had been robbed as opposed to 
25 percent (7) that did not experience a robbery attack. Therefore, good store 
visibility does not seem to have a deterrent effect. However, this finding should not 
detract from the value of good store visibility, as it is not possible in the scope of this 
study, which did not focus on the offender, to establish how many robbers were in 
fact deterred by this element. 
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Most (72.73 percent / 32) jewellery stores enjoyed good lighting conditions during 
day and night. As explained above, effective lighting (together with good visibility) 
can have a deterrent effect against criminals. However, as in the case of good 
visibility, 68.75 percent of the stores (22) that enjoyed good lighting conditions had 
also been robbed as opposed to 31.25 percent (10) that were not victimised. Again, 
based on the same considerations as above, this should not detract from the value of 
effective lighting in crime prevention which, as explained by Geason and Wilson 
(1992:75), increases the chances of identifying the offender and is an important 
element in CCTV surveillance. 
 
5.2.5 Personnel 
 
The section on personnel includes findings on the number of staff members visible 
inside the store (as an element of deterrence), the screening procedures (prior to 
employment) and specialised crime prevention training within a jewellery store 
environment. 
 
5.2.5.1 Presence of staff members 
 
In the majority of cases three or more employees were visible inside the store (40.00 
percent / 18), followed by two members of staff (26.67 percent / 12), one member 
(24.44 percent / 11) and none (8.89 percent / 4).  Evidence suggests that the more staff 
one can afford to have in the store the greater the deterrent against robbers (Home 
Office National Board for Crime Prevention 2000:11). It follows that the number of 
staff visible in a jewellery store should influence the criminals’ decision to commit a 
robbery. However, findings by cross tabulation indicated that, among the stores with 
three or more members of staff, 72.22 percent (13) were robbed and 27.78 (5) did not 
experience victimisation. Therefore, it would seem as if the number of staff on the 
floor did not deter a robbery attack. It must be noted that, as in section 5.2.4.2 above, 
it is not possible in the scope of this study to understand whether robbers had in fact 
been deterred by the presence of more employees inside the store.  
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5.2.5.2 Pre-employment screening of personnel 
 
The findings shown in Figure 5.22 are cause for serious concern.  In as much as 48.78 
percent of cases (20), jewellers did not proceed to screen their staff (prior to 
employment).  This constitutes a serious risk factor in view of the potential for 
internal criminal activities on the part of dishonest members of staff. Furthermore, 
lack of screening can also result in criminals being given important “inside 
information” for the planning of a robbery attack. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Further findings as a result of cross tabulation, indicated that among the stores that 
decided to screen their staff, 57.14 percent (12) were robbed and 42.86 percent (9) 
were not victimised. On the other hand, among the stores that did not proceed with the 
screening, 70 percent (14) were robbed and 30 percent (6) were not victimised. Based 
on these results, it would seem as if those stores that did not screen staff members 
were more exposed to robbery victimisation.  
 
5.2.5.3 Security awareness training of staff members 
 
Figure 5.23 indicates that in 56.82 percent of cases (25), jewellers had implemented 
some robbery prevention training for members of staff and in 43.18 percent of cases 
(19) no training programmes were introduced.  This constitutes another serious risk 
factor in that untrained members of staff could, through their negligent or provocative 
FIGURE 5.22: STAFF SECURITY SCREENING (PRIOR TO EMPLOYMENT))
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behaviour, either facilitate a robbery or aggravate the course of the event. In fact, 
during a robbery attack, unconsidered actions on the part of an untrained member of 
staff can lead to a tragic outcome, i.e. serious injuries or even death. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Findings by cross tabulation indicated that among the stores that implemented crime 
prevention training for members of staff, 68 percent (17) were robbed and 32 percent 
(8) were not victimised. On the other hand, among the stores that did not introduce 
crime prevention training, 63.16 percent (12) were robbed and 36.84 percent (7) were 
not victimised. Based on these findings, it would seem as if crime prevention training 
did not have a significant impact on the prevention of robbery. However, as stated 
earlier, these findings should not detract from the real value of robbery prevention 
training, i.e. creating awareness on how to reduce risks and behave during a 
confrontation with the offenders. 
 
If training was conducted, it is important to determine what it entailed. As shown in 
Figure 5.24, in most cases (88.00 percent / 22), the type of robbery prevention training 
implemented by jewellers involved only basic security procedures, e.g. activation of 
alarm and panic systems and general security awareness.  This was followed by a 
more comprehensive “in house” security induction programme conducted by security 
/ loss control managers (52.00 percent / 13).  Only 8.00 percent of respondents (2) 
indicated that they had contracted external consultants to conduct specialised crime 
prevention training. 
 
FIGURE 5.23: ROBBERY PREVENTION TRAINING FOR MEMBERS OF STAFF 
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A possible explanation for jewellers not resorting to external consultants is the cost 
factor linked to this type of service. However, it must be stated that specialised 
training by experts can be a valuable tool in a robbery risk reduction programme, 
especially useful in raising the employees’ level of awareness and their knowledge on 
how to respond to a criminal threat. 
 
5.2.6 Fear of crime 
 
Findings on the fear of crime among jewellers and members of staff throw light on 
their perception of risk of victimisation and their psychological reaction to the 
element of risk. 
 
5.2.6.1 Perception on the trend of jewellery store robbery 
 
According to Figure 5.25, in 80.95 percent of cases (34) the general perception 
amongst jewellers and members of staff was that the trend of robbery against 
jewellery stores was on the increase compared to 16.67 percent of respondents (7) 
who believed that there was no increase. Only 2.38 percent of respondents (1) 
indicated that the trend was decreasing.  
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Further results as a result of cross tabulation, showed that among 23 male 
respondents, 73.91 percent (17) believed that robbery was increasing, 21.74 percent 
(5) staying the same and 4.35 percent (1) decreasing. On the other hand, among 
nineteen female respondents, 89.47 percent (17) believed that robbery was on the 
increase and 10.53 percent (2) stationary. The fact that more female than male 
respondents believed that robbery was on the increase may be attributable to them 
being more sensitive to crimes of a violent nature.  
 
When considering the age factor in the perception of the trend of armed robbery 
among the respondents who believed that robbery was on the increase, the age groups 
30-39, 40-49 and 50-59 were equally represented (each at 23.53 percent / 8), followed 
by the group 20-29 (20.59 percent / 7) and the group 60 plus (8.82 percent / 3).  
 
5.2.6.2 Types of crime affecting jewellery stores 
 
According to the respondents, as shown in Figure 5.26, theft by customers is at the top 
of the list of crimes affecting jewellery stores (44.44 percent).  This is followed by 
robbery (33.33 percent), fraud (31.11 percent) burglary (8.89 percent) and theft by 
employees (4.44 percent). 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 5.25: PERCEPTION ON FREQUENCY OF ARMED ROBBERY AGAINST JEWELLERY STORES 
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The findings are in line with those by Jewellers’ Security Alliance (2000:2) in the 
United States which indicated that the most common crimes were theft (60 percent), 
followed by robbery at 22 percent. 
 
5.2.6.3 Perceptions on victimisation risk 
 
As reflected in Figure 5.27, most respondents (68.89 percent / 31) felt either 
frequently (35.56 percent / 16) or always (33.33 percent / 15) at risk of robbery 
victimisation, while 28.89 percent (13) indicated that they felt at risk occasionally. 
Only 2.22 percent of respondents (1) never felt at risk of becoming a victim. It is 
important to keep in mind that, as stressed by Fattah (1991:264), in certain situations 
many people are victimised more by fear of crime than by an actual crime. When 
certain people believe they are vulnerable, they may have a high level of fear which 
does not correspond to the objective realities of threat and risk. 
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Additional findings by cross tabulation indicated that among 26 male respondents, 
34.62 percent (9) felt at risk of robbery victimisation occasionally, 23.08 percent (6) 
frequently, 38.46 percent (10) always and 3.85 percent (1) never. On the other hand, 
among nineteen female respondents, 21.05 percent (4) felt at risk occasionally, 52.63 
percent (10) frequently and 26.32 percent (5) always. 
 
When considering the age factor, among sixteen respondents who frequently felt at 
risk of victimisation, most belonged to the age groups 20-29, 40-49 and 50-59 
(equally at 25 percent / 4), followed by the groups 30-39 (18.75 percent / 3) and the 
group 60 plus (6.25 percent / 1). Further results indicated that, among fifteen 
respondents who always felt at risk of victimisation, most belonged to the age group 
30-39 (40.00 percent / 6), followed by the group 40-49 (33.33 percent / 5), the group 
20-29 (13.33 percent / 2) and the groups 50-59 and 60 + (equally at 6.67 percent / 1).  
 
It is important to note that the respondents’ perception on victimisation risk may 
contribute to stress. In fact, as shown in Figure 5.28, findings indicate that, in 51.11 
percent of cases (23), respondents felt either frequently (28.89 percent / 13) or always 
(22.22 percent / 10) stressed due to the risk of robbery victimisation. A total of 42.22 
percent (19) experienced stress occasionally. Only 6.67 percent (3) indicated that they 
never experienced stress.  Therefore, feeling at risk of robbery victimisation and 
experiencing stress as a result of it, seem to be constant elements of being in a 
jewellery profession / occupation. 
FIGURE 5.27: FEELING AT RISK OF ROBBERY VICTIMISATION
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Findings by cross tabulation showed that among 26 male respondents, 46.15 percent 
(12) occasionally experienced stress, 23.08 (6) frequently, 23.08 percent (6) always 
and 7.69 percent (2) never. On the other hand, among nineteen female respondents, 
36.84 percent (7) occasionally experienced stress, 36.84 percent (7) frequently, 21.05 
percent (4) always and 5.26 percent (1) never.  
 
When considering the age factor, among thirteen respondents who frequently felt 
under stress due to the risk of robbery victimisation, most belonged to the age groups 
20-29 and 30-39 (equally at 30.77 percent / 4), followed by the groups 40-49 and 50-
59 (equally at 15.38 percent /  2). The group 60 plus was last (7.69 percent / 1). 
Further results indicated that among ten respondents who always felt under stress due 
to the risk of robbery victimisation, most (40.00 percent / 4) belonged to the age 
group 40-49, followed by the groups 30-39 and 50-59 (equally at 20 percent / 2), and 
the groups 20-29 and 60 plus (equally at 10.00 percent / 1).  
 
5.2.6.4 Psychological impact of the perception of victimisation risk 
 
The findings shown in Figure 5.29 are significant.  In as much as 46.67 percent of 
cases (21), jewellers and members of staff considered giving up their business / 
occupation. Therefore, feeling at risk of robbery victimisation and experiencing high 
levels of stress resulted in jewellers or members of staff considering giving up their 
business / occupation. 
 
FIGURE 5.28: FEELING STRESSED DUE TO RISK OF ROBBERY VICTIMISATION 
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Findings by cross tabulation also indicated that among 26 male respondents, 46.15 
percent (12) considered giving up their business / occupation as a result of the risk of 
robbery victimisation as opposed to 53.85 percent (14) who did not. On the other 
hand, out of nineteen female respondents, 47.37 percent (9) thought about giving up 
as opposed to 52.63 percent (10) who did not. These results showed a similar attitude 
between female and male respondents.  
 
When considering the age factor, among 21 respondents who thought about giving up 
their profession or occupation, most belonged to the age groups 30-39 and 50-59 
(equally at 28.57 percent / 6), followed by group 40-49 (19.05 percent / 4), the group 
20-29 (14.29 percent / 3) and the group 60 plus (9.52 percent / 2).  
 
5.2.7 Crime prevention initiatives 
 
The findings on crime prevention give an indication of the respondents’ attitude in 
respect of specific initiatives such as conducting specialised training, forming a 
jewellery industry crime prevention structure and introducing a crime intelligence and 
dismissed employee database. 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 5.29: CONSIDERING GIVING UP BUSINESS / OCCUPATION
NO, 53.33%
YES, 46.67% 
 - 143 -
5.2.7.1 Crime prevention training of jewellers and members of staff 
 
According to Figure 5.30, 93.33 percent of respondents (42) either agreed (60.00 
percent / 27) or highly agreed (33.33 percent / 15) on crime prevention training by 
experts as an integral part of staff general training.  Only 6.67 percent of respondents 
(3) disagreed. This is an important finding which underlines the fact that jewellers and 
members of staff viewed crime prevention initiatives in a positive light. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Findings by cross tabulation also indicated that, among 26 male respondents, 23.08 
percent (6) highly agreed on the need for crime prevention training, 69.23 (18) agreed 
and only 7.69 percent (2) disagreed. On the other hand, among nineteen female 
respondents, 47.37 percent (9) highly agreed, 47.37 percent (9) agreed and only 5.26 
percent (1) disagreed. Therefore, both male and female respondents gave significant 
value to crime prevention.  
 
Figure 5.31 shows that, as a further indication that the majority of respondents agreed 
to various crime prevention initiatives to help curb jewellery related crime, 71.79 
percent (28) favoured the introduction of a crime prevention study programme at the 
schools or institutions training jewellers.  
 
 
FIGURE 5.30: INTRODUCTION OF CRIME PREVENTION TRAINING BY EXPERTS AS AN INTEGRAL 
PART OF STAFF GENERAL TRAINING
DISAGREE, 6.67%
HIGHLY AGREE, 33.33% 
AGREE, 60% 
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5.2.7.2 Formation of a jewellery security structure 
 
Figure 5.32 shows that most respondents (91.11 percent / 41) believed that the 
formation of a jewellery security body aimed at creating and maintaining a crime 
intelligence and dismissed employees database was a useful instrument for the 
prevention of jewellery store crime.  This again emphasised the respondent’s 
willingness towards crime prevention initiatives. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Further results by cross tabulation showed that, among 26 male respondents, 88.46 
percent (23) found the introduction of a jewellery crime prevention structure useful 
FIGURE 5.31: CRIME PREVENTION AS PART OF STUDY PROGRAMME AT JEWELLERS' 
SCHOOLS
YES
71.79%
NO
28.21%
FIGURE 5.32: FORMATION OF A JEWELLERY SECURITY BODY TO CREATE AND MAINTAIN A CRIME 
INTELLIGENCE AND DISMISSED EMPLOYEE DATABASE
NOT USEFUL
8.89%
YES, USEFUL
91.11%
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for the industry. On the other hand, among a group of nineteen female respondents, 
94.74 percent (18) also found the initiative useful.  
 
Figure 5.33 shows how, in respect of the introduction of a crime intelligence and 
dismissed employee database, 57.78 percent of respondents (26) indicated that they 
would consider contributing with an annual subscription fee towards its running costs.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Regarding the financial implications and the perceptions of male and female 
respondents, 63.16 percent of female respondents (12) and 53.85 percent of males 
(14) indicated that they were willing to pay a subscription fee.  
 
5.3 FINDINGS BASED ON THE SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEW WITH  
      KNOWLEDGEABLE RESPONDENTS 
 
The analysis of the information collected from the semi-structured interview with five 
knowledgeable people referred to as respondents 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 (see Chapter 1, 
section 1.4.6.2) led to the following findings. 
 
5.3.1 Respondents’ professional experience 
 
All respondents were males in the age groups 40-49 and 50-59 working from different 
Johannesburg’s suburbs. They gained vast experience in their respective fields, which 
rendered them knowledgeable on the topic being investigated. 
FIGURE 5.33: ANNUAL CONTRIBUTION TO DATABASE 
NO
42.22%
YES 
57.78%
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5.3.2 Perception on jewellery store robbery 
 
This theme dealt with the interviewees’ perception on the phenomenon of jewellery 
store robbery, particularly with regard to aspects such as the seriousness of the crime, 
its frequency and severity. Respondents were also asked to explain the reasons for the 
recent spate of robberies at jewellery stores. 
 
5.3.2.1 Seriousness of the crime 
 
All respondents, with the exception of respondent 5 (SAPS spokesman), believed that 
jewellery store robbery was a serious crime problem causing significant losses and a 
blow to jewellers and staff’s morale. Respondent 5’s viewpoint is that robbery at 
jewellery stores does not constitute a serious crime problem compared to other types 
of robbery, such as those committed at supermarkets and petrol stations. These 
premises were targeted much more frequently by robbers. A problem crime, however, 
appears to be robbery against women wearing expensive jewellery. Often, this 
robbery is committed on the driveway when a woman returns home. 
 
5.3.2.2 Frequency versus severity 
 
All respondents agreed that while robbery at jewellery stores had stabilised in the past 
few years, it had shown a sharp increase since 2003, with major heists being 
committed against jewellers. Robbery had increased in terms of severity with a higher 
value of jewellery being stolen (respondent 3). It was not possible for the SAPS 
(respondent 5) to state whether robbery at jewellery stores was increasing or 
decreasing due to the fact that this specific crime was not classified separately for 
statistical purposes but appeared under the general category of “business robbery”. 
Respondent 5 also stated that one of the reasons why robbery at jewellery stores 
appeared to be on the increase was attributable to the wide publicity received in the 
newspapers. 
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5.3.2.3 Upsurge in robbery attacks 
 
All respondents stated that jewellery stores were being targeted due to them being 
perceived by robbers as soft targets with a high concentration (in a small area) of 
valuable jewellery, which can be easily seized and carried away. The reasons for the 
recent upsurge in jewellery store robbery, particularly in the Gauteng Province, 
received various responses such as: 
 
• The high rate of unemployment is causing people to try and make quick money by 
robbing easy targets (respondent 1). 
• Rolex watches agents are being increasingly targeted (respondents 1 and 3). 
• Organised crime syndicates led by foreign criminals from countries such as the 
Democratic Republic of Congo, Ghana and Nigeria are exploiting the many 
opportunities for crime in South Africa and the weaknesses of its criminal justice 
system (respondent 3). 
• Jewellery is easy to carry away and to dispose of. Low volumes of stolen 
jewellery offer high value returns (respondent 4). 
• While other targets such as banks and Cash in Transit vehicles have been 
considerably hardened, jewellery stores remain easy to attack and rob of valuable 
merchandise (respondent 2 and 5). 
 
5.3.3 The jewellery store robber 
 
With this theme the researcher focused on obtaining information on the jewellery 
store robbers and the criminals standing behind them (giving them instructions to 
commit the robbery). 
 
5.3.3.1 Local or international? 
 
According to respondent 5, it would appear as if jewellery store robberies were the 
work of both local and foreign crime syndicates with the executors of the robbery 
being mostly South Africans. Two respondents (2 and 4) indicated that there seemed 
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to be no hard evidence implicating international syndicates in jewellery store 
robberies, which were carried out in the majority of cases by local crime networks. 
 
Other respondents were of the opinion that the presence of foreigners appeared to be 
increasing, particularly in the theft of expensive watches (respondent 1). Criminals 
from the Democratic Republic of Congo, Ghana and Nigeria were known to be behind 
some incidents of robbery (respondent 3). 
 
5.3.3.2 Random or selective? 
 
All respondents agreed that there appears to be selective targeting of high value items 
such as watches, e.g. Tag, Rolex and Breitling, but also precious stones. Watches, 
especially Rolex, are being increasingly targeted due to market demands both in 
South Africa and other African countries (respondent 4). The value of a display tray 
of 67 Rolex watches is approximately R 1.5 million (respondent 1). Robbers also 
appear to be following orders by criminal syndicates for specific items of jewellery 
(respondents 3 and 5). It should, however, be born in mind that some robbers act 
randomly by seizing as many items as possible (respondents 1 and 4).  
 
5.3.3.3 Professional or opportunist? 
 
All respondents agreed that most jewellery store robberies were the work of 
professional criminals. This type of robbery was seldom committed by casual 
criminals. Respondent 3 believed that as many as 99 percent of jewellery store 
robberies involved professional criminals. The main reasons pointing to a professional 
type are the following: 
 
• Evidence points to a carefully planned attack (respondents 3 and 4). 
• In the majority of cases, the criminals had been seen at the store (prior to the 
robbery) posing as customers (respondents 3 and 4). 
• Robbers seem to be acting on orders placed by crime syndicates (respondents 3 
and 5). 
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• Robbers act in groups of armed individuals and have support / back-up systems in 
place (respondent 5). 
 
5.3.4 Particulars of the robbery 
 
All respondents had the same viewpoint in respect of the following: 
 
i)  Number of robbers 
Jewellery store robberies are committed by groups of individuals, at times up  
to twenty (respondent 3) but usually between four and six (respondent 5). 
ii)  Method of entry 
 Most robbers gain access to a store by posing as customers. They are usually 
 neatly dressed (respondent 5). However, at times, they may act violently, 
 particularly when a large number is involved (respondent 3), or no security 
 gates have been installed (respondent 2). 
iii) Use of disguises 
The use of disguises is not common and the majority appear to act as they are. 
When worn, disguises are usually not highly visible (to avoid drawing 
unnecessary attention), e.g. caps (respondents 3, 4 and 5). However, in certain 
instances, the use of heavy disguises such as dressing as clowns (respondent 3) 
or wearing balaclavas or masks (respondents 2, 4 and 5) was reported. 
Robbers also appear to disregard the presence of CCTV systems and the 
possibility of identification and arrest (respondents 2 and 5). 
iv)  Use of weapons 
In all incidents of robbery, a weapon (mostly firearms) is produced to subdue 
the victims. Due to the presence of firearms, this type of robbery is 
investigated by the Serious and Violent Crime Unit of the SAPS (respondent 
5). The most commonly used firearms are small handguns, which are easy to 
conceal and carry, but automatic rifles are at times also carried, especially by 
the robbers’ external  support team (respondents 3, 4 and 5). 
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v)  Stolen items 
Robbers appear to increasingly target jewellers, members of staff and 
customers’ personal belongings during the attack, including cellphones, 
wallets and firearms. 
vi) Time of execution of the robbery 
 Robberies at jewellery stores are usually carried out in a short period of time, 
 usually within five minutes. 
 
5.3.5 The victim of jewellery store robbery 
 
In this section the researcher aimed at obtaining information on the victims of 
jewellery store robbery, particularly with regard to the potential for physical violence 
inflicted upon them and the psychological impact resulting from the threat of robbery. 
 
5.3.5.1 Violence inflicted 
 
All respondents indicated that physical violence leading to injuries or death was not 
common. However, threat of violence was always present as robbers needed to take 
immediate control of the situation. Robbers will not hesitate to shoot if provoked by a 
victim’s reaction (respondent 5). In one incident that happened twelve years ago a 
young member of staff was shot dead (respondent 3). Another respondent stated that 
only one fatality (2002) had occurred among his clients (respondent 2). Respondent 1, 
instead, mentioned that he knew of two people who had been killed in 1996 after they 
reacted by screaming and confronting the robbers. 
 
5.3.5.2 Psychological impact 
 
All respondents believed that the threat of robbery had an impact on the jewellers and 
staff’s mental state, in particular by causing stress. Respondent 2 stated that the threat 
of robbery and the resultant stress caused jewellers and staff to become more 
observant of potential risks. Respondent 4 was aware of some members of staff 
having left their workplace for fear of a repetition; others instead, due to the trauma, 
were in need of psychological counselling. 
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5.3.6 The aftermath of jewellery store robbery 
 
In this section the researcher dealt with the aftermath of the robbery to understand 
what happened to the stolen jewellery, which must be disposed of through the 
available channels in order for the robbers to obtain cash. Furthermore, the 
effectiveness of the criminal justice system in respect of arrests and recoveries of 
stolen jewellery was investigated. 
 
5.3.6.1 Disposal of stolen jewellery 
 
The stolen jewellery may be sold via fences such as pawn shops whose owners are 
involved in receiving stolen property (respondents 2 and 5). Once stolen, the jewellery 
is handed over to the crime syndicate which commissioned the robbery. These 
syndicates pay the robbers only a fraction of the retail value and, in fact, they are paid 
an agreed upon amount to execute the crime. However, they inevitably keep some 
items of jewellery for themselves in order to increase their reward (respondent 3). The 
crime syndicates then dispose of the jewellery to obtain cash via a network of 
available fences (respondent 4). At times, the stolen goods are sold to corrupted 
jewellers (respondent 1). In order to avoid possible identification, the crime syndicate 
may decide to export the jewellery to foreign contacts, melt down the gold and 
reshape precious stones (respondents 3, 4 and 5). 
 
5.3.6.2 Arrests and recoveries 
 
All respondents agreed that the rate of arrest and recovery of the stolen jewellery was 
very low. The SAPS success is indeed limited (respondent 5). The conviction rate is 
also extremely low (respondent 3 and 4). Respondents 3 also stated that a serious 
problem was that, once arrested, criminals were easily released on bail, thus 
continuing to offend. Since 1977, he had only witnessed one case of conviction. 
Jewellery store robbery appears to be a type of crime where the risk of apprehension 
and conviction is extremely low. Therefore, because of the reward received from the 
sale of the stolen jewellery, this criminal activity may be well worth the risk 
(respondent 3). 
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5.3.7 Security risk reduction  
 
In this section, respondents were asked whether they could suggest security measures 
that could prove effective in reducing the risk of robbery.  
 
5.3.7.1 Suggested security measures 
 
According to respondent 4, while radio frequency identification (RFI) systems are 
useful in the prevention of theft or shoplifting, there is no special device to prevent 
robbery. Some measures that may prove useful are: 
 
• Limiting high value stock in the display windows. 
• Making access to high value stock more difficult, e.g. by keeping excess stock in a 
safe with a time lock mechanism. 
• Making access to the store more difficult to criminals by means of a double door 
interlocking system. However, in one instance, in order to gain access, a group of 
robbers shot their way through this barrier. 
 
Respondent 5 stressed the fact that risk reduction at a specific store or shopping 
complex should be regarded as the responsibility of the store owner and landlord, and 
not as a police function. It is simply not possible, in terms of the existing resources, 
for the police to maintain a visible presence at all shopping complexes in the country 
and patrol each and every store. Security at shopping complexes should be improved 
by means of more effective security technologies, e.g. professionally installed digital 
CCTV systems, and better trained and vetted security personnel. The latter should not 
be armed but instead furnished with the necessary equipment (e.g. two-way radios and 
panic transmitters) to immediately alert their control centre and in turn police and 
security response vehicles. 
 
A combination of various risk reduction measures offers the most suitable response to 
the threat of robbery. These measures should include employees’ security awareness, 
as well as physical and electronic security. The installation of an access control 
system such as a double security door would be well received by an insurance 
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company. However, this system is seldom accepted by jewellers due to the fact that it 
may discourage customers from entering the store. In addition, it may not be allowed 
by shopping centre management (respondent 2). 
 
Not only stores but also shopping centres’ security should be improved. CCTV 
cameras should be installed outside the store in order to also keep video records of 
suspects or suspicious activities in the vicinity of the store. At present, the tendency is 
to install cameras only on the inside of the store. In addition a double alarm / panic 
response system should be implemented by contracting two different security 
companies. This will minimise the risk of theft by corrupted members of one 
company (from the scene of an after hours robbery or burglary). Security gates are not 
recommended as they add to the risk of violence if the robbers happen to be trapped 
inside the store (respondent 1). 
 
Most measures will not stop an attack by a professional, well organised group of 
robbers. Most jewellers dislike security gates due to aesthetics and the fear of being 
trapped inside the store with dangerous criminals. However, a double door 
interlocking system may have a deterrent effect on robbers in that they may decide to 
move to a softer target. Although the effectiveness of CCTV surveillance is 
questionable due to poor follow-up investigations by the SAPS, a digital camera 
should be utilised at the entrance to capture an image of all people entering the store 
(respondent 3). 
 
5.3.7.2 Employees’ security screening and training 
 
All respondents indicated that there was no systematic screening of candidates prior to 
employment. Many jewellers appeared to be relying only on trade references. Some 
jewellers also appeared to be very superficial with regard to the need to train their 
staff in security risk awareness and reduction. 
 
5.3.7.3 Insurance coverage 
 
All respondents agreed on the need for jewellers to have an adequate insurance 
coverage due to the potential for crippling losses resulting from a robbery attack. A 
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major loss from a single robbery attack could put a jeweller out of business 
(respondents 2 and 3). Some jewellers experienced losses of up to R 5 million 
(respondent 4). Factors that may discourage jewellers from purchasing insurance 
coverage include the following: 
 
• Insurance is perceived to be expensive (respondents 1, 2 and 3). Coverage of 
approximately R 3 million for stock and R 1.2 million for armed hold-up may cost 
up to R 6000.00 per month (respondent 2). 
• The business is too small to insure (respondent 2). 
• Bad experiences with insurance companies (respondent 2). 
• Fraudulent activities on the part of jewellers who prefer not to keep records 
(respondent 3). 
• Insurance policies contain too many clauses making jewellers fully accountable 
(respondent 1). 
 
5.3.8 Security initiatives 
 
All respondents agreed on the measures proposed by the researcher, i.e.: 
 
• Improved security awareness training for jewellers and members of staff, and 
introduction of a crime prevention module as part of the study programme at 
schools or institutions training jewellers. In this regard, it was stated that emphasis 
should be on creating more security awareness amongst staff (respondents 4 and 
5). The Jewellery Council should introduce and subsidise training programmes 
(respondent 1). The cost factor may be a problem, especially if independent 
consultants are involved (respondent 2).  
• The formation of a jewellery security body and dismissed employee database. In 
this regard, it was stated that strict requirements on legal and employees’ rights 
should be taken into consideration (respondents 1 and 2) 
 
All respondents also agreed that the best way forward is to bring all sector players 
together in a joint effort to tackle the problem of armed robbery and crime in general. 
In this regard, it was stated that the Jewellery Council could play an important role in 
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achieving a common, unified response to the threat of crime (respondent 2). 
Moreover, there should be a more effective police response against the robbers who 
far too often manage to escape punishment. Consideration should be given to the 
creation of a special jewellery crime squad to increase the arrest and conviction rate 
(respondent 4). The SAPS should be involved in all industry security initiatives 
(respondent 5). 
 
5.4 FINDINGS BASED ON THE STRUCTURED INTERVIEWS WITH  
VICTIMISED JEWELLERS 
 
In the case of the semi-structured interviews with knowledgeable people reference 
was made to respondents 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5. For the purposes of the structured interviews 
with five victims of jewellery store robbery, reference is made to respondents 6, 7, 8, 
9 and 10 (see Chapter 1, section 1.4.6.3). 
 
5.4.1 General information 
 
All respondents, with the exception of respondent 9, were males. They all were in the 
age group 40-49 and operated their businesses from a suburban store situated in the 
Johannesburg metropolitan area. 
 
5.4.2 Description of the robbery event 
 
In the past five years, respondents 6 and 7 had each experienced an armed robbery in 
September 2006; respondents 8, 9 and 10 were victimised once in 2007. Respondent 7 
was also robbed once in 2004 and 2005 (only information on the most recent robbery 
was captured for the purposes of the interview).  
 
The results that emerged from the structured interviews with victims of jewellery 
store robbery were, for the most part, similar to those obtained from the 
questionnaires and semi-structured interviews. This helped to further substantiate the 
research findings as follows: 
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• While the day of the week in which the robberies occurred varied from one 
respondent to another, in the case of respondent 7 two robberies took place in 
December, which has already been described in sections 2.3.3.2 (i) and 5.2.2.3 as 
a critical month for robberies. 
• Two robberies took place at opening time (respondents 9 and 10); one during late 
morning (respondent 8); and two at closing time (respondents 6 and 7). This 
stresses the fact that opening and closing appears to be critical times for the risk of 
armed robbery. However, robbers may also strike during busy hours. In one 
instance (respondent 8), the store was attacked in a busy shopping centre at 
approximately 11:00 on Thursday. 
• All respondents were robbed by a large group of offenders (five or more). This is 
in line with the questionnaire and semi-structured interview results which 
indicated that the majority of stores were robbed by a group of five or more 
offenders (sections 5.2.2.6 and 5.3.4 i). During three incidents (respondents 6, 7 
and 8) gangs of up to fifteen robbers were involved. In one case, two stores 
(respondents 6 and 7) were robbed simultaneously by a large group of criminals 
who, once inside the shopping centre, split into two different groups and 
proceeded to attack the selected targets.  
• Respondents 7, 8, 9 and 10 pointed out that suspicious looking individuals were 
seen at the store prior to the commission of the robbery. According to the 
respondents, these individuals posed as customers with the purpose of casing the 
store. Respondent 8 explained that store CCTV footage confirmed the presence of 
individuals behaving in a very suspicious manner a few days before the robbery. 
This is also in line with questionnaire-based findings (section 5.2.2.7). 
• In four cases (respondents 6, 7, 8 and 10), robbers forced entry and, once inside 
the store, some of them wore balaclavas during the execution of the crime while 
others did not bother to disguise their identity. Some robbers instead wore a cap 
and kept is as close as possible to their eyes in order to make identification 
difficult (respondent 7). In one case (respondent 9), robbers entered the store 
posing as customers and, once inside, pulled out a firearm threatening members of 
staff. They were immediately joined by other members of the gang who took 
control of the store while others kept a watchful eye. 
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• In all cases, robbers were armed with firearms including handguns and automatic 
rifles. Respondent 8 stated that some of the robbers wore bullet proof vests for 
their protection. Some robbers carried hammers in order to smash the reinforced 
glass surface of the display counters (respondents 6 and 7). In other instances 
(respondents 8, 9 and 10), the butt of the rifles was used to smash the glass. 
Automatic rifles were carried under overcoats and inside large bags but were also 
openly displayed in an act of total defiance when the gang arrived at the store 
(respondent 8). Questionnaire and semi-structured interview findings also 
indicated that firearms were the robbers’ preferred weapon (sections 5.2.2.9 and 
5.3.4 iv). 
• Firearms were used to threaten and intimidate staff and customers. Although no 
injuries or death were reported among staff or customers, during three attacks 
(respondents 6, 7 and 8), robbers did not hesitate to open fire in order to destroy 
the display windows, generate panic among members of staff, customers and 
bystanders, and engage civilians and SAPS members who stood in their way. 
Some of the robbers were injured but helped away by other gang members 
(respondent 8); a robber was also found dead in an abandoned vehicle not far from 
the crime scene (respondent 6). During one incident (respondent 8), robbers made 
use of plastic explosive to blow a locked door open. This shows their level of 
preparation and determination in the execution of the robbery. 
• No resistance on the part of staff or customers was reported and this helps explain 
why no serious injuries had occurred. It is clear that any resistance would have 
been met with a swift and severe retaliation on the part of the robbers. This is in 
line with the questionnaire-based findings, which showed that the majority of the 
victims did not react or sustain injuries during the attacks (section 5.2.2.10). 
However, respondent 6 stated that a policeman had received serious injuries when 
confronting the robbers. Although no physical injuries were reported among staff 
or customers, all respondents indicated that they had experienced severe 
psychological trauma in the immediacy of the robbery event.  
• In four cases the offenders executed the robbery in three to five minutes. One 
attack (respondent 6) was completed in over five minutes, which is more in line 
with the majority of the responses obtained from the questionnaires (section 
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5.2.2.11). The fact that these gangs are prepared to spend five minutes or longer at 
a crime scene is an indication of their confidence, preparation and strength. 
• In three cases (respondents 6, 7 and 8), the robbers escaped with over R 500 000 
worth of jewellery and high-value watches, the latter being the most targeted item. 
In the remaining cases (respondents 9 and 10), the stolen jewellery caused a loss 
of just under R 250 000. Respondents 8 and 10 reported that, because they were 
not fully insured, their losses were substantial. Respondents 6 and 8 stated that 
shots fired inside the stores had caused extensive damage to shop fittings, thus 
adding to the financial burden. As indicated by the experts during the semi-
structured interviews (section 5.3.3.2) and as emerged from the questionnaire-
based findings (5.2.2.12), high-value watches appear to be a much sought after 
item due to the fact that they are easy to dispose of. 
• In all cases, even though the robbery was reported to the SAPS, no arrests or 
recoveries of stolen jewellery were reported. As in the case of the majority of 
questionnaire respondents, this explains why all interview respondents were 
dissatisfied with the way the SAPS conducted the investigation (section 5.2.2.13). 
Respondents 6, 7 and 8 also stated that their dissatisfaction was aggravated by the 
lack of feedback on the part of the appointed investigators. 
 
5.4.3 Location of premises 
 
All respondents’ stores are situated inside shopping centres. In the case of respondents 
6 and 7, the stores are trading at a distance of approximately 50 metres from each 
other. As indicated earlier, these stores were attacked simultaneously by a very large 
group of robbers. Four stores were located near entry / exit points in the proximity of 
a parking area (less than 50 metres); one store (respondent 8) was closer to the centre 
of the complex (over 50 metres from the nearest parking). Results indicate that all 
stores are in the proximity of general small business. However, two stores 
(respondents 6 and 7) also happen to be next to coffee bars. As pointed out in the 
questionnaire-based findings (section 5.2.3.2), a store’s proximity to an entry / exit 
point leading to a parking area and to certain premises such as coffee bars and 
restaurants is viewed as a risk factor in that the first provides an easier and quicker 
escape route, and the second offers an ideal place from which to observe a store. 
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5.4.4 Adopted security measures 
 
Standard security measures adopted by all respondents at their stores include intruder 
detection systems connected to a security control centre and armed response, 
reinforced glass and insurance approved safes. Only two respondents (7 and 8) made 
use of CCTV surveillance, which as in the case of questionnaire-based findings 
(section 5.2.4.1), indicates that the installation of digital CCTV systems is not a 
standard practice among jewellers, probably because of the high cost involved. One 
respondent (9) opted for a security gate with a strike lock system and another (7) went 
a step further in access control by installing an electronic security door system. All 
other respondents believed that they were better off, both in terms of trade and 
security, by maintaining free access / egress. In this regard, respondent 8 pointed out 
that, in the event of a robbery, he preferred seeing the offenders out of his store 
quickly rather than having to face a hostage situation by hindering their escape. It 
must be noted that the electronic security doors referred to above, did not deter the 
robbers who managed to shoot their way into the store by shattering the glass with 
automatic rifles. After the robbery, the jeweller decided to install 30 mm bullet proof 
glass, covering all glass surface of the store, in order to repel similar attacks. In 
addition, the landlord increased the level of security at the shopping centre by adding 
security manpower at strategic places, particularly in the jewellery retail area, and by 
improving the existing CCTV system and parking security. Other respondents did not 
implement any additional measures after the robbery event, with the exception of 
respondent 10 who decided to install a CCTV system in order to increase the level of 
deterrence and obtain video evidence in the event of criminal activities at the store. 
 
5.4.5 Personnel-related findings  
 
In the majority of cases (respondents 7, 8 and 9), the robbers were not deterred by the 
presence of three or more members of staff who were highly visible from the outside 
(respondent 8 pointed out that as many as ten members of staff were present at the 
time of the robbery). This is probably due to the fact that, as indicated earlier, the 
majority of jewellery store robberies appear to be committed by large groups of 
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heavily armed and professional criminals who can easily take control of a store and 
are fully prepared to deal with any reaction on the part of staff, security and police. 
 
All respondents indicated that their members of staff had neither undergone security 
screening prior to employment nor received robbery awareness and prevention 
training. This is also a reflection of the questionnaire-based findings (sections 5.2.5.2 
and 5.2.5.3), which showed that over 40 percent of respondents chose not to take any 
preventative action with regard to staff screening and training. Therefore, it appears as 
if a simple reference check is common practice among jewellers. 
 
5.4.6 Psychological impact 
 
Four respondents believed that the frequency of armed robbery at jewellery stores was 
increasing; respondent 7 instead believed it was decreasing (after reaching a peak in 
2005-2006). This is in line with the questionnaire-based findings, which showed that 
the majority of respondents believed that armed robbery was on the increase (section 
5.2.6.1). 
 
All respondents felt at risk of robbery victimisation and this caused them to 
experience stress. Due to the constant threat of robbery and to the stress resulting 
from it, all respondents considered giving-up their businesses, particularly after the 
robbery event. Questionnaire results also showed that a high percentage of 
respondents (46 percent) had contemplated changing their type of work because of the 
risk of violent victimisation (section 5.2.6.4). 
 
5.4.7 Strategy against robbery 
 
All respondents agreed that crime prevention should become an integral part of staff 
general training. They also expressed in favour of the formation of a jewellery 
security body taking care of all security issues pertaining to the jewellery industry, 
and indicated that they would be willing to pay a subscription fee in order to fund this 
initiative. This is in line with the questionnaire-based findings (section 5.2.7.1). With 
regard to the question on whether crime prevention should form part of the study 
programme at schools or colleges training jewellers, respondent 8 indicated that he 
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was not in favour as he believed it should be the direct responsibility of the Jewellery 
Council to prepare and manage training programmes for jewellers. 
 
5.5 CONCLUSION 
 
This chapter has presented the main findings of the empirical research on jewellery 
store robbery. Topics like the respondents’ profile, geographical location of the stores 
in relation to its surrounding environment, robbery event (precursors, crime, criminal, 
victim and aftermath), available security measures, personnel-related security issues, 
perception of victimisation risk and crime prevention initiatives, were discussed. 
Based on the study, it is evident that robbery at jewellery stores is a cumbersome 
phenomenon, which needs to be addressed not only by the individual jewellers but 
also by the jewellery industry as a whole. With regard to this study, encouraging is the 
fact that the findings that emerged from the questionnaire and interview responses 
were similar in many respects. The main results can be summarised as follows: 
 
• Findings on the robbery event indicated that most respondents experienced a 
robbery attack in a five year period. The stores situated in urban /suburban areas 
reported the highest percentage of robbery victimisation.  
• Both questionnaire and interview results furnished a clear picture of robbery at 
jewellery stores as an organised criminal event involving large groups of 
professional robbers, for the most part armed with firearms (linked to local and 
foreign crime syndicates). It was also found to be a phenomenon involving repeat 
victimisation (more robbery attacks against the same target). In many instances, 
robbers or suspicious individuals were reported by jewellers and members of staff 
as having visited the store prior to the commission of the robbery. While fatal 
injuries were not reported, and in general death seemed to be a rare occurrence, 
due to the violent nature of this event, physical injuries did, in some instances, 
occur. The average reported loss, coupled with the very low arrest and jewellery 
recovery rates, stressed the importance for jewellers to be adequately insured in 
order to avoid losing a significant amount of money or even risk the success of 
their businesses.  
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• Questionnaire and interview findings on the location of the stores and on their 
immediate environment showed that the jewellery stores situated near entry / exit 
points, in close proximity to external parking, main routes and freeway ramps 
appeared to be vulnerable to robbery victimisation. However, interview 
respondents seemed to agree on the fact that a group of professional robbers 
would seldom be deterred by environmental factors. 
• Findings on the available security measures at jewellery stores indicated that, 
while a variety of measures were implemented by jewellers as part of their risk 
reduction programme, there were specific areas of deficiency. Particularly evident 
was the lack of physical security barriers at the main entrance to the store and of 
CCTV systems.   
• Questionnaire and interview findings on personnel pointed to a lack of security 
screening procedures prior to employment and also of crime awareness training 
for members of staff. These areas of deficiency contribute to a higher risk profile 
for jewellers. 
• With regard to the fear of robbery victimisation, questionnaire and interview 
findings showed that the majority of respondents believed that robbery was on the 
increase. Semi-structured interview respondents instead seemed to agree that the 
increase was more on the severity than on the frequency of the attacks. However, 
they agreed that there had been a sudden upsurge in robberies, particularly in the 
Gauteng Province. Robbery was found to be second on the list of the crimes that 
questionnaire respondents perceived as occurring mostly at their stores (after 
theft). Feeling at risk and under stress as a result of the possibility of robbery 
victimisation was found to be a common element among jewellers and members 
of staff, and had such a negative impact that almost half of the questionnaire 
respondents and all interviewees (victims of robbery) considered giving up their 
business or occupation.  
• Findings on crime prevention indicated that the majority of questionnaire 
respondents and all the interviewees were in favour of the introduction of a 
jewellery security structure with the task of forming a crime intelligence and 
dismissed employee database. Stricter employee screening procedures and 
improved crime prevention training for all staff were also viewed in a favourable 
light. 
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While the above findings are important to describe the phenomenon of jewellery store 
robbery, additional research is recommended particularly from the robbers’ 
perspective. This will undoubtedly add value to new crime reduction initiatives in this 
specialised field. In the following chapter, a jewellery store robbery intervention 
strategy, which is based on the situational crime prevention model, will be 
formulated.  
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CHAPTER 6 
 
INTERVENTION MODEL FOR THE REDUCTION OF JEWELLERY 
STORE ROBBERY 
 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The realisation of a comprehensive robbery intervention strategy, which serves as a 
guide to jewellers and members of staff in reducing the risk for robbery victimisation, 
is the ultimate aim of this study (see Chapter 1, section 1.3). In order for this strategy 
to be effective, it is necessary for it to be developed within an appropriate theoretical 
framework which makes use of tested principles and techniques and the research 
findings from Chapter 5. Since the emphasis of this study is on the opportunities 
generated by the physical environment (the jewellery store and its immediate 
surroundings) and the behaviour and activities of individuals (the jewellers and 
members of staff), situational crime prevention was chosen as a model to reduce 
opportunities for robbery. This model focuses on the reduction of crime opportunities 
as a practical and short-term answer to specific crime situations, in this case jewellery 
store robbery.   
 
Firstly the basic principles of the model will briefly be discussed and evaluated, 
followed by specific robbery intervention strategies focusing on the crime situation, or 
the context in which the crime occurs, and the individual behaviour, or the behaviour 
of potential or actual victims. The researcher was not concerned with an approach 
based on the robbers’ perspective, except when discussing situational, environmental 
and victim’s behavioural strategies which could bear an influence on the criminals’ 
behaviour and their decision to commit robbery.  
 
In order to be as comprehensive and as effective as possible, the suggested robbery 
intervention strategies are explained in terms of specific categories as reflected in the 
empirical findings of Chapter 5, i.e. decisional, environmental, situational, procedural, 
personnel and business-oriented strategies. For these categories of prevention to be 
effective they should not be considered in isolation but rather as a cohesive unit which 
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aims at achieving a specific objective, i.e. the reduction of the opportunities for 
robbery. 
 
6.2 THE SITUATIONAL CRIME PREVENTION MODEL 
 
Having stressed opportunity theories in the explanation of jewellery store robbery (see 
Chapter 4, section 4.3.1), it follows that, with regard to the prevention of this crime, 
emphasis will be on a model derived from the said perspective. Accepting opportunity 
as a cause of crime also opens up a new vista of crime prevention policies focused 
upon opportunity-reduction. The reduction of crime opportunities through situational 
crime prevention is considered as a successful strategy in that it is focused on 
immediate and concrete crime generating conditions (Felson & Clarke 1998:1-3).   
 
After having been conceptualised in the United States through Newman’s defensible 
space, situational crime prevention developed from 1976 with Mayhew, Sturman, 
Hough and Clarke, and reached its peak with Clarke’s work (1990) at the British 
Home Office (Felson 2002:144). Situational crime prevention has to do with the 
reduction of opportunities people have to commit particular crimes and, as Clarke 
puts it (Conklin 2001:529), “is directed at highly specific forms of crime; involves the 
management, design or manipulation of the immediate environment in a systematic 
and permanent a way as possible; is aimed at increasing the efforts and risks of crime 
and reduce the rewards as perceived by a wide range of offenders”.  
 
From a practical point of view, situational crime prevention incorporates two main 
categories of prevention (Geason & Wilson 1992:9-10): 
 
• Environment centred prevention including physical, mechanical and electronic 
prevention as well as environmental design. 
• Individual centred prevention including procedural (behavioural) security, self 
protective measures and business / employee oriented programmes. 
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6.2.1 Environment-centred prevention 
 
Environmental crime prevention, as a specialised field of research in modern 
criminology, is relevant to this study because of its specific applicability in the 
prevention of jewellery store robbery. The origin of environmental crime prevention 
can be traced to the United States in the early 1970s with Newman’s model of 
defensible space and Jeffery’s concept of Crime Prevention Through Environmental 
Design, which involved making use of or manipulating environmental features with a 
view to eliminating or reducing opportunities for delinquency and crime (Siegel 
2004:117). Their view was that crime could be prevented through the introduction of 
specific measures such as, among others, physical security, electronic security, high 
visibility and neighbourhood watch patrols. This reasoning, which initially involved 
large urban and residential areas as well as housing projects can, in modern 
criminology, also find an important application in the design and layout of business 
premises, e.g. shopping complexes and retail stores.  
 
The concept of Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design also known today 
as CPTED evolved from the idea of creating a defensive environment both from a 
physical and psychological perspective. The principal goal of CPTED is the reduction 
of opportunities for a crime to occur. This reduction is achieved by employing 
physical and psychological features to a specific environment, aimed at discouraging 
the commission of unlawful activities. The uniqueness and success of CPTED stems 
from the manner in which its main individual elements, i.e. target hardening, 
territoriality, surveillance /  visibility, access / escape routes, and image and 
aesthetics, are integrated in the protection of a specific environment (Du Plessis & 
Holtmann 2005:155-158). 
 
6.2.2 Individual-centred prevention 
 
The success of situational crime prevention may also rest on the behaviour of people 
whose actions directly influence crime prevention. In situational prevention these 
people are also known as crime discouragers (Siegel 2004:118). Discouragers have 
different levels of responsibility and can be grouped into three categories, namely 
guardians who monitor specific targets, such as jewellery store security guards; 
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managers who are in charge of a specific place such as the jewellery store owners 
and managers; and handlers who monitor potential offenders, e.g. parents and parole 
officers.  This study is concerned with the first two categories of discouragers. 
 
The principles of situational crime prevention, i.e. increasing the efforts, increasing 
the risks and reducing the rewards for the criminal, can also be achieved through the 
application of specific behavioural procedures on the part of potential victims. 
According to Karmen (2007:25), two main strategies contribute to the prevention of 
victimisation. The first involves educating likely victims; the second calls for likely 
victims to enhance their safety through security hardware and protective measures. 
These strategies aim at guiding the individual’s behaviour in the reduction of 
victimisation risk and changing the criminal’s perception towards a specific target or 
victim. Clearly, victimisation cannot be prevented solely through educational 
campaigns that simply stress behavioural procedures. A more comprehensive 
approach advocates a reliance on security hardware and protective services as well 
(Conklin 2001:530).  
 
Victimisation reduction strategies can be adopted by single individuals (e.g. jewellery 
store owners), a group of individuals (e.g. jewellers and members of staff) as well as 
organisations or communities (e.g. the jewellery retail sector). The crucial point is that 
by taking responsibility for their personal security and property, and by not taking 
unnecessary risks or creating opportunities for crime, jewellers may be able to largely 
avoid victimisation.  
 
6.2.3 Critical evaluation of situational crime prevention   
 
It is necessary to state that situational crime prevention is not just a collection of “ad 
hoc” methods, but is firmly grounded in opportunity theory. In the context of this 
study, this model is considered very important as a strategy to reduce the opportunity 
for the commission of jewellery store robberies. Accepting that opportunity is a 
primary cause of crime, equal in importance to personal and social factors, results in a 
criminological approach that is not only more complete in its theorising but also more 
practical and effective in the short term (Felson & Clarke 1998:33). In fact, it is 
increasingly evident that situational crime prevention offers society the best chance 
 - 168 -
for a quick and inexpensive way to reduce crime slice by slice in three general ways: 
i) designing safe settings, ii) organising effective procedures and iii) developing 
secure products (Felson 2002:145). 
 
Situational crime prevention has been mainly criticised for addressing only symptoms 
and not causes and thus for never being a permanent solution. Moreover, it has been 
argued that it leads to a displacement rather than prevention of crime, in that offenders 
may decide to shift their activities to another area (geographical displacement), or to 
another time (temporal displacement), target (target displacement), method (tactical 
displacement) or to another type of crime (crime type displacement) (Lab 2000:154; 
Newman 1997:4). In this regard, it can be stated that displacement is always a threat 
to prevention, but there are strong theoretical reasons for believing that it can be 
avoided or limited in scope (Felson & Clarke 1998:25-28). There is also the problem 
of extinction which implies that opportunity reduction programmes may produce a 
short-term positive effect, but benefits dissipate as criminals adjust to new conditions 
(Siegel 2004:120). For example, if security measures and systems increase, motivated 
offenders may resort to armed robbery against soft targets. It has also been said that 
the situational prevention model may enhance the fear of crime, in that specific forms 
of opportunity reduction (e.g. target hardening measures such as locks, grilles and 
shutters) are considered as part of a “fortress mentality” (Sacco & Kennedy 
2002:303).  
 
Apart from the above criticism, it can be safely stated that the advantages of 
opportunity reduction out-weigh the disadvantages. In fact, besides being practical 
and effective, the situational model may lead to a reduction of crime with a “diffusion 
of benefits”. In so doing, preventative measures adopted in one location may lead to a 
diffusion of benefits in nearby places, because offenders seem to overestimate their 
reach (Newman 1997:2-4). As an example, general crime preventative measures 
inside a shopping complex, e.g. CCTV systems and guarding services, are beneficial 
to the security of a jewellery store situated inside the same complex.  
 
With regard to individual-centred prevention, much criticism has also been levelled at 
the concept of victim response strategies (Fattah 1991:293-294). In fact, it is 
sometimes difficult to ask a potential victim to behave in a certain way in order to 
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avoid victimisation. Victims of robbery and the actual situation in which they find 
themselves, vary far too widely to be controlled by policy prescriptions. It has also 
been argued that limiting the range of responses open to a victim may be harmful to 
both the victim him/herself and the interest of society in controlling crime (Fattah 
1991:211). Furthermore, self-help actions by potential victims may, in certain cases, 
lead to infringements of the law, e.g. excessive use of force or vigilantism. However, 
on a positive note, it cannot be denied that victim empowerment strategies are 
essential in providing individuals with knowledge on how to prevent crime and avoid 
further victimisation. Furthermore, empowering individuals means providing them 
with a positive attitude against crime and, by implication, reducing their fear. 
 
6.3  INTERVENTION STRATEGIES FOR JEWELLERY STORE 
 ROBBERY 
 
Based on the research findings, crime opportunity can be regarded as a primary risk 
factor in jewellery store robbery. It follows that opportunity reduction as emphasised 
by the situational crime prevention model will be the main factor for its prevention. In 
a jewellery store context, usually crime opportunities are generated by the actions (or 
inaction) of the jewellers and their members of staff as well as by the environment 
where they operate, i.e. the jewellery store and the surrounding areas (due to factors 
such as lack of security barriers and systems or a high crime rate). Following on these 
considerations, effective robbery intervention strategies must necessarily focus on the 
environment, i.e. the jewellery store and its immediate environment, and on individual 
behaviour, i.e. the jewellers and members of staff’s. It is in this specific context that 
opportunities for robbery can be minimised. 
 
6.3.1 Decisional strategies 
 
Prior to implementing any strategy, it is of the utmost importance for jewellers to 
consider factors such as the security and cost effectiveness of the proposed measures 
as well as risk transfer possibilities. 
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6.3.1.1 Security and cost effectiveness 
 
Jewellers are faced with the task of deciding what level of security protection they 
need, given their type of business, location, inventory and other situational / 
environmental factors (Jewellers’ Vigilance Canada 2000:7). An essential 
requirement prior to the implementation of any crime prevention strategies is that they 
must effectively reduce the risk of victimisation. In order for any strategy to be 
effective, they have to be selected and implemented after a thorough evaluation 
conducted by experts on all crime risk factors related to a business activity (risk 
assessment). Each strategy whether situational, environmental or procedural, should 
specifically target the identified risk and help minimise the possibility for it to occur.  
 
A further consideration is that effective security does not necessarily have to be 
costly. In fact, it is fundamental to determine the cost-effectiveness of all preventive 
measures before their implementation. This can be done by weighing up the costs of 
possible crime related losses against the cost of preventive measures. In general it can 
be stated that if the cost of a possible crime exceeds the cost of the preventive 
measures being considered, then such preventive measures will be cost-effective 
(Stevens 1988:209).  
 
One of the consequences of crime against jewellers is an increase in crime prevention 
spending. According to the British Retail Consortium (2000:12), while the value of 
retail losses in 2000 decreased by 3 percent, actual spending on crime prevention rose 
by 13 percent (from 1999). The spending was spread as follows: security staff (57 
percent); cash collection (17 percent); theft protection (11 percent); security systems 
leasing and maintenance (8 percent); burglary protection (7 percent). The total cost of 
crime should, therefore, be measured on the value of losses from crime added to the 
cost of crime prevention measures in a given year. To this figure one should still add 
the various cost factors linked to absence from work, low productivity, loss of 
clientele, and so forth. According to a Retail Costs Survey, published by the British 
Retail Consortium Crime Initiative in the United Kingdom, while retailers in general 
spent low amounts on crime prevention measures as a proportion of losses by crime, 
jewellers instead were spending a staggering 247 percent of the figure they lost from 
crime (Cost of crime 1995:22). 
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While the implementation of certain robbery intervention strategies, e.g. procedural 
and behavioural, are inexpensive, other recommended strategies may require 
considerable expenditures, especially electronic security measures such as CCTV 
surveillance systems. Due to the fact that, as stated earlier, the selected intervention 
measures need to be both security and cost-effective, it is advisable for jewellers to 
resort to expert advice at an early stage, ideally prior to setting up a store. The 
implementation of late measures without professional advice, e.g. after having 
sustained a serious loss, may result in inappropriate and costly decisions. 
 
The cost-effectiveness of the implemented risk reduction measures is also reflected in 
the likely reduction of insurance rates. In fact, insurance savings may more than offset 
the cost of installing insurance-approved security systems. In addition, improvements 
in management practices stemming from security concerns may increase the 
profitability of the enterprise as a whole, again resulting in savings (Gem & Jewel 
Acceptances 2002). 
 
Given the nature of the jewellery business, it is impossible to create a crime-proof 
environment. Some security measures, which could be extremely effective against 
robbery, are simply not practical in a jewellery retail context. Nevertheless, jewellers 
must continuously strive to keep crime risks to a minimum. In other words, sales and 
marketing must be balanced with intelligent security solutions (Jewellers’ Vigilance 
Canada 2000:9). 
 
6.3.1.2 Risk transfer 
 
Because of the high risk factors inherent in their activity, it is of the utmost 
importance for jewellers to adopt risk transfer strategies, bearing in mind that this 
should not detract from the value of an effective security programme, but rather be an 
integral part of it. Risk transfer is simply a structured approach to dealing with the 
many risks to which a specific business is exposed in order to minimise the financial 
effect following loss or damage (Gem & Jewel Acceptances marketing material 
2004). The consequences of risks can be measured by considering two factors: 
frequency (how often a particular type of risk will occur) and severity (how serious, 
in financial terms, will a particular risk be if it happens). 
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Insurance is the most economic method of providing for the more serious forms of 
loss or damage. It can be stated that no jeweller can afford to be without an adequate 
insurance cover as, even a single robbery attack against a jewellery store may force 
the uninsured jeweller out of business. The manner in which such insurance is 
arranged and the quality of the protection provided for the property insured will have 
a significant effect on the cost of such insurance. In general terms, a low severity risk 
could be self-funded within the business and those risks with severe financial 
consequences should be covered through insurance. 
 
It is important for jewellers to select an insurance company that can provide a 
specialised policy that is designed to meet the needs of the jewellery industry, and 
who can offer competent advice regarding risk control. When arranging insurance, it 
is most important to ensure that the company selected carries out a detailed survey of 
the premises in order to significantly reduce the potentially onerous duty of 
disclosure, i.e. providing accurate information regarding the implementation of 
security or risk reduction measures. Therefore, it is evident that by adequately 
insuring their businesses, jewellers will be able to limit financial losses and in such a 
way remain in business. In addition, members of staff will be able to retain their jobs 
which could otherwise have been lost as a result of an uninsured event.  
 
Jewellers should also make sure that they disclose accurate values as being under-
insured could lead to considerable losses. Under-insurance refers to a situation when 
the value for which a jeweller is insured is less than the actual replacement value of 
the insured items (Van Alphenstahl 2004:13). In today’s economic climate this could 
have a serious impact on a jeweller’s day-to-day finances. If funds are not available to 
replace the stolen items, jewellers may be forced to take out a loan; or worse still, take 
a step backward and simply not replace many of the lost items. To avoid a situation of 
under-insurance it is necessary for jewellers to go back to and update their inventory. 
If this is done regularly jewellers will always know the true value of their stock and 
will avoid being under-insured on the day of a claim, a mistake that could result in 
significant losses. 
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6.3.2 Environmental strategies 
 
Environmental strategies involve acting on the physical environment with a view to 
deter a criminal attack or render access to the target as difficult as possible through 
the application of target hardening measures. These intervention strategies focus on 
physical and psychological prevention and deterrence. 
 
6.3.2.1 Selection and manipulation of the environment 
 
Research findings in Chapter 5, sections 5.2.3.1 and 5.2.3.2, indicate that a jewellery 
store’s location and environment may be a factor in creating opportunities for 
robbery.  Therefore, specific robbery reduction measures need to focus on store 
location, store design and layout.  
 
6.3.2.1.1 Store location 
 
The location of a jewellery store and the nature of the surrounding area play a 
significant role in the vulnerability and risk of the business with regard to crime. For 
this reason, it is important to conduct a thorough analysis of the area where a jeweller 
is considering setting up a store. If this aspect is overlooked, it may have negative 
implications for a jeweller and his/her business. In fact, once the store has been set up, 
it is usually very difficult and costly to move to another location. Consideration 
should be given to the following important aspects (Gardner 2001:14; Maree 1999:59; 
Maree & Naudé 1991:68-69):  
 
• Choice of surroundings and site. This is fundamental for both the success of the 
business and the security of the store. In making their choices, jewellers must bear 
in mind aspects such as vulnerability, risk and cost-effectiveness. 
• Assessment of the general crime statistics in the area. This is an important 
element in the overall security strategy. The higher the armed robbery figures, the 
more serious the risk for the store to be attacked by criminals. 
• Typology of crimes. An analysis of the type of crimes affecting other businesses 
in the area may assist jewellers in their decision on whether it will be safe to 
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invest in the area. All the precautionary measures taken by business owners 
should be noted. The more security measures are in place, the higher the crime 
risk is likely to have been and continue to be in future. 
• Nature of the socio-economic and demographic environment. This usually 
indicates an enterprise’s likelihood of success or failure and the risks that 
jewellers may face. The presence of a poor socio-economic environment with a 
high population density may signify a high burglary and robbery rate in the area. 
Also the presence of a high concentration of juveniles in the streets of a 
neighbourhood may have implications on the levels of crime in the area. 
• Access to escape routes. Easy access to freeways or major thoroughfares in the 
vicinity of the store must be considered as a risk factor in that, after a robbery has 
been committed, freeway or major thoroughfares offer criminals an easy escape 
route. 
 
6.3.2.1.2 Store design and layout  
 
The architectural design of the store should be adequately arranged giving priority to 
the elements of security. The following measures are suggested (Home Office 
National Board for Crime Prevention 2000:3-5): 
 
• Ideal location. The store should be located within a business complex that has all 
three separating brick walls extended from concrete floor level to concrete ceiling 
height without any openings or apertures to any other adjoining retail store by way 
of false ceilings.   
• Display cases need to be positioned in such a way that better control can be 
exercised, especially at the most vulnerable areas, e.g. at entrances and exits, and 
where expensive merchandise is displayed, bearing in mind that high value 
merchandise should not be kept inside display cabinets near exit points. 
• Counters need also to be positioned in a way that criminals are unable to keep all 
the staff in their line of sight, also making their movements more difficult. The 
width of the counters is also important since the installation of narrow counters 
would lend itself to criminals leaning over them, giving access to locking 
mechanisms and tampering with them. 
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• Visibility inside the store is an important element. Counters and display cases 
should not hinder visibility in the store. A jewellery store in which, on the one 
side, staff can exercise a high degree of visual control and, on the other, members 
of the public or security can see the store’s activities from outside, increases the 
likelihood of a criminal act being observed and reported. This has a deterrent 
effect on would-be robbers. However, jewellers cannot rely only on natural 
methods of surveillance; they also need to implement formal methods of 
surveillance such as CCTV systems, guarding services and business watch 
initiatives. 
• Cash registers need to be adequately positioned. They should not be too close to 
the main entrance / exit, otherwise robbers would have the advantage of being 
able to act quickly and escape easily with cash.  
• Store security systems, e.g. video surveillance, intruder detection and panic 
systems, need to be carefully considered at the design stage in order to maximise 
security and minimise the costs related to the installation of such systems. The 
introduction of security measures at a later stage may be a very costly exercise. 
• Surveillance needs special attention in order to increase robbery deterrence. The 
internal area of the store should be clearly visible from outside. It is therefore 
advisable for jewellers to remove or rearrange anything that may obstruct good 
visibility inside the store and to create adequate light conditions.  
• Zone division also plays a role in robbery risk reduction. High-risk areas need to 
be divided from the general area where customers can move freely, by means of 
physical and electronic barriers. 
 
6.3.2.2 Barriers to protect the store and merchandise 
 
The protection of store and merchandise involves symbolic, physical, living and 
electronic barriers which, in combination, considerably increase the element of 
robbery deterrence.  The following risk reduction measures are suggested:  
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6.3.2.2.1 Symbolic and psychological barriers 
 
As indicated in Chapter 5, section 5.2.4.2, the effectiveness of symbolic and 
psychological barriers in jewellery store robbery deterrence needs to be researched 
from a robber’s perspective. The purpose of symbolic barriers is to act on the 
psychology of the criminals and, in such a way, discourage them from committing a 
crime. Examples of symbolic or psychological barriers in a jewellery store 
environment are (Zannoni 2002a:11-12): 
 
• Visibility.  This element may act as a psychological deterrent. In fact, criminals 
may refrain from committing a robbery if they believe that they may be seen in 
the process. Therefore, high priority should be given to creating an environment 
with good visibility and lighting.  
• One-way mirrors. These need to be installed inside the stores in a highly visible 
position, thus giving potential robbers the impression that someone is watching 
them from the other side.  
• Notices and signage. In order to deter potential criminals it is necessary to use 
notices or signage to advertise the fact that specific security measures and 
systems, e.g. cash control, CCTV, intruder detection and time locks, are in place. 
 
6.3.2.2.2 Physical barriers  
 
In a jewellery store, the purpose of physical barriers is the protection of the staff and 
merchandise. Some of these physical security measures will undoubtedly make access 
to the store and the jewellery more difficult for robbers but may, at the same time, put 
jewellers and staff more at risk if they cannot immediately comply with the criminals’ 
demands. Therefore, as a result of this risk, it is necessary to assess each situation 
carefully and consult with qualified security specialists.  
 
Findings in Chapter 5, section 5.2.4.1 indicated that the most common physical 
barriers adopted by jewellers include safes and shutter proof glass on widows. The 
following physical barriers are suggested by the experts (Zannoni 2002b:14-15; 
Thames Valley Business Crime Centre 2001:20): 
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• Security gates. Jewellers are sensitive to aesthetics and usually prefer to avoid the 
installation of barriers which may discourage customers from entering their store. 
According to a 2002 security survey sponsored by the Jewellery Council of South 
Africa (Security industry best practice for S.A. 2002:18), in the case of private 
jewellers, access control is usually handled by a door buzzer system, after which 
further access is controlled by human intervention, usually receptionists. 
However, there are some stores, in particular chain stores that do not have any 
form of access control. This implies that customers have free and unannounced 
access into the stores. This situation can be reviewed with the introduction of 
some form of access control such as a security gate or door linked to a buzzer 
system. Some jewellers are installing a low height door which serves as a more 
friendly barrier than the traditional security gate. This allows jewellers and 
members of staff to check who is at the gate or door and use their discretion prior 
to authorising access. However, these gates/doors do not constitute an effective 
barrier as they can be easily jumped over, but this action should draw the attention 
of members of the public or security, thus providing some degree of deterrence. 
Another advantage of this barrier is that, should a robber panic during the attack, 
he would still be able to jump over the door without being trapped inside the store, 
a situation which could cause a violent reaction with serious consequences for the 
jewellers, staff and customers (see Chapter 5, section 5.3.7.1). 
• Safe and vaults. A safe within which to store high value jewellery, precious 
stones and cash is a necessary long-term investment for the jeweller. Insurance 
requirements need to be considered when choosing the type of safe, which should 
be South African Bureau of Standards (SABS) approved and have a minimum 
category 2 ADM (Anti-Disc Material) grading. However, since its purpose is to 
provide maximum security, a safe of the highest rating is well worth the 
investment, particularly in instances where jewellers have high value items in 
stock. The following serves as a guideline (safe category and insured value) : 
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SABS Category 2 ADM Grading R   50 000 
SABS Category 2 ADM Grading D3 R   75 000 
SABS Category 3 Grading R 100 000 
SABS Category 4 Grading R 200 000 
 
Furthermore, jewellers with large inventories should, at the design stage, make 
provision for a vault which can also contain the safe(s). In this case, even if 
burglars manage to enter a jewellery store, they are far less likely to attack the 
safe(s).  Hidden safes can prove useful in the event of robbers successfully 
managing to have access to the main safe. A smaller safe can be hidden, for 
instance, under the floor and only the jeweller or trusted person should be aware 
of its existence.  
• Time locks. By using time locks on safes which allow opening only at pre-set 
times, staff cannot hand high value jewellery over to robbers (see Chapter 5, 
section 5.3.7.1). Furthermore, if robbers were to kidnap the jeweller, he / she 
would not be able to open the safe outside the pre-set times. This measure has 
both advantages and disadvantages. While valuable jewellery is secured, robbers 
may resort to violence if they cannot have immediate access to it. For this reason, 
it is necessary to have prominently displayed notices indicating that time locks 
have been installed as an added source of protection. An alternative method is that 
of making use of a hidden safe. 
• Secure jewellery and cash handling areas. These areas need to be adequately 
secured against a robbery attack. The installation of security measures such as 
video surveillance cameras, reinforced doors, walls, ceilings and glass areas, and 
access control systems (e.g. fingerprint identification), needs to be considered. 
• Display cases. Jewellers need to use display cases that have break and enter 
resistant or shatterproof glass on the sides as well as the top (for all the showcases 
containing high-end merchandise). This will help prevent quick smash and grab 
attacks by slowing down the robbers. Sturdy locking mechanisms are also vital in 
order to resist tampering effects. 
• Security glass. All glass surfaces need to be strengthened with insurance 
approved high-impact glazing material (security films). If properly installed, this 
film bonds with the glass to form an invisible barrier that defends against the most 
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violent of blows and is particularly effective in deterring smash and grab attacks. 
This is, however, not effective if the windows or door frames are not sufficiently 
strong to sustain repeated blows. High-impact security glass is available in the 
following thicknesses (no plate glass of any kind should exceed the measurement of 4 
square metres or 2m x 2m): 
 
7mm Made up of two part 3mm Glass Floats with a 1.5mm thick Vinyl 
Transparent Lamination between the respective 3mm each Glass Floats. 
9mm Made up of two part 4mm Glass Floats with a 1.5mm thick Vinyl 
Transparent Lamination between the respective 4mm each Glass Floats. 
11mm Made up of two part 5mm Glass Floats with a 1.5mm thick Vinyl 
Transparent Lamination between the respective 5mm each Glass Floats. 
13mm Made up of two part 6mm Glass Floats with a 1.5mm thick Vinyl 
Transparent Lamination between the respective 6mm each Glass Floats. 
 
Bullet resistant glass is also suitable for jewellers risk but very expensive to 
install.  Limits of values should be calculated on the thickness of the glass in 
respect of values of stock displayed during and after business hours.  The glass 
floats and returns should be protected by an approved alarm radio linked system 
that provides audio impact sensors in addition to inside metal grilles with small 
apertures or, preferably solid roller shutters. On account of the mounting of the 
glass floats and glass returns, which for impact purposes are installed in 
cushioned gaskets surrounds and then in metal or wood frames, alarm impact 
sensors or alarm metallic strips are not recommended as this type of glass is not 
subject to vibration or complete breakage unless violently struck by an extremely 
heavy object (manhole cover or vehicle collision).  Glass of this nature, when 
attacked, is shattered and adheres together and does not fall apart. 
 
Inherent glass limitations should also be borne in mind, in particular that i) it is 
vulnerable to icy conditions below freezing point because under such conditions 
the glass becomes very fragile; ii) any vinyl laminated glass is easily glazed and 
broken under extreme heat; iii) security film on existing glass is ineffective unless 
the entire glass floats are removed from their respective frames and completely 
laminated and refitted (because the inner frame surrounds is not protected, it 
becomes vulnerable to breakage).  
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6.3.2.2.3 Living barriers 
 
As in the case of psychological barriers, findings in Chapter 5, section 5.2.5.1, 
stressed the need to conduct a further study based on the robbers’ perspective, in order 
to understand the real value of living barriers in deterring a robbery attack against a 
jewellery store.  However, based on literature findings (Wright & Decker 1997:91; 
Maree 1999:55), these barriers help reduce the risk of a robbery attack. The following 
are examples of living barriers:  
 
• Members of staff. The presence of more members of staff may act as a deterrent 
against robbers who, in order to have better control over the situation, usually 
prefer to target stores where staff can be easily overpowered. 
• Security and police. The presence of security guards or patrol vehicles near the 
store may help prevent an incident of robbery. Dedicated security guards may also 
act as a deterrent, particularly during times of special risk such as during events 
calling for unusually high value at the store, e.g. seasonal increases during the 
Festive Season (see Chapter 5, section 5.3.7.1). According to Wright and Decker 
(1997:91), commercial armed robbers disagreed on the deterrence value of 
security guards. Some said that they would not attempt to rob an establishment 
while a security guard was on duty. Others, instead, reported that guards were not 
much of a threat, especially when committing robbery as part of a team.  
• Bystanders. High volumes of pedestrian traffic in the vicinity of the store may act 
as a barrier against criminals in that the latter are worried of being observed and 
reported to security or police. 
 
Based on the findings in Chapter 5, section 5.2.4.1, jewellers do not usually employ 
the services of a dedicated store guard, possibly because of the high on-going cost 
factor. Frequent police patrols or the presence of a police station or security company 
in the area may also be a deterrent against robbers, who, for obvious reasons, prefer to 
avoid being confronted by law enforcement or security officials. 
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6.3.2.2.4 Electronic barriers 
 
Findings in chapter five, 5.2.4.1, indicated that intruder detection and panic systems 
linked to an emergency armed response are the jewellers’ preferred electronic 
barriers.  These barriers are important whenever the behavioural procedures adopted 
by jewellers and members of staff are not on their own sufficient to prevent robbery. 
Their main functions are the deterrence and prevention of crime as well as the 
detection of a crime in progress and the possible identification of the offenders. An 
important consideration is that electronic barriers need to be installed by insurance-
approved contractors, adequately maintained and regularly tested in order to 
maximise their effectiveness, especially in times of need. The following 
considerations on electronic barriers are relevant (Thames Valley Business Crime 
Centre 2001:14-19; Jewellers’ Vigilance Canada 2000:20-24; Criteri di sicurezza 
1998:74-76): 
 
• Intruder detection and panic systems. An effective alarm system includes three 
types of detection devices: i) perimeter protection on doors and windows; ii) area 
protection, also called volumetric protection and; iii) object protection, for 
example, to the safe or vault from being interfered with. The protection against 
entry from various spots, such as side walls, a false ceiling, or from the walls 
facing other stores, needs to be addressed. Showcases should also be protected 
against smash and grab attacks or distraction theft by means of glass break 
detectors and magnetic contacts linked to a buzzer and flashing light system.  
 
A panic system by means of fixed switches and portable remote transmitters needs 
to be incorporated into the main alarm and installed at strategic positions, which 
should be easily accessible not only by the action of the hand but also by foot or 
knee. A strategic place for a panic switch can also be within till drawers or under a 
tray, with the alarm being activated when the last banknote is removed from a 
clip.  On activating the panic alarm, jewellers or members of staff should not try 
to reach for a panic button unless they are absolutely certain that the robbers 
cannot see them in the process. A silent panic alarm is also suggested as the 
activation of a siren might cause the robbers to react violently. Furthermore, 
jewellers need to be aware that pressing a panic button during a robbery may 
 - 182 -
result in a hostage situation, if a security or police response unit arrives while the 
suspects are still in the store. 
 
Insurance companies usually require that the above systems comply with the 
following specifications: 
 
- South African Intruder Detection Services Association (SAIDSA) 
approved installer 
- Certificate of installation and maintenance contract with quarterly 
inspection by installer 
- Hard-wired system (no wireless systems) 
- Radio transmitter signals (no tele-dialer) 
- Internal passive detectors for space protection, including roof void 
- Magnetic contacts on external doors 
- Audio glass breakage sensors for windows 
- Dedicated alarm circuit for each detection device 
- 24-hour tamper circuit protection for the alarm devices and control unit 
- End of Line Resistance (EOL) for all space protection units 
- Control box and transmitter in alarm protected area 
- Entry/exit delay at main entry/exit point 
- Panic buttons (preferable portable as it is easier to activate and at the 
critical opening and closing times allows a staff member to observe from a 
distance)  
- Duress signaling facility in the event of an armed hold-up 
- Immediate siren on alarm; delayed or silent mode on panic 
- Stand-by battery (minimum 8 hours) 
- Alarm monitoring by SAIDSA approved control centre 
- Security response via a Private Security Industry Regulatory Authority 
(PSIRA) registered company 
 
• Security response. The effectiveness of an alarm depends upon the reaction that 
follows. For this reason, the alarm and panic systems need to be linked to a 
reputable security company, with a visible operational presence in the area where 
the jewellery store is situated. It is also important for this company to maintain 
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high standards of training for their response officers, be registered with PSIRA, as 
required by law, and have its own control centre in compliance with SAIDSA’s 
regulations.  
 
Due to the vulnerability and unreliability of telephone lines, a radio transmitter 
link to the security response is necessary.  Linking the alarm and panic system to 
on-site security, i.e. the complex security team, is also an important step, but 
jewellers should not rely on this protection only as it has its limitations and risks. 
In fact, it may happen that the entire guard force is held up at gunpoint by a group 
of robbers who then proceed to break into jewellery stores. 
 
Depending on budget and degree of risk, jewellers should also consider two 
different alarm companies protecting their premises (see Chapter 5, section 
5.3.7.1). One alarm system would protect the perimeter, which is all doors, 
windows and points of entry to the store, while the other system would protect the 
interior of the store and the safe. This double alarm monitoring gives added 
protection if one alarm is defeated, response in some manner is rendered 
ineffective, or if there is collusion with criminals by dishonest employees of one 
alarm company.   
 
Today’s technology makes it possible to link the alarm system to a CCTV camera 
system which is activated when the alarm or panic is triggered. With this system 
in place, the alarm monitoring company is able to listen in and see the actual 
events inside the store. This will initiate the most appropriate response to an 
emergency situation. The cameras provide images over telephone lines which can 
produce photographs of the criminals or help determine if the signal was a false 
alarm.  
• Closed circuit television (CCTV). The installation of closed circuit television 
cameras to record crime vulnerable areas and all who enter the store is a valuable 
tool in a jeweller’s security programme. To increase the chances of video 
evidence being used to get a conviction, it is necessary to use good quality digital 
equipment and recordings need to be date and time stamped. Cameras should be 
installed at a suitable position in order to get a clear picture of persons and events.  
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There are some conflicting statements with regard to the deterrence value of 
CCTV. While, on the one side, Jewellers’ Vigilance Canada (2000:20-23), agrees 
on CCTV as an effective deterrent against crime, on the other hand, some 
criminals have different opinions in that, according to them, the system can be 
defeated by the wearing of disguises such as a pair of dark glasses or a sport cap. 
In addition, it would appear as if CCTV has become so much a part of the urban 
commercial landscape that robbers have begun to take their presence for granted 
and plan accordingly (Wright & Decker 1997:90-91).   It is advisable, in order to 
increase the element of deterrence, to have highly visible notices advising 
customers that a video surveillance system is in place.  
 
CCTV has undoubtedly a valuable role to play in a jewellery store security 
strategy, mainly for the following reasons (Home Office Crime Prevention 
Agency 2000:3-4): criminals can be identified and arrested; many incidents of 
“mysterious disappearances” or shoplifting, which would not have been covered 
by insurance, can be turned into identifiable theft losses through the availability of 
video evidence; the actions of distraction thieves or dishonest members of staff 
can be uncovered; and an important database of visual information can be 
developed. 
 
However, the effectiveness of CCTV can be hampered by various factors such as, 
amongst others, the following: faulty installation and inadequate positioning of the 
cameras; lack of proper maintenance; improper use by employees; inadequate 
lighting; no connection to video recorder, obstacles in front of cameras; and 
destruction of video system or removal of recording devices by criminals. 
 
Some of the problems stated above can be eliminated through the utilisation of 
digital CCTV technology instead of the conventional analogue systems. The 
benefit of using a digital system is that it allows the user to replace the switching 
unit, monitor and time lapse recorder with one centralised system, which can be 
accessed and controlled from several locations. Digital CCTV systems offer many 
advantages over the analogue systems, such as the following (Eagle Technology 
2004:89):  higher image quality; faster retrieval times; less storage space required; 
better archiving capabilities; no routine maintenance required, software can be 
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upgraded; and transmit and retrieve stored data remotely across towns or across 
the world. 
 
Risk areas that need to be covered by a video surveillance system are the 
following: a store’s entry and exit points; point of sale / till area; high value 
jewellery and precious stone displays; safe and vault; secure room (where digital 
photographs of potential buyers can be taken either openly or secretly); external 
areas (particularly useful for street front stores where pictures of suspicious 
individuals or vehicles can be obtained) (see Chapter 5, section 5.3.7.1). 
. 
Notwithstanding the value of video surveillance in a jewellery store environment, 
findings in Chapter 5, section 5.2.4.1 have clearly shown that only a small number 
of jewellers are willing to invest in this type of technology, mainly due to the fact 
that its application requires a considerable financial investment. 
• Smoke screen system. Once activated, this system, within seconds, fills a small 
area with a dense but non-toxic smoke, thus preventing criminals from seeing and 
forcing them to flee. It can be incorporated into an existing alarm or used as a 
stand alone unit. In one instance (Flanagan 2006:4), a smoke screen system 
installed in the window area helped reduce the extent of the loss during an armed 
robbery at jewellery store in a busy shopping centre. In the opinion of the 
researcher, the smoke screen finds a better security application in the prevention 
of after-hours burglaries. Its activation during a robbery by a jeweller or staff 
member could cause a robber to react violently by shooting at random. 
• Smart water sprinkler system. This consists of a liquid specially encoded with a 
DNA code unique to the store and visible under an ultraviolet light. Once 
activated, because the liquid sticks to everything over a long period of time, it may 
assist the police in linking a suspect to a specific crime scene (Smart water not a 
blessing for robbers 2005:2). 
• Electronic security doors. These doors are used for the protection of high-risk 
areas such as, for example, banks, post offices and jewellery laboratories. In these 
types of environment, they may be useful in preventing a robbery attack as they 
generally restrict entry / exit to one person at a time, and may be used in 
conjunction with a metal detector. In addition, robbers can be effectively trapped 
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in the air lock between the doors in the event of an emergency. Their application 
in the case of a jewellery store, instead, is more problematic as their presence may 
discourage customer traffic. In this regard, findings in Chapter 5, sections 5.2.4.1 
and 5.4.4 indicated that electronic security doors are not on the top list of 
jewellers’ preferred security measures. Furthermore, according to Jewellers’ 
Vigilance Canada (2000:14), such system might actually bring about violence if 
the robbers set off an alarm or if they are caught between the doors. In some cases, 
depending on the degree of risk involved, it may be sufficient to have a security 
gate installed which can be opened by means of an electric strike lock. This is, in 
fact, the preferred option of many jewellers. These considerations underline the 
dilemma that most jewellers are facing, i.e. attaining a balance between the need 
for security and the need to make their businesses attractive to customers, without 
discouraging them from entering the store. 
• Anti-robbery device. This is an electronic tracking device placed in jewellery 
trays which enables the police or security to follow the stolen tray by means of 
satellite tracking. Another system has a time triggering mechanism, which is set 
off shortly after robbers take trays from a store. This device explodes and releases 
smoke and dye. According to Jewellers’ Vigilance Canada (2000:15), in the 
United States there have been successful recoveries of stolen jewellery using both 
devices, which seem to have scarce application in South Africa. 
• Entrance alarms. Simple door alarms warning staff that someone has entered the 
store may help reduce the chances of jewellers or members of staff being caught 
by surprise in a robbery or theft attempt.   
• Access control for secure areas. Access control by means of biometric 
identification, e.g. fingerprint or face identification, has an important role to play 
in securing high risk areas in a jewellery store. The fingerprint scan is the most 
widely used biometric and is based on the unique patterns of ridges and valleys 
visible on the fingertips (The benefit of biometrics 2003:44) 
• Exterior and interior lighting. Effective lighting may help reduce the risk of 
burglary, theft and armed robbery. When used properly, lighting not only 
discourages criminal activity but also enhances natural surveillance opportunities 
and reduces fear. Lights should be positioned at strategic points and exterior lights 
should be protected against deliberate damage.  
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6.3.3 Situational strategies  
 
Situational strategies involve acting on a specific situation which creates the 
opportunity for crime commission. These strategies focus on the immediacy of a 
situation and aim at bringing about the necessary changes, within a specific 
environment, in order to reduce the risk of victimisation. Since jewellery store robbers 
are primarily interested in high value items of jewellery and cash, it is necessary to 
adopt target removal measures. This can be achieved in different ways (Zannoni 
2002a:11; Home Office National Board for Crime Prevention 2000:3-5; Jewellers’ 
Vigilance Canada 2000:13-14): 
 
• Lock away expensive items. High value jewellery items such as top-end 
diamonds and watches need to be locked away (see Chapter 5, section 5.3.7.1). 
Only selected samples should be displayed. When closing for business high value 
merchandise should always be removed from show windows or display cases and 
locked in the safe or strongroom. No high value items should be left out to attract 
the attention of robbers and thieves. 
• Keep a supply of decoy precious stones. Some jewellers follow the practice of 
not keeping their valuable diamond inventory in the safe during the day, but rather 
conceal it elsewhere in the store so that criminals will not have access to it in the 
event of a robbery. These jewellers keep a supply of decoy stones in the safe to 
use if there is an armed robbery. A word of caution: the stock inventory should be 
kept in a secure place, e.g. a hidden safe installed under the floor or off premises. 
• Split higher value merchandise. This merchandise needs to be split among 
different display cases. Since time is of the essence for the robbers, making the 
criminals’ action slower and more difficult may reduce the quantity of jewellery 
the robbers can easily remove. 
• If jewellers own multiple stores, they should not keep the same merchandise 
in identical showcase locations in each store. Keeping the same locations allows 
robbers to learn the position of valuable merchandise in each store by learning the 
layout of only one. 
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• Keep cash in the till to a minimum. It is suggested that jewellers keep as little 
cash as possible in the till at all times by regularly transferring it to somewhere 
more secure, e.g. a hidden safe.  
• Prepare decoy money. Bags filled with low denomination bank notes and coins, 
purposefully prepared to face such an emergency, can be kept inside the main 
safe, ready to be handed over to determined and potentially violent robbers.  In 
such a way the loss of cash will be reduced to a minimum. 
• Encourage non-cash transaction. In order to make a business a less attractive 
target, non-cash transactions, e.g. by means of credit or debit cards, need to be 
encouraged.  
• Separate key holders. Different members of staff need to be responsible for 
holding different keys; in particular, the store and safe keys should be kept 
separately. This procedure can help prevent a member of staff who holds both 
keys from being taken hostage.  
• Control all keys. Keys to the premises, safes and alarm need to be removed after 
close of business (keys to display cabinets and windows may be left in a locked 
safe). 
 
6.3.4 Procedural strategies 
 
Procedural strategies involve acting on the mentality and behaviour of individuals, in 
this case jewellers and members of staff, with a view to reduce their risk of crime 
victimisation. The focus of these strategies is on the human element in crime 
prevention. 
 
6.3.4.1 Developing a mentality of security 
 
Effective crime prevention begins with a mentality of security. To think in terms of 
security means having the necessary mental attitude towards crime while remaining 
fully aware that it may affect anyone, at any time or place. If jewellers and members 
of staff are unprepared and do not have a mentality of security, it may lead to serious 
consequences. On the contrary, through a mentality of security, they will be 
empowered with a positive and confident attitude against crime, in the belief that it 
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can be prevented and, in the event of an occurrence, its effects minimised. This 
confidence derives from knowledge and insight into crime (Zannoni 1998:88-89; 
Shadel 1995:24).  
 
A company programme is fundamental for the development of an awareness of crime 
among employees and to arm them with the knowledge they need to minimise the risk 
for its occurrence (see Chapter 5, section 5.3.7.1). To be effective this programme 
necessitates the following (Van Kaam 2003:16): 
 
• A conscious programme of awareness on the implications of criminal activities on 
both employees and businesses. Employees need to be made aware that 
criminality can harm them directly in terms of, for instance, possibility of physical 
injuries, lost opportunities, lowered salaries and even retrenchment. 
• Suitable response mechanisms through which employees can react to criminality, 
e.g. through security measures, procedures and systems. 
• Design and implementation of a professional security plan which assigns specific 
responsibilities to employees. 
• The propagation of a culture of integrity, values and ethics throughout the 
company. 
 
Through the development of a mentality of security, employees will be actively 
encouraged to assume responsibility and take steps to enhance the security of the 
company. However, findings in Chapter 5, sections 5.2.5.3 and 5.4.5, indicated that 
often jewellers do not seem to do enough towards the development of a mentality of 
security and this leads to a lack in crime prevention training. 
 
6.3.4.2 Adopting behavioural security procedures 
 
Having acquired a mentality of security, jewellers and members of staff need to have 
a specific plan to respond to a potential or real crime situation such as armed robbery. 
In this context, the adoption of specific procedural intervention strategies is important. 
Security procedures can be defined as an individual’s rational, behavioural responses 
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which can be adopted before, during and after the commission of a robbery. This 
implies that there is a need for planned actions on what to do to prevent and 
counteract a robbery attack.  
 
At times, in spite of the adoption of robbery preventative measures, individuals may 
still be victimised. In fact, criminals often rely on the advantage of the “surprise 
factor”, in other words the possibility of choosing place, time and methods of attack 
most suitable to them. But even when this happens, one should not think that all is 
lost. In fact, when a robbery is committed, it is still possible to adopt specific 
behavioural responses that can help minimise the risk of further victimisation, e.g. 
being seriously assaulted or murdered. Since, as indicated in Chapter 3, sections 3.4.1 
and 3.4.2, the victims’ verbal or physical reactions are directly linked to a robber(s)’ 
violent response, it is essential to avoid verbal or physical confrontation. Furthermore, 
it needs to be stated that, the way one behaves during and after the commission of a 
crime has an influence on the possible apprehension and conviction of the offender(s). 
The behavioural security procedures discussed below, are not only relevant to the 
jewellery industry but can, in fact, be successfully applied by any individual, business 
or organisation. 
 
6.3.4.2.1 Before the robbery 
   
Effective robbery prevention encompasses a person’s day to day activities on a 24 
hour basis, e.g. while at home or leaving home to go to work by car, public transport 
or on foot, while working, on the way back home and also during social times. 
Jewellers may adopt different behavioural strategies to reduce the risk of robbery 
victimisation (Zannoni 2003b:10; Zannoni 2002b: 14-15; Jewellers’ Vigilance Canada 
2000:12-15): 
 
• While travelling to the store, it is suggested that jewellers and members of staff: 
 
- Be aware and alert. Awareness of the surrounding environment and 
alertness as to the presence of possible dangers are powerful instruments in 
crime prevention. 
 - 191 -
- Be suspicious. They need to be on the look out for suspicious activities, 
such as the same persons or vehicles following them. 
- Change direction. If Jewellers and staff realise that they are being 
followed, they need to remember the particulars of the vehicle and 
immediately change direction. If the following continues, they should 
proceed to the nearest police station or stop at the nearest safe place and 
ask for assistance.  
- Avoid routine. Travelling at the same times and via the same routes to and 
from the workplace increases the risk factor. 
- Park in a secure area. Parking in a security protected and well-lit area 
will help minimise the risk of criminal attacks. 
 
• While opening for business, it is suggested that jewellers and members of staff: 
 
- Be on the lookout for suspicious persons or activities in the vicinity of 
the store. Who or what can be considered as suspicious looking? Persons 
or cars, for instance, that have been repeatedly seen at the same place; 
individuals standing at street corners pretending to be waiting for someone, 
especially if wearing disguises which render personal identification 
difficult such as sunglasses, hats, scarves or overcoats (under which 
various weapons may be hidden). If something makes them suspicious, 
jewellers and staff should leave the area and notify their security company 
or the police without delay. 
- Be extremely careful when opening. Opening time is always critical; 
jewellers and staff may be surprised by someone approaching rapidly from 
behind or arriving coincidentally at opening time. 
- Activate the panic system in the event of a suspicious situation. 
Jewellers and staff need to be ready to activate the emergency panic system 
(via a portable transmitter which they should carry on their person at all 
times) to obtain assistance from the security service provider. 
- Avoid opening the store alone. Whenever possible, there should be two 
members of staff present during opening time. One needs to remain 
vigilant outside the store while the other proceeds to open.  
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- Immediately re-lock the door and turn off the alarm. The jeweller or a 
member of staff will inspect the premises and, if satisfied that all is in 
order, will give a signal to the staff member outside to also enter the store. 
- Avoid unlocking the door. Until the merchandise has been removed from 
the safe and placed in locked showcases and staff are ready to open for 
trade, the door should be kept locked and nobody allowed to access the 
store. 
 
• During business hours, it is suggested that jewellers and members of staff: 
 
- Be careful about unexpected deliveries. Robbers may successfully enter 
a store by posing as delivery personnel, particularly outside business hours 
or when a jeweller or staff member is alone. According to Jewellers’ 
Vigilance Canada (2000:19), robbers have impersonated letter carriers, 
package delivery drivers, delivery personnel of overnight courier services 
and telephone workers, among others. 
- Have an alert system in place. If a suspicious person is in the store, 
jewellers and staff need to have a coded signal to alert other employees 
that they believe a crime is about to be committed. A phrase containing the 
word “ruby”, for instance, may signify a state of alertness for all members 
of staff without disturbing genuine customers. 
- Always apply the “serve one customer at the time” rule. This will help 
jewellers and staff keep control over customers and avoid being distracted 
by a group of criminals. 
- Be vigilant for individuals casing the store. Many robberies are preceded 
by some kind of casing as when criminals, pretending to be customers, 
obtain as much information as possible about the store and business 
operations prior to committing a robbery. Some casing takes place 
immediately before an attack; in other situations, the process of casing is 
conducted over a period of hours, days, weeks and even longer. It is during 
the casing that alert jewellers and members of staff have an opportunity to 
spot the criminals and take appropriate steps to deter a robbery. In this 
regard, findings in Chapter 5, sections 5.2.2.7 and 5.4.2, indicated that 
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robbers often visit the store on different occasions prior to committing the 
crime. To detect casing, jewellers and members of staff need to: 
 
? Be suspicious of anyone acting in a manner not consistent with a 
regular customer’s profile. Is there something that does not look 
right? Are customers asking unusual questions? Are there odd 
groupings of people at unlikely hours? Are they just looking around 
without being interested in merchandise or prices? Are they dressed in 
a manner possibly designed to disguise their true appearance? Potential 
robbers casing the store will be interested in information such as 
opening and closing times, security systems, exits and entrances, 
location of valuable items, location of safe and vault and when the 
fewest employees are present. 
? Trust their instincts. As a rule, jewellers and staff should not neglect 
the instincts given by their first impressions.  
? Mind unusual behaviour. Jewellers and staff need to be suspicious of 
those “clients” who show visible signs of nervousness, avoid making 
eye contact, speak with an altered voice and appear to be constantly 
looking towards the entrance / exit, walls or ceiling. In this case, 
without being noticed, the emergency panic system needs to be 
activated. 
? Look for suspicious individuals or vehicles in the vicinity of the 
store, particularly when positioned for an unusual length of time with a 
direct line of sight to the store. In this case, jewellers and staff need to 
write down number plates and descriptions of individuals and vehicles, 
as well as the time and date of their observations.  
 
- Avoid actions that put them at risk, such as displaying or removing 
products from windows or showcases when the door is open or customers 
are in the store. Also, jewellers and staff should never balance their float or 
prepare a bank deposit when the same situation exists. 
- Have at least two employees on the floor at all times. The risk of armed 
robbery increases if there is only one member of staff, as this makes the 
target less threatening and more appealing to occasional criminals. 
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• When closing the store, it is suggested that jewellers and members of staff: 
 
- Watch out for suspicious “customers”, particularly those who arrive 
coincidentally at closing time. 
- Check the external environment. At the time of closing, jewellers and 
staff need to be on the look-out for suspicious persons or vehicles that can 
be seen in the immediate vicinity of the store.  
- Call security if a suspicious situation is observed. In such a case, 
jewellers and staff should lock up in the presence of security officials. It 
may also be advisable, depending on the degree of risk perceived, to ask 
security to provide an escort service.  
- Inspect the store before leaving to ensure that no one is seeking to 
conceal him/herself on the premises with the purpose of being locked 
inside. 
- Keep the door locked. Jewellers and staff should never allow non-
employees into the store after closing. 
 
• On the way back home, it is suggested that jewellers and members of staff: 
 
- Follow procedures. When returning home, the same behavioural strategies 
that have been suggested on the way to work need to be followed. 
- Be aware of possible threats when approaching home. If they arrive 
home to find suspicious persons or activities, they should not go inside but 
instead call the police or security from a cellular phone or a neighbour’s 
home. 
 
• When at home, it is important to remember that the threat of robbery continues 
outside the store. In South Africa, jewellers have been attacked by robbers at 
home and forced back to their store (Williams 1999:2). Hence the importance to 
think with a mentality of security (Zannoni 1998:88-89; Jewellers’ Vigilance 
Canada 2000:27-28). It is suggested that, while at home, jewellers and members 
of staff (particularly those who have keys to access the store and safe): 
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- Maintain a high level of alertness. If they notice any suspicious person or 
vehicles near their home, they should immediately alert the police or 
security. They also need to beware of repairmen, delivery personnel or 
general workers in the proximity of their home. When inside their home, 
jewellers need to remain vigilant, e.g. arm the perimeter alarm, check 
doors and windows and listen to unusual noises. 
- Strengthen all their security arrangements. They need to ensure that 
intruder detection and panic systems remain in good working order. A 
perimeter protection system should be installed in order to alert the 
occupants as to a potential threat. Strong locks, security gates, burglar 
proofing, effective outdoor lighting, CCTV surveillance system and dogs 
should also be an integral part of a jeweller’s security programme.  
- Beware of calls after hours, from individuals identifying themselves as 
“police or security personnel” and asking the store owner or key holder to 
come to the store for an emergency. They could be taken hostage, forced to 
open the store and robbed of high value merchandise. Therefore, it is 
necessary to always ask for identification and double check with a caller’s 
station or office for the authenticity of the call. Jewellers and staff should 
maintain an unlisted home telephone number and install a caller’s 
identification device. 
- Educate domestic staff and children to look out for suspicious people 
loitering in the neighbourhood and report them to the police. The telephone 
numbers of the police and security should be in a visible place. Domestic 
staff and children need to be told not to release information on their 
employers / parents and not to allow strangers on the property without 
permission.  
- Always check domestic staff’s references, as the threat of robbery may 
also come from within the household. 
- Always lock doors, gates and skylights and activate the alarm system 
even if they have to go just around the corner.  
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6.3.4.2.2 During the robbery 
 
If, in spite of the suggested risk reduction measures, jewellers or members of staff 
become victims of robbery, it is important for them to avoid irrational forms of 
behaviour which may seriously compromise their safety and the safety of others. 
Giving advice to a potential victim on how to react when confronted by robbers is an 
extremely sensitive issue, which cannot have easy answers. The decision to resist is, 
in general, related to the victim’s perception and assessment of the potential danger 
inherent in the situation. This usually depends on factors such as the number of 
attackers, the level of force employed or threatened, the presence or absence of a 
weapon, and the type of weapons used by the robbers. Although as indicated in 
Chapter 5, sections 5.2.2.10 and 5.3.5.1, only a small percentage of victims are 
physically assaulted, to minimise the risk for a violent reaction on the part of the 
criminals, it is suggested that, during a robbery, jewellers and members of staff 
(Zannoni 2003a: 30-31; Jewellers’ Vigilance Canada 2000:16-17): 
 
- Safeguard lives. The priority at this very moment is to safeguard one’s life 
and the lives of others, i.e. staff, customers or bystanders. 
- Avoid offering resistance and stay calm. In the event of a robbery, 
jewellers and staff need to immediately co-operate with the robbers in 
order to avoid serious or fatal injuries.  
- Refrain from disarming the robber or reaching for a concealed 
weapon. It must be assumed that the robber will shoot without hesitation. 
- Expect to be threatened. One of the robbers’ weapons is the fear they 
create by repeatedly threatening their victim(s).  
- Obey orders. Robbers want to complete their crime in the shortest 
possible time in order to avoid apprehension, that is why it is necessary to 
comply with their demands. They may turn violent if their actions are 
delayed. 
- Avoid abrupt movements, by holding their hands well in sight without 
making any sudden moves which may cause the robber(s) to react with 
violence, e.g. by trying to reach for a panic button or a firearm.  
- Avoid provocative actions. A defiant attitude or the passing of 
provocative remarks may cause a reprisal by the robbers. This behaviour 
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will only draw the criminal’s attention and seriously increase the risk of 
further victimisation 
- Activate panic system only if it is safe to do so, when the robber(s) 
cannot see them. 
- Concentrate their attention on the physical features of the robber(s). 
Features such as gender, race, age, height, weight, hair colour and style, 
eye colour and facial hair are all important. In the event of a confrontation 
by more than one robber, jewellers and staff should try and memorise the 
features of only one in particular. By doing so, they will be able to furnish 
the police with sufficient details which will help reconstruct a reliable 
identikit of the criminal(s). 
- Avoid staring at the robber(s), as this action may cause him/them to react 
violently. 
- Memorise as many particulars as possible such as, for instance, the 
presence of scars and tattoos which may, however, be part of the criminal’s 
disguising tactics. The type of clothing and items such as jewellery worn 
by the robber(s), as well as the type of weapons are also important.  
- Pay attention to the criminal’s behaviour. Bodily movements, language 
used, slang, accent and tone of voice are also important aspects which can 
help the police obtain a behavioural typology or modus operandi of the 
criminal(s), thanks to which the police may link different robberies to a 
single robber or group of robbers with a similar modus operandi. 
- Refrain from hindering the robbers’ escape, as this is a critical time 
where the possibility of injuries increases.  
- Seek cover in the event of a shoot-out. A quick police or security reaction 
may cause a shoot out with the criminals; in such a case, jewellers and staff 
need to immediately look for cover behind a counter or any object which 
may be utilised for their protection. In any event, they should throw 
themselves to the ground in order to reduce the size of their body and wrap 
their arms around the head to protect it from stray or ricocheting bullets or 
any fragment caused by them. 
- Rehearse the above procedures with all members of staff. Being 
prepared may help prevent an employee from panicking and provoking 
violence.  
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In a study which involved interviewing robbers in a dangerous, life threatening field 
research, Wright and Decker (1997:136) suggested that victims of robbery: 
 
- Immediately co-operate with the criminal(s) in order to avoid serious 
or fatal injuries. Most of the robbers said that they typically responded to 
any indication of victim’s resistance with severe violence. 
- Avoid staring at the criminal(s) during the robbery. The majority of 
robbers stated that they did not want victims to look directly at them for 
fear of being identified. 
 
6.3.4.2.3 After the robbery 
 
The period immediately after the robbery may mean the difference between a 
successful or unsuccessful investigation into the criminal event. It is suggested that 
jewellers and members of staff (Zannoni 2003a:30-31): 
 
- Avoid rushing after the robbers. There have been cases where marksmen 
have been used to kill any pursuers. 
- Approach store exit with caution. Once the robbers have left, jewellers 
and staff need to approach the exit with extreme caution in order to try and 
identify their getaway vehicle(s), escape route, the make of the vehicle(s), 
the colour, the number plate and the number of criminals on board.  
- Call the police and security and alert them with a description of the 
criminals and their getaway vehicle(s). 
- Lock the store to avoid outside interference with the crime scene. 
- Protect the crime scene to assist the police with the investigation. 
Jewellers or a designated member of staff should secure the crime scene 
according to the following SAPS guidelines (ECR South Africa 2005): 
? Alert police and medical emergency personnel (where necessary) 
without delay. 
? Close off the premises (all doors leading to the crime scene). 
? Inform police of access routes which will not interfere with the crime 
scene. 
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? Move all unauthorised people away from the crime scene. 
? Set-up inner cordon and prevent all unauthorised access. 
? Use red and white chevron tape on traffic cones, white chalk to mark 
evidence and surgical gloves for handling evidence. 
? Set-up temporary facility (outside the crime scene) to receive 
emergency and police services, take care of injured or traumatised 
people, as well as interview witnesses, etc. 
? Identify all potential witnesses and encourage them to furnish 
information, personal details and contact numbers. 
? Handle the evidence with extreme care by always protecting the 
evidence matter and, when unavoidable, by removing the evidence 
with the minimum of handling (after marking / noting the location). 
This includes injured or deceased persons. The control of videotapes 
and films is of paramount importance. Also, memorise all the locations 
touched by the robbers, so that police can trace fingerprint evidence. 
? Hand over the scene to the SAPS first member arriving on the crime 
scene; also, meet with the crime scene investigation and processing 
senior officers and explain what has been done to protect the scene.  
? Be available to assist them during this period and also to accept the 
scene back. 
? Refrain from discussing details concerning the robbery, as this can 
create confusion and lead to a misrepresentation of the events 
(jewellers and staff should only speak to the police or the head of 
security). 
? Continue to liaise with the SAPS crime scene and investigation officers 
in order to keep informed on the development of the case. 
 
- Compile a crime incident information form. After the robbery, when the 
memory of the events is still fresh, jewellers and staff need to jot down 
information pertaining to the criminal event, preferably in a specifically 
designed “Crime Incident Information Form” (see below example). They 
should always keep a copy of this form for future reference.  
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Example: Crime Incident Information Form 
PARTICULARS OF CASE 
 
Date: 
 
 
Time: 
 
 
Place: 
 
TYPE OF INCIDENT 
 
Specify (e.g. theft, fraud, robbery, suspicious 
activities, etc.) 
 
 
 
 
REPORTING MEMBER OF STAFF 
 
Full name: 
 
 
Store / Branch: 
 
 
Contact number(s): 
 
SENIOR POLICE OFFICER ATTENDING THE 
INCIDENT / SCENE 
 
Full name: 
 
 
 
Police station: 
 
 
Contact number(s): 
 
 
Case number (when available): 
 
WITNESSES 
 
1)  Full name: 
 
 
 
     Contact number(s): 
 
 
2)  Full name: 
 
 
     Contact number(s): 
 
SUSPECTS’ 
DESCRIPTION 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
Age     
Race     
Sex     
Height     
Build     
Hair Colour     
Hair Length     
Facial Hair     
Complexion     
Scars / Marks     
Clothing     
Language/s     
Type of weapon     
Other details     
VEHICLE (S)’        
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DESCRIPTION 
Make   
Model   
Colour   
Registration number   
BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF INCIDENT / MODUS OPERANDI 
 
 
INCIDENT CONTROL 
 
YES NO 
Notified manager(s)   
Notified Head Office   
Notified SAPS   
Preserved crime scene, e.g. fingerprints or objects   
Refrained from discussing incident (except with manager)   
Other actions taken (explain)  
 
 
Signature (reporting staff member) 
 
Signature (manager) 
 
 
6.3.4.3 Utilising self-protective measures 
 
Jewellers and members of staff may utilise various devices in the defence of their 
person and property during a robbery attack. It must be stressed that it is important to 
inquire regarding the legitimacy of a device prior to its purchase and utilisation (laws 
may vary from country to country).  Furthermore, it needs to be remembered that the 
device used by jewellers for their own protection may, in fact, be turned against them, 
especially if they are not adequately trained on how to use it or they are overpowered 
by the criminal(s). It is therefore necessary to assess each situation carefully and 
decide on the best course of action. The following are among the most common self 
protection measures: 
 
- Firearms can be used to stop a criminal attack in extreme cases when 
one’s life or the lives of others are in immediate danger.  In this case there 
are important aspects to be considered.  First of all it is necessary to strictly 
act in terms of the Criminal Procedure Act and Criminal Law, with 
particular reference to section 49 regulating justifiable homicide for 1st 
Schedule Offences and the law of self-defence (Maepa 2002:11-12). 
Jewellers need to remember that, while the case law remains unclear, the 
guiding principles today suggest that killing another person in order to 
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retain property is unlikely to be deemed lawful by the courts (Du Plessis 
2004:1). In fact, courts are no longer lenient on the use of firearms and one 
may well end up on the wrong side of the law for having acted outside the 
permitted scope. Various requirements must be met before the defensive 
act will be considered lawful; the criminal attack must be (Du Plessis 
2004:1): 
 
? commenced or imminent; 
? against a legally recognised interest; 
? unlawful. 
 
The action made in defence must be: 
 
? necessary to avert the attack; 
? reasonable in terms of the amount of force used; 
? directed against the attacker. 
 
Based on the above, it is clear that the law specifically rules out any action 
being taken, on the one hand, pre-emptively or, on the other, in revenge. 
Furthermore, the new Firearm Control Act which came into effect in July 
2004 introduced stricter regulations including, amongst others, background 
checks, one gun per person for self defence, compulsory competency 
training, renewal of licenses, and 21 as a minimum age to own a firearm 
(Ellis 2004:2) Research conducted in South Africa by the Institute for 
Security Studies on the impact of firearms on the outcome of a robbery 
found as follows (Hansmann 2000:24-28):    
 
? The possession of a firearm by a victim does not always favourably 
influence the outcome of a robbery for the victim and it is not 
necessarily a deterrent to a crime.  
? There are circumstances under which a firearm may assist the victims 
in not having their possession stolen, although this may be at the 
expense of an injury.  
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? In fact, an unarmed victim has a greater chance of having his/her 
possession stolen during a robbery, while an armed victim has a greater 
chance of being injured when confronted by one or more offenders.  
? The deterrence value of a firearm during a robbery cannot be 
determined against the utilisation of other types of personal protection 
system, as further research efforts are needed in this regard.   
 
According to Jewellers’ Vigilance Canada (2000:15), an analysis of the 
actions in 241 cases of homicide in the United States demonstrated that the 
risk of death or serious physical injuries to jewellers increased 
significantly if the latter tried to resist or did not co-operate fully with the 
robbers. Furthermore, any shot fired by a jeweller can end up hitting an 
innocent person inside the store, outside the front window, or even a 
considerable distance away, causing not only injury or death, but raising 
serious issues of legal liability for the jeweller. 
- Anti-robbery briefcases may be useful when transporting cash or 
valuables items such as jewellery. A siren, smoke, dye and, if required, a 
low amperage electrical shock, can be remotely set off in the event of a 
robber seizing the case. This device implies a quick action on the part of 
the victim as the criminal may be able to run out of the required range or 
throw the case into an awaiting vehicle. 
- Personal alarms can be carried on one’s belt or pocket and when activated 
will set off a loud siren which aims, on the one side, at drawing the 
public’s attention to the robbery attack and summoning help and, on the 
other, at scaring the robber off. This may be useful in public places but in 
isolated areas may in fact achieve the opposite effect, i.e. provoke the 
robber(s) into a physical attack. 
- Stun and spray guns can be used to disorient and stop an aggressor by 
either delivering a strong, high voltage but low amperage shock to his body 
or by spraying oleum capsicum (derived from peppers) directly into his 
eyes and respiratory system. To be effective, both these actions imply that 
there be either bodily contact or that the attack be carried out at a very 
close range, and this can lead to a violent reprisal on the part of the robber 
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6.3.5 Personnel-oriented strategies 
 
In some instances, in a robbery event, there may be collusion between criminals and 
dishonest members of staff. Robbers may receive information on factors such as the 
location of the safe and high value jewellery, the most suitable time for a robbery 
attack, jewellers’ habits, activities and home addresses. Information about a jeweller 
or jewellery representative exiting the store with a very valuable package containing 
precious stones or other jewellery may also be passed on. Findings in Chapter 5, 
sections 5.2.5.2, 5.2.5.3 and 5.4.5, indicated that jewellers often lack adequate risk 
reduction strategies, particularly with regard to staff selection and training. Specific 
intervention strategies focusing on personnel selection, training and morale are 
therefore important. 
 
6.3.5.1 Personnel selection  
 
In order to minimise the risk for a potentially dangerous or criminally-minded person 
to be employed, the screening of all prospective (and existing) employees is crucial to 
the well being of a company (see Chapter 5, section 5.3.7.2). This is particularly true 
for certain types of businesses where the potential for theft, fraud and collusion with 
the criminal element is high as in the case of jewellery-related activities. Due to these 
risk factors, integrity assessments are important during the selection process, their 
main purpose being the following: 
 
• Keeping unwanted people out of one’s company. 
• Assessing compatibility with job requirements by verifying all information 
provided in a curriculum vitae including qualifications, personal documents, work 
history, credit history, criminal records history, experience and skills. It is also 
wise to check for existence of any expensive habits. 
• Identifying high-risk existing employees. 
 
Polygraph examination (a test used in the detection of deception, based on the natural 
involuntary response of the human body to stressful situations, e.g. lying), has a 
useful application in pre-employment integrity screening, i.e. prior to employment of 
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staff in specific posts in order to verify critical information, e.g. qualification and 
experience. Polygraph testing should also be considered as an instrument for periodic 
honesty screening among existing members of staff. 
 
When applying the test, the following considerations are relevant (Cilliers & Martin 
2003:94-105): 
 
• The examinees must submit voluntarily and they are at liberty to terminate the 
examination at any stage, if they so choose. 
• If a candidate refuses to submit to a polygraph examination, he / she should not 
then automatically be presumed to be guilty. 
• The examinee must be mentally and physically suitable to undergo an 
examination; as an example, a person suffering from physical or mental pain or 
effects of alcohol, drugs or stress disorder are not suitable to be tested. 
• The accuracy of the test varies from 85 to 95 percent, depending on the question 
technique used, the clarity of the case facts and the competence of the 
polygraphist. 
• Polygraph examinations are not intended to provide irrefutable probative evidence 
but they can be used to assist investigators to collect probative evidence and to 
corroborate other evidence. 
• Proper polygraph procedures comply with the Constitution and Labour legislation. 
They actively promote fair labour practices and also afford innocent suspects an 
opportunity to be heard and to prove their innocence. 
• South African Trade Unions now recognise that the polygraph is a legitimate, 
accurate and positive investigative tool that can be used to eradicate crime and 
criminals from the workplace and exonerate innocent staff. 
 
According to a 2002 security survey commissioned by the Jewellery Council of South 
Africa (Security industry best practice for SA 2002:17-18), in the case of chain stores, 
general staff are strictly pre-screened, whereas in the case of independent upmarket 
jewellers, credibility built-up within the industry provide suitable reference (with no 
systematic pre-screening process). As the area of integrity assessments is particularly 
sensitive in that constitutional rights and privacy issues come to the fore, it is 
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advisable for jewellers to request the assistance of professional companies 
specialising in this field. 
 
6.3.5.2 Personnel training 
 
Employees’ involvement in security is important for a successful risk reduction 
strategy. In fact, it can be stated that well-trained and alert staff form the basis for 
good crime prevention (Home Office Crime Prevention Agency 2000; Geason & 
Wilson 1992:75-76). While findings in Chapter 5, sections 5.2.7.1 and 5.3.7.2, 
indicated that the majority of respondents agreed to the introduction of crime 
prevention training for jewellers and members of staff, the reality is that this is not 
implemented as a standard procedure. Personnel need to be trained in reducing 
opportunities for crime in a business enterprise. Such training needs to take place as 
part of the initial employee induction and, as indicated by findings in Chapter 5, 
sections 5.2.7.1, 5.3.7.2 and 5.4.7, should also be introduced at institutions training 
jewellers. The following important aspects need to be considered for the training 
programme: 
 
• Crime awareness in order to help staff develop a mentality of security. 
• Identification of specific crime risk areas. 
• Description of the criminals’ modus operandi based on the jewellery industry’s 
experience. 
• Crime intervention / reduction strategies applicable to specific types of crime 
affecting the jewellery industry. 
• Behavioural procedures to be adopted during specific crimes when prevention 
fails and members of staff are confronted with the reality of the criminal act. 
 
Furthermore, it is important for jewellers to bring their security policy to the attention 
of employees also with regard to aspects related to employee theft / fraud and the 
consequences of such actions. It is important to stress that in the field of crime 
awareness and prevention education, professionalism is of the utmost importance as 
the wellbeing of people is at stake. It is therefore essential that such training be 
conducted by accredited crime reduction specialists. 
 - 207 -
 
6.3.5.3 Creating a positive working environment 
 
Due to the danger of dissatisfied employees becoming a security risk to their 
employers, jewellers need to always strive to ensure job satisfaction among their staff. 
Factors that could lead to job dissatisfaction include, amongst others, unfair salaries, 
unfair treatment causing absence of loyalty to the company, absence of rewards for 
good performance as well as impersonal and negative attitudes towards employees 
causing hostility (Stevens 1988:216). 
 
When the above negative factors are present, employees may resort to criminal 
actions against the company, e.g. by stealing valuable items or by passing sensitive 
information to would-be robbers. Therefore, it is vital for jewellers to instill a sense of 
pride and ownership among members of staff by treating them fairly, assigning 
specific responsibilities and educating them in all aspects of security. By doing so, 
employees will develop a strong attachment to their work environment and will be 
encouraged to defend it against possible threats. At the end, the preventive value of 
loyal employees will be greater than any formal sanctions or physical preventive 
strategies imposed by management. 
 
6.3.6 Business security initiatives 
 
Businesses, police and security personnel need to closely work together towards the 
implementation of specific crime prevention / reduction initiatives. As shown in 
Chapter 5, sections 5.2.7.2, 5.3.8 and 5.4.7, most respondents were in favour of new 
initiatives contributing to the reduction of crime.   
 
The creation of a common strategy in the prevention of crime against the jewellery 
trade and industry is of the utmost importance. A successful business strategy should 
include the following: 
 
• Membership to organisations involved in initiatives such as the Consumer Goods 
Council of South Africa’s crime prevention project, which offers an excellent 
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platform for companies in the retail sector to share ideas and initiatives as well as 
join forces in the reduction of crime. 
• Close liaison between jewellery store owners, representatives of the jewellery 
trade and industry, the Jewellery Council of South Africa, insurance companies / 
brokers, and representatives of the South African Police Service and private 
security industry. 
• Regular meetings on security and crime related issues. Important for jewellers is 
the attendance of police / community forums where they can become aware of the 
crime problems affecting their area and, at the same time, meet with high-ranking 
officers or detectives from the local police station. 
• The creation of business watch systems involving a high level of co-operation 
between jewellers in a specific area, and between them, other businesses, police 
authorities and security agencies. Jewellers need to develop a neighbourhood alert 
system, passing along warnings by phone, fax or email to other retailers in the 
area. 
 
Examples of crime reduction initiatives can be offered. 
 
6.3.6.1 Database on crime and dismissed employees 
 
To aid in the selection and screening process, it is suggested that the jewellery 
industry introduce a database on jewellery related crime and dismissed employees. As 
indicated in Chapter 5, sections 5.2.7.2, 5.3.8 and 5.4.7, most respondents viewed this 
initiative in a very positive light. The database should be used to advise the jewellery 
industry on various issues such as criminal trends within the industry, statistical 
analysis, criminals’ modus operandi, as well as identification of known criminals or 
suspected individuals or vehicles by means of digitally stored photographs. Jewellers 
should be issued with a form where all relevant security incidents can be recorded and 
forwarded either by fax or on-line to the crime prevention structure for centralised 
record-keeping purposes.  
 
It is common cause that staff, once found by their company to be engaging in 
dishonest activities, more often than not move employment to another company 
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within the industry. The result is that the criminal element is not being rooted out, and 
the risk of perpetrating a crime is not that great, as employment is easily obtainable in 
the same field, where the same criminal opportunities usually exists. The proposed 
dismissed employees’ database aims at solving this problem, by providing a means 
whereby companies can discover whether the candidate they are considering has 
proven dishonest in the past. The potential benefit of not employing people who are 
known to be dishonest cannot be quantified in Rand. However, common sense 
dictates that if dishonest people are removed from the industry, crime will decrease. 
The database will have the following benefits: 
 
• To facilitate more informed employment decisions. A prospective employer 
will be able to look up a candidate’s name on the list, and the details of any 
dismissal due to dishonesty within the industry will be recorded. 
• To increase the risk of crime to the individual, by making it considerably more 
difficult to obtain employment subsequent to his/her dismissal. This should also 
act as a strong deterrent. 
 
There are a number of legal issues that need to be considered in order to ensure that 
the correct procedures/rules are in place for the database (ECR South Africa 2001): 
 
• Employee communication. The first issue is that employees need to be informed 
that they will be registered on a database should they be found guilty of a criminal 
activity, which leads to their dismissal. This should also become part of their 
contract of employment. It will be up to the individual companies to clear this 
through their particular unions. 
• Limited access. The right to access information must be restricted to participating 
members. A corollary to this limitation is that the database may not contain any 
details of the incident for which the employee has been dismissed, apart from a 
“type of incident” indicator. 
• Objective listing. Only names of employees who have been (or are going) 
through the disciplinary process may be listed. This is intended to prevent names 
being posted without there being foundation for that listing. Should an employee 
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challenge the listing, the company must be able to refer to the minutes of the 
hearing(s). 
• Not a blacklist. Blacklists, which prevent members from employing individuals 
listed, have been found to be against the Constitution. The registration of an 
individual must therefore be seen as a part of the employment process, and the 
candidate employee must be provided with an opportunity to explain his or her 
listing. 
 
6.3.6.2 Retail security schemes 
 
Various crime reduction initiatives have been introduced, both locally and 
internationally, in the retail sector which is constantly targeted by criminals. The 
“Safer on Radio” retail scheme introduced in Luton (United Kingdom), for instance, 
serves as an example of a business initiative aimed at discouraging criminal activities 
in a specific area (Luton retail radio link 2000:26). The scheme involves participating 
retailers purchasing two-way radio systems which they use to warn each other about 
shoplifters or any other criminal acts occurring in the shopping area. Meetings with 
police officers and business security departments are held monthly, so that the 
companies involved can be updated on events and get to know new techniques on 
crime prevention. Photographs of known criminals operating in the area and suspects 
are also circulated among retailers. 
 
Another example of business security initiative in South Africa introduced by Gem & 
Jewel Acceptances involved the implementation of a jewellery crime database (on-
line). Jewellers are encouraged to contact crime@gemjewel.co.za and provide a brief 
description of crimes or attempted crimes that have been committed against them, as 
well as a profile on the criminal(s) or suspect(s). This information is then forwarded 
to the SAPS Robbery Intelligence Desk and analysed by police experts with a view to 
initiate preventative and investigative actions, as well as recovery of stolen 
merchandise.  
 
Another initiative was introduced by the Consumer Goods Council of South Africa 
Crime Prevention Office which has installed a capacity of sending SMS instant alerts 
to cellular phones of members in an area where a serious security incident has 
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occurred. This will alert members of the criminals’ modus operandi and provide a 
brief description of individuals and vehicles (Consumer Goods Council of South 
Africa: Crime Prevention Programme 2005). 
 
It is necessary to state that the success of any business security initiative ultimately 
depends on the commitment of all the parties involved, i.e. business owners, staff, 
police, security and industry bodies. Without a collective effort initiatives will fail to 
achieve the desired goal, i.e. the creation of a safer and more profitable working 
environment. 
 
6.4 CONCLUSION 
 
Chapter 6 has clearly shown that, while the risk of robbery prevails no matter the type 
or robustness of the security measures adopted, jewellers and staff can go a long way 
in minimising the likelihood of this type of crime to occur.  Furthermore, they can 
also considerably reduce the chances of serious injuries and financial loss in the event 
of a robbery being committed. However, it is necessary to stress that the success of 
the suggested robbery intervention strategies is dependant on their level of integration 
and the jewellers and staff’s ability to act as a cohesive unit. Only a holistic approach 
to the problem will deliver a sustainable solution. Without a professional plan 
involving all levels of intervention, i.e. decisional, environmental, situational, 
procedural, employee and business-oriented strategies, jewellers will find it difficult 
to significantly reduce the risk of robbery victimisation. In the final chapter, further 
suggestions are presented in an attempt to provide the most effective response to the 
threat of robbery. 
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CHAPTER 7 
 
SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND SUGGESTIONS 
 
7. 1 INTRODUCTION 
 
In this chapter the project is reviewed in terms of its main goal and objectives and an 
explanation is provided as to how, through the applied research methods and 
techniques, the goals have been achieved. Answers will be provided to the actuating 
questions, which were originally formulated in Chapter 1, section 1.3, to reach the set 
objectives. 
 
To add value to the robbery intervention strategy discussed in Chapter 6, section 6.3, 
attention is also focused on specific elements of the strategy which, in the researcher’s 
opinion, represent the most appropriate solution to reduce the risk of robbery 
victimisation at jewellery stores. 
 
7.2 PROJECT REVIEW 
 
This section includes an evaluation of the work done and an assessment on whether 
the principal goal and aims of the investigation into jewellery store robbery have been 
achieved. The suitability of the methodology used to reach the immediate and 
ultimate aim of the study is also addressed. 
 
7.2.1 Research methodology 
 
The scientific methods used in this exploratory study involved a study of the existing 
literature, observations at jewellery stores, discussions with jewellers and 
knowledgeable people as well as a process of data collection by means of a 
questionnaire (directed to jewellery store owners and members of staff drawn from 
the Jewellery Council of South Africa’s database), a semi-structure interview held 
with a group of knowledgeable respondents, and a structured interview with 
victimised jewellers. Specific case studies were also compiled based on information 
obtained by the researcher. 
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While important information was gathered through the research instruments, the lack 
of existing South African literature and statistics on the subject constituted a 
considerable obstacle in the research process. Notwithstanding this deficiency, the 
methodology adopted by the researcher, together with the availability of a few 
specialised international sources such as Jewelers’ Security Alliance (USA) and 
Jewellers’ Vigilance Canada, proved sufficient in achieving the study’s main 
objectives, i.e. the exploration of jewellery store robbery as a crime phenomenon and 
the development of a comprehensive robbery intervention strategy.   
 
7.2.2 Research goal 
 
The principal goal of the study, which is the exploration of jewellery store robbery 
from a victim and intervention perspective, has been achieved. The results from the 
data collected during the investigation together with specialised literature and case 
studies, helped create a picture of this crime phenomenon. However, as indicated in 
Chapter 1, section 1.4.7, it is important to stress the fact that, due to the small number 
of respondents taking part in the project, results cannot be generalised beyond the 
research group.  
 
7.2.3 Immediate objectives of the study 
 
In this section the actuating questions, which were formulated to reach the stated 
objectives, are answered.  These answers demonstrate that the immediate aims of the 
study identified in Chapter 1, section 1.3 have been achieved.  
 
• Is armed robbery a serious phenomenon affecting jewellers? 
 
The fact that armed robbery is considered as a serious crime affecting jewellers is 
evident in Chapter 1, section 1.2 “Rationale for the research” and in the findings 
in Chapter 5, sections 5.3.2.1 and 5.4.6. Jewellery store robbery is, for the most 
part, the work of organised criminals and not of occasional robbers. This is 
evident from the following findings (Chapter 5, sections 5.2.2, 5.3.3, 5.3.4 and 
5.4.2): 
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- Both local and foreign crime syndicates appear to be behind most 
robberies. 
- Robbers are selective and usually target high value items of jewellery such 
as watches and precious stones. 
- Five or more offenders are usually involved in the robbery. 
- The crime shows evidence of careful planning. 
- Robbers often visit the stores on different occasions, posing as customers, 
before committing the crime. 
- In the majority of cases, robbers are armed with firearms, including 
automatic rifles.  
- Some jewellery store robberies have been executed by group of criminals 
acting with military precision. 
- The average loss caused to a jeweller in a very short period of time is 
considerable.  
- Generally, there is a low rate of physical violence, which is usually more 
prevalent with occasional and inexperienced robbers. 
- Jewellery store robbers need a network of fences to dispose of the stolen 
jewellery. 
 
• Do jewellery stores experience a high level of risk of robbery because of the 
nature of their activities and the type and value of the merchandise being 
stored? 
 
Due to the presence of high value merchandise, as indicated in the literature 
findings in Chapter 3, section 3.5.1, jewellery stores are considered as attractive 
targets by criminals, thus putting them at constant risk of robbery victimisation. In 
this regard, research findings in Chapter 5, sections 5.2.2.11, 5.2.2.12 and 5.4.2 
show how, on average, the merchandise stolen in a jewellery store robbery (in just 
a few minutes) may bring a considerable financial reward to the criminals. Retail 
jewellers are also relatively easy to rob due to their open door approach and, often, 
to the weakness of the implemented security measures. The merchandise 
displayed in the stores is valuable, small and easy to carry away from the scene of 
the crime inside bags or pockets (see Chapter 5, sections 5.3.2.2, 5.3.2.3 and 
5.4.4). 
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• Can a theoretical explanation be offered on the phenomenon of jewellery 
store robbery? 
 
The theoretical explanation offered in Chapter 4, focused mainly on the victim 
and the crime and not on the offender as such. Particular attention was paid to the 
opportunities generated by the physical environment (the jewellery store and its 
immediate surroundings) and individual behaviour / activities (the jewellers and 
members of staff), as well as to the criminal event, including the interaction 
between the victim and the offender. For this reason, it is suggested that further 
research activities on jewellery store robbery, directed specifically to the jewellery 
store robber, be undertaken. This will foster understanding of what motivates 
criminals into committing jewellery store robbery and their criteria for target 
selection. 
 
• Do factors such as, amongst others, geographical location, presence of escape 
routes, positioning of store, store visibility, lighting conditions and number of 
staff visible on the floor, affect the likelihood that a jewellery store will be 
robbed? 
 
Research findings in Chapter 5, section 5.2.3 and 5.4.3 seem to indicate that 
jewellery stores located in urban and suburban areas, in close proximity to main 
routes and freeway ramps are more at risk of robbery victimisation. There is 
instead no clear answer on whether factors such as good store visibility, lighting 
conditions and presence of more staff on the floor affect the likelihood of a 
jewellery store being robbed. While these factors may indeed play a role in 
deterring a robbery attack, additional research involving structured interviews 
with arrested jewellery store robbers is needed in order to understand their real 
value in robbery deterrence. This was confirmed by the interview respondents 
(section 5.3.7.1) who indicated that, once a store has been identified as a lucrative 
target, professional criminals will proceed to attack it in spite of specific 
environmental or situational conditions. 
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• Do jewellers and their staff perceive their work as being risky?  
 
Research findings in Chapter 5, sections 5.2.6, 5.3.5.2 and 5.4.6 show that 
jewellers and members of staff do feel at risk of robbery victimisation, to such an 
extent that most of them work under stress and often think of quitting their 
profession / occupation. 
 
• Can anything be done to reduce a jewellery store’s vulnerability to robbery? 
 
Chapter 5, section 5.3.7.1 offers various suggestions on the part of experts on how 
to reduce security risks in a jewellery store. In Chapters 6 and 7, the researcher 
places more emphasis on what can be done by jewellers, members of staff and 
relevant organisations regarding robbery risk reduction. Environmental, 
situational, behavioural and business-related strategies based on the research 
findings can be adopted, through an integrated approach, to reduce the risk of 
robbery victimisation. 
 
• Do jewellers and the staff employed by them have the right mentality of 
security in order to counteract the threat of robbery?  
 
Research findings in Chapter 5, sections 5.2.5, 5.3.8 and 5.4.5 show that there is 
an evident lack of robbery risk reduction programmes and pre-employment 
screening of staff on the part of jewellers. This deficiency indicates that more 
should be done by jewellers in developing a better mentality of security among all 
their staff. In a jewellery store environment, not thinking in terms of security can 
lead to a significant increase in the risk of crime victimisation.  
 
• Are their stores equipped with adequate security measures to minimise the 
risk of robbery? 
 
Research findings in Chapter 5, sections 5.2.4, 5.3.7 and 5.4.4 indicate that 
jewellers adopted a wide range of security measures in their effort to reduce the 
risk of a robbery attack. It is evident that, due to the risk factors inherent in their 
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business activity, security is a major concern for most jewellers. Being without 
adequate security measures often means the difference between succeeding or 
failing in business. However, the above findings also indicated that there were 
certain deficiencies with regard to the implementation of security systems that 
needed to be urgently addressed, e.g. the lack of physical barriers, CCTV systems 
and dedicated security response in the event of alarm activations.  
 
• What is the jewellers’ attitude in respect of crime prevention in general and 
robbery prevention in particular? 
 
Research findings in Chapter 5, sections 5.2.7, 5.3.8 and 5.4.7 indicate that the 
majority of questionnaire respondents and all interviewees have a positive attitude 
towards crime prevention and welcome specific initiatives aimed at improving the 
security situation in the jewellery retail sector. In particular, respondents favoured 
the introduction of crime prevention training at an early stage, the formation of a 
jewellery security structure and the creation of a dismissed employee database. 
 
• Are jewellers willing to make a difference and invest in new systems and 
procedures to minimise the risk of robbery and injury to themselves, their 
staff and customers? 
 
Research findings in Chapter 5, section 5.2.7, 5.3.8 and 5.4.7 proved that most 
questionnaire and all interview respondents, by giving their approval to specific 
initiatives proposed in the questionnaire by the researcher (e.g. the formation of a 
jewellery crime prevention structure and the implementation of a jewellery crime 
and dismissed employees’ database), are indeed willing to make a difference in 
their efforts to reduce the serious risk of robbery victimisation. 
 
7.2.4 Ultimate objective of the study 
 
While the real threat of robbery against jewellers requires the introduction of 
comprehensive security measures, some of these are, in practical terms, of difficult 
implementation in a retail store context. In fact, as opposed to jewellery 
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manufacturers and wholesalers who can adopt strict security measures to protect their 
businesses, retail jewellers always need to maintain a friendly environment in order 
not to discourage customers from entering their stores. Therefore, a jeweller’s 
approach to security is more complex in that it must necessarily take into account this 
need. This reasoning does not imply that jewellers should be left exposed to criminal 
threats; on the contrary, the need to balance security with the environment requires 
intelligent solutions. Without a well-planned risk reduction programme, jewellers 
would certainly run the risk of incurring heavy financial losses of such gravity that 
they might be forced out of business. 
 
The ultimate aim of the study as indicated in Chapter 1, section 1.3, has been achieved 
through the formulation of an exhaustive robbery intervention strategy based on the 
situational crime prevention model and involving six different levels of intervention, 
i.e. decisional, environmental, situational, procedural, personnel and business-oriented 
levels. In addition, section 7.3 below elaborates further on the said robbery 
intervention strategy focusing on specific risk reduction elements. 
 
7.3 THE WAY FORWARD: SUGGESTIONS 
 
In addition to all robbery intervention strategies that have been thoroughly explained 
in Chapter 6, section 6.3, the researcher believes that the suggestions given below 
represent an appropriate response to the threat of robbery against the jewellery retail 
sector. 
 
7.3.1 Jewellery industry summit 
 
An industry-wide summit should be hosted seeking to address the crime and security 
related problems affecting the industry. The summit should also prioritise the 
formation of a jewellery industry crime prevention structure as suggested by the 
researcher in section 7.3.2 below. Role players within the jewellery industry, the 
Jewellery Council of South Africa, insurance companies, security specialists and 
SAPS experts, should get together to initiate the process leading to the summit. 
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7.3.2 Jewellery industry security structure  
 
The creation of a high-level jewellery crime prevention structure is required. The 
principal purpose of the structure, which needs to feature senior representation from 
the jewellery industry, retailers and employees, will be to unify the sector’s crime 
prevention strategy and facilitate improved communication on crime and security-
related issues affecting the industry, with all parties concerned, i.e. Jewellery Council, 
industry sectors, police and security. In fact, one of the structure’s key tasks should be 
the improvement of relations with the SAPS, the National Prosecuting Authority and 
the Department of Justice.  
 
The structure needs to establish an industry-wide code of practice, setting out 
minimum standards for jewellery manufacturers, wholesalers and retailers. Important 
work already done by crime reduction specialists and insurance advisors can be used 
as a basis to implement the suggested standards. The structure also needs to seek 
common interest and experience from other industries’ crime prevention initiatives 
such as the one initiated within the Efficient Consumer Response (ECR South Africa 
2001). The Jewelers’ Security Alliance in the United States and Jewellers’ Vigilance 
Canada can also be approached for advice.  
 
The proposed Jewellery Crime Prevention Structure could be funded in different ways 
such as: 
 
• Annual subscriptions allowing participating jewellers to have access to the 
services and products offered by the structure, e.g. access to the database on 
jewellery-related crime and dismissed employees, crime risk reduction manual 
and videos. 
• Fees charged for “ad hoc” services for non-subscribers belonging to the 
industry. 
• Sponsorship received by companies in the jewellery industry, and other interested 
organisations. 
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The proposed Jewellery Crime Prevention Structure will be responsible to set up a 
database on jewellery crime and dismissed employees as discussed in Chapter 6, 
sections 6.3.6.1 and 6.3.6.2.  
 
7.3.3 Employee screening 
 
The lack of pre-employment screening on the part of jewellers is clearly an area of 
security vulnerability which needs to be addressed. It is suggested that employee 
screening be adopted as an on- going procedure involving not only candidates (pre-
employment screening) but also existing employees (post-employment screening). 
Screening procedures should include a thorough reference check on employment and 
qualification historical information, criminal and civil records and credit vetting in 
order to determine if the candidate’s profile may pose a threat to the employers. A 
post-employment screening carried out by Griffith and Associates (Employee 
screening 2004:51) for a major retail group showed that 7 percent of all employees 
who had started work with a clean record had, since commencement of employment, 
acquired criminal records for serious offences, ranging from robbery to drugs (all 
without the employer’s knowledge). Therefore, while pre-employment screening will 
help companies identify problem areas before a person starts working, post-
employment screening will assist companies in minimising the risk to which they are 
exposed over the long term. 
 
As stressed in Chapter 6, section 6.3.5.1, jewellers should utilise the services of 
reputable companies to screen employees. Consideration should be given to offering 
this type of service as an integral part of the proposed Jewellery Crime Prevention 
Structure as explained in section 7.3.2 above.  
 
7.3.4 Integrating environment, human behaviour and security 
 
Section 6.1 in Chapter 6 stressed that, in order for a robbery intervention strategy to 
be effective, jewellers should direct their efforts towards integrating environmental, 
behavioural and technological elements within their stores. In fact, manipulating the 
environment, acting on the behaviour of staff and jewellers and introducing specific 
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security systems and barriers, have the potential of going a long way in reducing the 
risk of victimisation.  
 
7.3.4.1 Environmental security 
 
In the area of environmental security, good visibility, lighting and adequate store lay 
out are important factors which, if applied correctly, can act as a deterrent against 
various crimes such as jewellery store robbery and theft. In fact, environmental 
security, which is often neglected, should be prioritised in a jeweller’s risk reduction 
programme at an early stage, i.e. preferably during the design stage prior to the 
opening of a jewellery store.  
 
7.3.4.2 Crime awareness and prevention training 
 
In the area of human behaviour emphasis needs to be given to the creation of more 
awareness among jewellers and staff, particularly on how to reduce the risks of 
victimisation, and also by giving them guidance on how to react when threatened by 
dangerous criminals. Besides the jewellers themselves who have an obvious 
responsibility in creating a safer working environment for their employees and 
customers, other parties need to contribute to raising the level of security awareness. 
For instance, it is suggested that the Jewellery Council of South Africa and jewellery 
insurance companies introduce manuals and workshops to new and existing customers 
on crime risk reduction and security-related issues. Specialised jewellery magazines 
should encourage regular article contributions from crime reduction and industry 
specialists. Furthermore, institutions training jewellers will take a step in the right 
direction by introducing crime prevention as part of their study programme. In this 
regard, attention must be drawn to the Risk Control Manual for Jewellers recently 
completed by the researcher. The manual identifies security-risk factors affecting 
jewellers and provides suggestions on how such risks can be effectively reduced from 
a practical point of view (Zannoni 2007). 
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7.3.4.3 Physical and electronic security 
 
The findings on physical and electronic security in chapter 5, section 5.2.4 and 5.4.4 
also indicated that certain improvements are needed if jewellers were to further reduce 
the risk of robbery victimisation and other criminal activities. Of particular concern, 
for instance, is the scarce utilisation of video surveillance systems linked to recording 
facilities of a digital type. Remote CCTV surveillance technology linked to a security 
control centre providing visual verification of events in a jewellery store should also 
be considered. In the event of a criminal incident, the control centre operators will be 
able to assess the situation prior to dispatching emergency reaction.   
 
The lack of physical barriers at the main entrance to a jewellery store is also cause for 
concern. At present, the implementation of specific barriers such as security gates or 
electronic security doors seems to be a reactive (after the robbery) rather than 
proactive (before the robbery) measure. Although physical barriers are usually not a 
preferred method to secure a jewellery store, the threat of robbery is such that 
jewellers need to make access into their stores more difficult to criminals.  
 
7.3.5 Retail crime intervention initiatives 
 
Because retail stores are vulnerable to various types of crime, jewellers and other 
business owners should be working closely together in order to reduce their risk of 
victimisation. While effective security measures at the store level are indispensable in 
order to increase their level of security, jewellers should not remain isolated from the 
rest of the business community. In fact, by actively co-operating in crime prevention 
schemes as discussed in Chapter 6, section 6.3.6.2, retailers stand a better chance of 
keeping criminals away from their stores, as they can: 
 
• Immediately alert each other as to suspicious activities and individuals spotted 
within a protected area. 
• Provide each other with descriptions or photographs of known or suspected retail 
criminals. 
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• Be proactive in calling out security or police at an early stage to investigate the 
above activities. 
 
To set up a retail crime prevention scheme within a specific business area, a 
committee of motivated business owners should get together and plan for the most 
suitable strategy for the area where they operate (with the assistance of a crime 
reduction specialist and the local SAPS). To be successful, the scheme needs to be 
actively advertised throughout the protected area by means of signboards placed at 
strategic positions, stickers on store windows and other conspicuous measures. By 
doing so, retailers will send a strong message to criminals that the business 
community within a specific area is standing united against crime. All localised 
incidents relevant to the jewellers’ security should then be transmitted to the 
centralised jewellery crime prevention structure as explained in section 7.3.2 above.  
 
7.3.6 Protection for shopping centres 
 
The frequency of armed robbery at jewellery stores in busy shopping centres 
necessitates that landlords and management implement target hardening measures 
aimed at deflecting this crime. In this regard, the Consumer Goods Council of South 
Africa (2007) conducted surveys at 50 shopping centres and, in consultation with 
various stakeholders, published the following best practice guidelines: 
 
• Perimeter fencing (minimum height of two metres) to be installed around the 
entire centre; clear of vegetation on both sides; illuminated by outward facing 
lighting. 
• Vehicle access / egress control to include ticket operated booms manned or 
unmanned, preferably linked to automated road teeth barriers; speed humps on 
both sides of the booms. 
• Car park lighting to provide adequate visibility to entire parking area; lights 
(preferably mercury vapour 125 watt type) to not shine towards CCTV cameras as 
they overexposed the picture. 
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• CCTV to be installed by a reputable company with sound references; digital 
technology preferable with remote off site recording or secure on site control 
room; adequate coverage of all public and high risk areas to be included. 
• Observation towers to be positioned for maximum viewing of car park. 
• Cash-in-transit (CIT) movement during peak trading hours to be avoided and, 
where possible, restricted to centre service areas isolated from public areas. 
• Shopping centre security service providers including car guards to be: PSIRA 
registered; vetted for criminal records; in an identifiable and suitable uniform; in 
direct contact with their company; issued with adequate equipment such as 
portable two way radios, panic alarms linked to armed response, torches, 
handcuffs and self defence equipment; issued with Standing Operational 
Procedures and all applicable documentation; supervised during day and night 
shift duties. 
• Customer reporting facilities to be included in order to encourage customers and 
tenants to report all incidents to shopping centre security; all security incidents to 
be recorded. 
• Emergency planning to be formulated through tenants meetings. 
 
In the researcher’s opinion, there seems to be a tendency on the part of management 
to deploy most security resources on the inside of a shopping centre, thus neglecting 
the external areas. It is of the utmost importance for security personnel to spot 
suspicious activities at an early stage, when the offenders are still outside. For this 
reason, trained security officers need to be deployed at strategic external positions. 
 
7.3.7 Further research activities 
 
As indicated in various findings in Chapter 5, sections 5.2.4.2 and 5.2.5.1, the 
researcher recommends that further studies into jewellery-related crime be conducted. 
In particular, jewellery store robbery should also be approached from a robber’s 
perspective. This is necessary to understand what triggers criminals into committing 
 - 225 -
jewellery store robbery, and most importantly what acts as a deterrent in their decision 
not to carry out a robbery against a store. Furthermore, robbery against travelling 
jewellery representatives and other criminal activities against jewellers such as theft, 
burglary and fraud should be investigated for a comprehensive risk reduction strategy 
to be developed. 
 
7.4 CONCLUSION 
 
Based on the findings of this study, it is clear that armed robbery is a real threat to 
jewellers, not only because of its potential for violence, but also due to the fact that a 
single criminal event may cause significant financial losses, and even force a business 
to close. While it is of the utmost importance for all jewellers to implement a well 
planned robbery intervention strategy at store level, the reality is that, as suggested in 
Chapter 5, section 5.3.8, only a collective effort on a much larger scale involving the 
jewellery industry as a whole, can bring about the necessary conditions to effectively 
reduce the risk of robbery victimisation.   
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APPENDIX “B” 
 
SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEW SCHEDULE ON JEWELLERY STORE 
ROBBERY 
 
Name:  _____________________________ 
 
Company: _____________________________ 
 
Date:  _____________________________ 
 
Time:  from___________ to____________ 
 
Venue:  ______________________________ 
 
 
A)  INTERVIEWEES’ PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE 
 
A1) What is your position at work? 
______________________________________________________
______________________________________________________ 
 
A2) Kindly tell us about your professional experience in your field of work. 
____________________________________________________________________ 
______________________________________________________ 
 
B)  PERCEPTION ON JEWELLERY STORE ROBBERY 
 
B1) Do you consider armed robberies at jewellery retail stores as a serious crime problem 
 affecting jewellers? 
____________________________________________________________________ 
______________________________________________________ 
 
B2) Do you perceive jewellery store robbery as being stable, on an upward or downward 
 trend? 
____________________________________________________________________ 
______________________________________________________ 
 
B3) Can you explain the recent upsurge in jewellery store robberies? 
____________________________________________________________________ 
______________________________________________________ 
 
C)  THE JEWELLERY STORE ROBBER 
 
 
C1) Are robberies conducted by local criminal groups or is there an involvement of 
 international organised crime? 
____________________________________________________________________ 
______________________________________________________ 
 
C2) Do the robbers target specific items of jewellery or do they steal jewellery at random?  
____________________________________________________________________ 
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______________________________________________________ 
 
C3) Are jewellery store robbers professional or opportunists? 
____________________________________________________________________ 
______________________________________________________ 
 
C4) Are they planning the robbery over a period of time or acting on an available 
 opportunity? 
____________________________________________________________________ 
______________________________________________________ 
 
D)  PARTICULARS OF JEWELLERY STORE ROBBERY 
 
 
D1) Are robbers acting individually, in small or large groups? 
____________________________________________________________________ 
______________________________________________________ 
 
D2) How do they gain access to the store to commit the robbery? 
____________________________________________________________________ 
______________________________________________________ 
 
D3)  Do they use any disguise? 
____________________________________________________________________ 
______________________________________________________ 
 
D4) What type of weapons do they carry? 
____________________________________________________________________ 
______________________________________________________ 
 
D5) What valuables are mostly targeted? 
____________________________________________________________________ 
______________________________________________________ 
 
D6) How long do the criminals usually take to complete the robbery? 
____________________________________________________________________ 
______________________________________________________ 
 
 
E) THE VICTIM OF JEWELLERY STORE ROBBERY 
 
E1) Do robbers usually inflict violence on the victims? 
____________________________________________________________________ 
______________________________________________________ 
 
 
E2) Does the threat of robbery affect the psychological well-being of jewellers and 
 members of staff? 
____________________________________________________________________ 
______________________________________________________ 
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E3 If so, in what way is their psychological condition affected? 
____________________________________________________________________ 
______________________________________________________ 
 
F) THE AFTERMATH OF JEWELLERY STORE ROBBERY 
 
F1) How do robbers dispose of the stolen jewellery? 
____________________________________________________________________ 
______________________________________________________ 
 
F2) Are the police successful in apprehending jewellery store robbers? 
____________________________________________________________________ 
______________________________________________________ 
 
F3) Is the stolen jewellery recovered during an investigation? 
____________________________________________________________________ 
______________________________________________________ 
 
G) SECURITY RISK REDUCTION  
 
G1) Beside the standard security measures, which are commonly adopted by jewellers to 
 reduce the risk of robbery, is there any new system /measure that jewellers have 
 recently adopted? 
____________________________________________________________________ 
______________________________________________________ 
 
G2) What do you consider as the most effective measure(s) to deter a robbery? 
____________________________________________________________________ 
______________________________________________________ 
 
G3) Do you think that there should be a strict access control at jewellery stores on the 
 same basis as, for instance, the systems in place at financial institutions? 
____________________________________________________________________ 
______________________________________________________ 
 
G4) Do jewellers, as part of their internal security policy, regularly employ risk reduction 
 measures such as:  
 
 i) employee screening prior to employment? 
____________________________________________________________________ 
______________________________________________________ 
 
 ii) staff crime prevention training? 
____________________________________________________________________ 
______________________________________________________ 
 
G5) Is adequate insurance coverage a must for all jewellers to survive in business? 
____________________________________________________________________ 
______________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
 - 241 -
F) JEWELLERY STORE ROBBERY PREVENTION INITIATIVES 
 
F1) Should crime prevention training by experts be an integral part of staff general 
 training? 
____________________________________________________________________ 
______________________________________________________ 
 
F2) Do you think that crime prevention training should be introduced as part of the study 
 programme at jewellery schools? 
____________________________________________________________________ 
______________________________________________________ 
 
F3) Would you agree to the formation of a jewellery security body and a dismissed 
 employees database? 
____________________________________________________________________ 
______________________________________________________ 
 
F4) What should, in your opinion be the way forward to get all relevant parties involved 
 in tackling the problem of robbery at jewellery stores and, in general, all forms of 
 crime affecting the jewellery retail sector? 
____________________________________________________________________ 
_____________________________________________________ 
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APPENDIX “D”  
